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Objectives of the research 
 
The aim of this study was to examine the effects of institutional constraints to Finnish 
ICT companies in sub-Saharan Africa. To be more specific, the aim was to investigate 
using institutional theory, what kind of difficulties and challenges Finnish companies 
come across when penetrating sub-Saharan African markets. Attention was paid on 
contextual factors which affect entry decisions of Finnish companies. The another aim 
was to investigate how companies see and react to pressures arising from local 
institutional environment and how these companies are able to achieve legitimacy in 
turbulent markets of SSA. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
In this study qualitative research approach was applied. The method of this study was 
multi-case study, and the case companies were Omnitele, Jutel, Tramigo and SANAKO. 
Each of these case companies represented one example country of the study. The empiric 
part included six in-depth interviews which were recorded and analyzed in the light of the 
research problem. These in-depth interviews followed a constructionist interview 
research approach. All these six interviews were conducted between November 2008 and 
January 2009. 
 
Findings and conclusions 
 
The findings of this study indicate that foreign entrants tend to use in-direct modes of 
entry in sub-Saharan Africa and that importance of local partner or outside consultancy is 
extremely relevant. Findings also suggest that different institutional constraints affect 
foreign companies differently and that case companies were either defying or 
compromising with the institutional pressures of local market environments. As for 
establishing legitimacy of the company in sub-Saharan African markets, competent 
products and good personal relations can be seen as factors mostly affecting legitimacy in 
the region. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
 
Africa is often described as a lost continent, the continent that has been deeply 
damaged by wars, famines and deadly diseases and plagued by tremendous poverty. 
Western media often emphasizes the negative side of Africa and only occasionally 
does positive news come out from Africa. My personal interest towards this topic 
arose when I was doing my six months traineeship in Kenya; I was able to witness 
great optimism among the people everywhere I traveled in East Africa. During my 
journey I saw tremendous potential in the continent. During the same journey I also 
witnessed and experienced the post-election crisis in Kenya when the country was at 
the very edge of civil war in December 2007–February 2008.  
 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) consists of 45 different countries which are presented at 
the end of this section. Current growth in Sub-Saharan African countries has over the 
past four years been more promising than in the last three decades. In 2007 the growth 
was about 6.5%; IMF predicts that in 2008 the growth rate will be the same. At the 
same time the growth in the EU was 2.7%. It seems that despite immense challenges 
Sub-Saharan Africa might become anew hot spot for economic growth. Naturally this 
creates opportunities as well challenges for Finnish companies, which is why this 
research has been conducted. 
 
While many European and US companies have casted their eyes to Asia, Africa has 
attracted less attention. However, countries like China have invested billions in Sub-
Saharan Africa that is home for over 770 million people, which makes 10% of the 
global population. Demographically it is one of the fastest expanding markets in the 
world. Sub-Saharan Africa is notably rich with natural resources that are to a great 
extent still unexploited. For example China needs Africa’s energy and resources and 
has clearly identified huge prospects in the continent that other countries have 
neglected. 
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This research is topical in many ways. To begin with, Finland has a long history in 
Africa where the first Finnish missionaries positioned already in the 19th century. 
Finnish government has been aiding various African nations since their early 
independence in the 1960s and actively supporting development of Africa. Despite 
this activity, Finland’s trade with Sub-Saharan African nations is very small-scale 
business. Despite the tremendous potential in SSA markets there are clearly a lot of 
constraints and challenges which can be considered as a reason to cut down Finnish 
economic involvement in SSA. Furthermore, it is commonly known that it has been 
estimated that in the future aid to developing countries will be more and more trade-
related than direct monetary aid. Trade-related aid potential could be one of Finland’s 
niches. 
 
Despite the immense business potential in the SSA area, business general market 
environment is still challenging and risky. The SSA countries are still deeply affected 
by poverty and weak infrastructure. Nevertheless, institutional environment and the 
performance of African business practices are often not clearly understood.  In SSA 
lack of proper market institutions add additional challenges and constraints which 
have to be taken into consideration while conducting business in SSA or while 
considering market entry to the area. To study those companies that are already active 
in SSA or have experience in the region could provide important knowledge on how 
to tackle environmental forces and to assess business potential prevailing in the area. 
 
This research was conducted based on my own genuine interest. There are few recent 
studies analyzing macro environment and assessing challenges and risks of Sub-
Saharan Africa from Finnish company perspective. This gap in research makes this 
study valuable and important to conduct. In addition, it also seems that academic 
research is less rapid than general growth in Africa. The topic of this study is partly 
new and has not been studied as widely as it should have been. Due to this fact it has 
been difficult to find new and relevant information. However, multiple and alternative 
information sources are used in this study. 
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Figure 1 Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
1.2 Research gap 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa has been widely studied in development economics that deals for 
instance with methods of promoting economic growth and structural change in low-
income countries. In many researches (Goldsmith (1998), Ndulu and O’Connell 
(1999) and Masanjala and Papageorgion (2004)) Sub-Saharan Africa is examined 
from a historical perspective and authors concentrate on emphasizing defects of 
African states and giving recommendations which sub-African states should 
implement in order to gain economic growth. Many researches focusing on sub-
Saharan Africa suffer from overgeneralization. After all, there are great differences 
between different countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
There is vital need for research that identifies what it takes for the companies to be 
successful in the SSA markets and how the institutional environment affects that 
challenge. This study concentrates on institutional constraints to market entry 
strategies in Sub-Saharan Africa. The study seeks to avoid the problem of 
overgeneralization, and therefore example countries were selected in the empirical 
part and then analyzed how well these examples describe a whole region. 
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Macro-environmental forces are acknowledged to be an important determinant of 
strategy selection in international marketing (Nwankwo, 2000). Much of the theory of 
foreign market entry strategies has earlier been based on transaction theories while 
currently institutional context has been put increasing focus on (Brouthers, 2002). In 
complex environments, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, the significance of contextual 
factors could not be enough emphasized. Concerning different entry-mode choices 
institutional structure can provide barriers to entry such as legal restrictions on 
ownership (North, 1990). These legal restrictions can be seen as formal restrictions, 
but informal restrictions do exist as well because different interpretations might occur 
among authorities regarding how they regard legislation (Karhunen, 2002). The 
institutional environment affects companies and their market entry strategies in 
different ways because one can understand that each institutional constraint affects 
foreign entrants differently, even in cases when existence of all constraints is not 
noticed by firms’ executives. 
 
There have been previous studies (see Habiyakare and Tornroos, 2007) of Finnish 
companies’ market entry strategies in SSA area, but they have been concentrating 
only on South Africa and have not applied an institutional approach to their studies. 
Therefore there is a clear gap in this research because there have been no previous 
researches available that link institutional constraints of Sub-Saharan Africa to 
Finnish companies and to their entry strategies and that apply the institutional 
approach. The company perspective has clearly been neglected in many researches 
which concentrate on Sub-Saharan Africa (Nwankwo, 2000). Concentration on 
specific industry will even further crystallize the existence of the research gap. 
 
1.3 Research problem 
 
The aim of this study is to clarify and analyze what kind of effects institutional 
environment exerts on Finnish companies in SSA. Therefore my research problem is 
“How do formal and informal constraints of institutional framework affect entry 
strategies of Finnish companies operating in Sub-Saharan Africa”. Both micro- and 
macro-level information will be included in this review in order to increase scientific 
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validity of the research. Due to the huge size of Sub-Saharan Africa, only some 
example countries are picked to this research and analyzed in the empirical part. To 
avoid overgeneralization, I will narrow down the scope to ICT companies. In this 
study, the focus is on Finnish companies since the study is made in Finland, but most 
likely information yielding from these companies may partially be applied to other 
foreign companies, too. 
 
1.4 Research objectives and questions 
 
The first objective of this study is to gain understanding of contextual factors which 
affect entry decisions of Finnish companies penetrating to the SSA region.  The 
second purpose is to find information on how companies see and react to those 
factors, AND finally to provide information describing how competitiveness and 
legitimacy is achieved in turbulent markets of SSA and provide answers to ease 
attempts of Finnish companies to benefit from the economic growth of SSA. Thereby 
a more general objective concerning this study is to gain reliable and critical 
information on the topic.  
 
The research problem is divided into three research questions which are the following: 
 
1. What are the challenges and pressures which Finnish companies come across in 
SSA? 
2. How do Finnish companies respond strategically in order to cope with pressures of 
the turbulent market environment of SSA? 
3. What kind of organizational capabilities and strategies might be demanded from the 
company to overcome different constraints and gain legitimacy in the market area? 
 
1.5 Contribution to international business   
 
It has been a hallmark finding in the international business literature that companies 
must adapt their strategies to the host country environment (Meyer, 2001). Institutions 
have a great meaning to any economy, because they either facilitate or hamper 
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business. It is important then to gain deeper knowledge of how institutions affect 
business in SSA. The Finnish perspective is also important not only because it is a 
new a potential market area, but also because it provides information on how 
companies from small countries are able to compete in highly complex market areas. 
 
1.6 Sub-Saharan Africa as research context 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa, briefly SSA, is a widely used term to describe the part of Africa 
that has also been referred to as Black Africa. SSA is used to describe this area in 
geographical studies and reports, but is widely used to define this area in different 
economic reports such as the IMF’s or The World Bank’s reports. In addition, many 
private facets use SSA to distinguish this region. This study aims at explaining how 
the institutional environment affects companies in this area. In this part of the study, 
SSA is seen as a unified region to be scrutinized. In addition, information dealing with 
developing countries can in many cases be extended to provide answers to this SSA 
context, because SSA countries are some of the least developed in the world and 
unlike countries such China or Brazil can unarguably be stated to belong to the 
category of developing countries. Therefore, in this part of the study, SSA will be 
concentrated on as a whole. In further parts of the study, particular case examples are 
scrutinized in order in order to gain more profound understanding of challenges 
Finnish companies face in SSA. 
 
1.7 Where is Sub-Saharan Africa now? Is it as bad as it looks like? 
 
In many studies of global economic institutions and private institutions, scholars have 
emphasized the poor results of African development and growth                              
(Goldsmith, 1998; Collier and Gunning, 1999; Easterly and Levine, 1997). According 
to Artadi and Sala-i-Martin (2003), Africa’s growth performance is the worst 
economic disaster of the 20th century. All these authors state that despite the enormous 
hopes and opportunities Africa has done worse than it should have.  These authors 
reflect the common pessimism which relates to economic growth of Africa. Growth 
has been undoubtedly weaker than in other economic regions, especially when GDP 
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or GNP per capita indicators are used to analyze economic development. A common 
feature of latter studies is that they indicate that poor growth performance is evident 
also in the future unless some radical changes will take place in macro-environment 
and institutions and deep economic problems of SSA can be overcome only if IMF 
and World Bank policy recommendations are successfully implemented.  
 
Artadi and Sala-i-Martin correctly emphasize the human aspect of economic 
development in SSA. The authors point out that although some development has been 
seen, GDP capita has remained at zero levels in many of the very poorest countries in 
SSA. Artadi and Sala-i-Martin state that between the years 1975 and 2000 the number 
of Africa’s poor has risen from less than 140 million to over 360 million. Commonly 
in almost every Sub-Saharan nation the rich have remained rich or become even 
wealthier while the poor have become even worse off (Artadi and Sala-i-Martin 
2003).  
 
Undisputable poverty is a tremendous problem in SSA and the number of the poor 
might actually be even higher than estimated. World Bank economist Branko 
Milanovic (2008) states that the number of the poor in the world is much higher than 
estimated earlier because of inadequate measuring and outdated price levels. 
Milanovic states that rich and poor countries should be measured equally by 
comparing price levels in different countries, because ultimately a haircut or a loaf of 
bread is exactly the same product or service regardless of where it is produced. The 
income levels are often measured in money but not in purchase power which is a more 
accurate way of measuring poverty. The main statement of Milanovic’s study is that 
global poverty seems to be growing instead of shrinking. This shows that 
globalization ultimately increases poverty and misery instead of decreasing it as 
considered before.   
 
Dramatic poverty is often mentioned as the first indication when SSA is discussed. 
Although poverty is widespread in SSA, it does not mean that Africa is not growing 
nor does it mean that there are no opportunities outside the humanitarian industry for 
foreign actors. Above all, even if poverty is increasing not only in SSA, but all over 
the world – it can occur as only a short-time phenomenon. 
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Past economic performance in SSA 
 
Before going to the current economic situation of SSA it is important to take a small 
glimpse at history in order to better understand growth in SSA.  In 1975–2005, the 
GDP per capita growth (PPP) was 0.70%, while it in 1995–2005 was 1.88%. During 
accelerating growth periods the region grew 3.6%, but shrank -2.7% during periods of 
growth collapses (Arbache and Page, 2007). The region grew fast in the sixties, but 
declined in 1973–74 during the OPEC oil prices shock and then stagnated or fell from 
the late 1970s to the early 1990s (Arbache and Page). The period of stagnation 
resulted from multiple reasons such as wars and famines, bad economic policies such 
as socialistic policies or central planning in Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania, Burkina 
Faso, Ghana, Ethiopia and Namibia. A negative view of Africa which is also related 
to the concept of Afro-pessimism is likely a result of the years of stagnation and bad 
economic policies.   
 
Small growth numbers of SSA might be delusional, especially when the region is put 
to same context with other emerging economies, for example East Asian or Eastern 
European countries. Masanjala and Papageorgion (2004) found that African countries 
actually do grow differently from other countries. This founding was already backed 
before by Easterly and Levine (1997) who found that, conventional factors of growth 
(such as labor, physical and human capital accumulation) do not fully explain the bad 
results of sub-Saharan Africa’s growth.  
 
Masanjala and Papageorgion (2005) present four variables that have particularly 
affected SSA’s dismal growth: the fraction of GDP in mining, the fraction of primary 
commodities in exports, years of economically open revolutions and coups, and 
investment. The authors explain that most of the mining economies in the world are 
located in SSA and in many countries mining has a significant fraction of both GDP 
and exports. Africa has not only been more closed than rest of the world, but has also 
suffered from constant coups and revolutions which explain bad growth results.  
 
In a further study of Masanjala and Papageorgion (2005), the authors reveal that the 
legacy of colonialism has also negatively affected Africa’s growth performance, 
because the independence from former colonial masters had left the countries in the 
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middle of social, tribal and economic difficulties. Some other reasons why Africa 
might grow differently are peculiar geography and geographical determinants, high 
malaria prevalence and HIV/AIDS. In addition, there are two other possible 
explanations for poor longer-term growth for Africa: inadequate education and poor 
health standards. (Johnson, et al. 2007). 
 
 Volatile growth in different African states has been a common characteristic between 
them, but this has happened in some cases during different time periods (Arbache and 
Page, 2007). While some countries have grown, others have declined and vice versa.  
Arbache and Page emphasize that the growth process in Africa may be erratic, and 
that past growth does not predict future growth. This statement reveals the actual fact 
that even though SSA has done more badly in terms of economic development than 
other developing countries, SSA has a chance to arise from poverty to future success.  
 
Current economic situation of SSA 
 
Although real GDP growth in SSA has been a disappointment in the past – it is 
important to understand that historical data of past growth is not an adequate indicator 
to measure future growth. Even if information of economic history and peculiarity of 
SSA helps to identify future challenges and indicate possible trends, it does not help 
to identify the figures of future growth.  
 
Some recent academic writings suggest that Africa might be at the turning point after 
decades of low growth figures (Ndulu 2006; Commission for Africa 2008). The 
current growth is around 6% per year. But it is important to understand that this 
growth figure has been affected by Nigeria and South Africa, whose economies are 
the biggest in SSA. For example Nigeria’s economy (166778; IMF) was over 40 times 
bigger than that of Niger (4174; IMF).   
 
The picture below presents the economic growth in 2007 in the world and shows that 
SSA is growing at the same pace as regions in Asia and Latin-America.  
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Figure 2 Real GDP growth of the world 
Source: CIA Factbook, 2008. 
 
The fastest growing countries in SSA are Angola (16.30%), Sudan (12.80%), 
Equatorial Guinea (12.70%), Ethiopia (9.80%) and Liberia (8.50%). These high 
figures can be explained by the rate of increased oil exports and high oil price, 
whereas Liberia has grown faster because of the recently ended civil war. If we take a 
glimpse at Real GDP growth, a steady over 5% growth for the last five years has 
occurred in Botswana (5.76%) and Mozambique (5.46%). In addition, other high 
positive growth countries are Nigeria, Namibia, South Africa, Ghana, Tanzania, 
Burkina Faso and Gambia. These countries have done exceptionally well in 
comparison with their rapid population growth and high level of inflation (IMF, 
2008).  
 
Although SSA countries lag behind in many ways, many of those countries are 
improving their market environments for foreign actors and undertaking serious 
reforms to maintain future growth. Nwankwo and Richards (2004) argue that although 
the pace of change varies from country to country in SSA one is able to identify a few 
general directions of change. To quote directly from Nwankwo and Richards, the 
main six patterns of change in Sub-Saharan Africa are the following: 
• a change from a state-dominated economic order towards market-based 
economic system; 
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• a change in the political systems, that is, a considerable move away from 
systems dominated by one-party and military structures to some sort of multi-
party, popular democratic arrangements; 
• a shift from conflicts and strife to political reconciliation and social 
rehabilitation; 
• a change in geo-demographics – a move away from “nationalistic 
introversion”(i.e. intolerance of other nationals) to greater cross-culture and 
cross-border mobility of labor and capital; 
• a gradual shift from donor-led development assistance strategy to country- 
“owning” and directing development agenda; and 
• a departure from the dependency/self-reliance approach of immediate post-
independence initiatives (author’s quote Owusu;2003) – a realization that 
Africa cannot shield itself from globalization without risking further 
marginalization 
(Nwankwo and Richards, 2004:112-13). 
 
1.8 Characteristics of SSA business environment  
 
Even though there is progressive change towards a more liberal market in SSA, there 
are some distinct characteristics in SSA business environment that distinguishes it 
from business environments in advanced countries. Some of the characteristics are 
similar everywhere in developing countries, and some are distinctively African. Some 
of the main characteristics are presented and briefly discussed below. 
 
Different market structure 
 
The market structure of SSA and different features of this structure differ greatly from 
market structures in advanced markets. According to Kinsey (1990:40–44), the reason 
for this is that the demand and supply conditions are very different. Kinsey states that 
a potentially high demand resulting from a growing population is reduced due to low 
income levels, poverty, poor health, low savings and cultural lifestyles. Kinsey 
continues that demand can be further reduced due to poor credit, high interest rates, 
poor distribution and infrastructure and storage. Cavusgil and Ghauri (1990:42) state 
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that domestic Third World markets are generally characterized by a seller’s market 
and a concentrated market. It means that individual customer concerns are not crucial 
in consumer goods and that most personal selling strategies require modification 
(Kinsey. 1990:45).  The latter is due to high government involvement.  
 
Although there are relatively developed private markets in some SSA countries such 
as in South Africa, Kenya, Côte-d’Ivoire and Botswana, most of them are still far 
from market economies. According to Cavusgil and Ghauri, this is the fact because 
domestic markets in developing countries are small in terms of purchasing power and 
absolute size that ultimately leads to natural monopolies, for instance small markets 
would decrease interests of foreign companies to penetrate into the country. However, 
there are other reasons behind natural monopolies than the small size of domestic 
markets, such as legislation and regulation.    
 
Dualism 
 
Dualism refers to the issue of existing dual markets. There are the rich urban market 
and the poor rural market; basically these markets work in a parallel way, but are 
attached to each other so that different products are traded between rural and urban 
areas (Kinsey, 1988:40). According to Kinsey (1988:41), dualism exists also on other 
levels; for example, within urban centers different market structures exist between the 
modern affluent sector and the inhabitants of the slums and the shanty towns.  
Dualism can be witnessed also in the retailing sector where in big cities there are 
special retail shops for middle and upper classes and elsewhere all retailing may go 
through one general store (Kinsey, 1988:41). 
 
The informal sector is one distinctive feature of dualist markets. According to 
Nwankwo (2000), the informal sector plays a key role in economic activities and in 
the marketing system at large in Africa by distributing goods and services and being a 
big source of employment. Jamison (2003) notes that the informal sector is 
characterized by a lack of official or governmental sanction and/or control of the 
activities of informal market participants. Due to the informal sector African 
economies often look smaller than they actually are which can lead to false 
assumptions of the market characteristics (Jamison).   
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Marketers of foreign companies should not neglect understanding informal marketing 
channels, because they play a crucial role in distribution in SSA (Jamison). Nwankwo 
argues that particularly firms in the fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) should not 
neglect the role of the informal sector in reaching far-flung markets. Informal 
marketing channels can be difficult to manage, which is important because informal 
marketers participate in marketing in the same way as formal marketers do. However, 
informal marketers do not necessarily support overall marketing strategies or 
marketing communication, because informal marketers do not receive formal support 
from the company which for example might ultimately negatively affect the 
positioning of the product (Jamison).  Jamison notes that particularly this can be the 
case with brand products which can be difficult to position in the markets because 
informal marketers often lack long-term commitment and are driven by short-term 
interests. 
 
Corruption and rent seeking 
 
Blatant corruption and mismanagement are certainly tremendous problems in SSA 
where most corruption is “rule in the system”. Huge natural resources, a history of 
autocratic and unaccountable governments and conflict and crisis throughout the 
continent have negatively affected governance and fight against corruption 
(http://www.transparency.org/regional_pages/africa_middle_east/about/africa). 
Nigeria, Guinea, DRC and Kenya, to name a few, are famous examples of corrupt 
countries but there are many more. According to Transparency International (2008): 
“Out of 47 countries reviewed, 30 scored below 3 indicating that corruption is 
perceived as rampant there and 14 scored between 3 and 5 indicating that corruption 
is perceived as a serious challenge by country experts and businessmen. Only 
Botswana, Cape Verde and Mauritius are above the level of 5”. 
  
According to Rodriguez et al. (2005), corruption has two different features: 
pervasiveness and arbitrariness. Arbitrariness refers to a firm’s likelihood of 
encountering corruption in its normal interactions with state officials (Rodriguez et 
al.). Transparency.org measures pervasiveness of corruption, but corruption varies by 
more than just the degree to which it engages firms (Rodriguez et al.). Corruption can 
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be associated with varying degrees of uncertainty that is arbitrary corruption. 
Arbitrary corruption occurs where laws and informal policies may be subject to 
capricious and varied interpretation (Alhstrom and Bruton, 2001). 
 
Coolidge and Rose-Ackerman (1997) state that corruption at the top government is a 
major reason for weak institutions in Africa. Mbaku (1996) argues that in Africa, rent 
seeking is prevalent among bureaucrats and entrepreneurs. Mbaku reveals that where 
government imposes severe risk or cost on a business, the entrepreneur is able to 
minimize the cost by paying bribes to a member of the enforcement community. Due 
to weak institutions government has in many cases unlimited power to intervene in 
private exchange. Consequently, corruption is mainly rent-seeking behavior which is 
directly linked to the level and extent of government activity in the economy 
(Mbaku). The more influence government has on economy the more corruption 
occurs in the economy. 
 
Business networks 
 
The role of business networks is often more important in economies where the 
business environment is not fully developed or is in a transitional phase. For example 
in China and Russia the role of business networks has been important in order to get 
access to resources and knowledge which would otherwise be impossible due to 
institutional constraints (Michailova and Worm, 2003). Consequently, networks ease 
companies to perform in harsh and/or underdeveloped environments. This is because 
relationship-based commerce will prevail where rule-based markets cannot flourish 
due to institutional deficiencies. 
 
According to Fafchamps (1999), business networks are essential in Africa also 
because they facilitate business transactions and play a variety of functions. McDade 
and Spring (2005) state that entrepreneurial networks do not only exist within one 
country but are significant also in cross-border trade in SSA. Fafchamps states that the 
main role of networks is to create trust, which in a way acts as a substitute for the 
security provided by costless legal enforcement. He continues by pointing out that a 
relationship-based network is expected to arise in markets where screening costs are 
high and where potential abuse is a threat leading to a situation where personal trust is 
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substitute to external enforcement. In that context a legal system is often incapable of 
providing sufficient protection against opportunistic breach of contract (Fafchamps).  
 
Fachamps argues that trust is based on a history of successful changes which also 
leads to a person’s trustworthiness and reputation in the network. Relationships are 
also beneficial because they can help economize on search cost by getting access to 
information which would otherwise be difficult to achieve (Fafchamps). Personal 
relationships and contacts are clearly important in SSA, but Fafchamps argues that 
entry into an existing network is biased since many networks are based on exclusion 
of “outsiders”. Nevertheless, Fafchamps states that outsiders are able to gain 
acceptance in the business community, but it takes time because new-comers are 
“tested” first. There is therefore clear a similarity between Guanxi and Blat networks 
where long-term commitment is desired from a new-comer. Fafchamps also 
recognizes the importance of social interacting in entering and maintaining networks. 
This indicates that also foreign entrant firms can utilize local networks and ease the 
penetration to the markets. 
 
High costs  
 
Shelley (2004:pp.18) states that even though return on investments can be higher in 
Africa than in other parts of the developing  world, one should bear in mind that costs 
and risks are far higher, too. Shelley emphasizes that although production costs are 
low in most of Africa, productivity is also low. This is also due to poor infrastructure 
which has immediate effects on production costs. Furthermore, office rents, telephone 
charges etc. can be as expensive in Africa as they are in Europe. Tax rates are higher 
in Sub-Saharan Africa than in any other region in the world: almost 67% of the profits 
are used on tax payments (see appendices.). Costs can also always occur to be higher 
than evaluated. Jackson (2004:57) quotes one Western managing director positioned 
in Cameroon who describes that the economy in Cameroon is severely under the 
control of the IMF and the World Bank, which has led to a situation where 
government tries to collect more taxes from the companies they know will pay rather 
than widening the tax base. He also mentions that those with contacts in government 
can deal with that kind of problems in a pragmatic way (bribing). This is directly 
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linked to weak tax collection in Africa which can therefore have negative affects on 
foreign companies. 
 
HIV/AIDS 
 
Last but not least, the severe HIV situation characterizes SSA market environments. 
The HIV/AIDS pandemic varies from country to country, but it has been estimated 
that in 2007, over 22 million people were infected with AIDS in SSA, which is 
roughly two thirds of the number of infected people in the world (UNAIDS).  
HIV/AIDS has a profound impact on economic growth by affecting productivity 
growth, accumulation of population, labor and human capital and accumulation of 
physical capital (Arndt, 2006). The disease impacts negatively on the work pool in the 
host country. Companies need to be prepared to assign additional resources to training 
new workers while old ones are dying of AIDS. In addition, HIV/AIDS has a direct 
impact on the market structure which further might somehow affect entry strategies of 
foreign companies. 
1.9 ICT sector in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
One particular reason for backwardness and unsuccessfulness of SSA economies is 
related to the digital gap between Africa and the West. Stenvall (2004) states that 
Africa is the most excluded continent in technological progress in ICT. She describes 
how significant a meaning ICT has in poverty eradication and equality promotion, but 
states that in a global setting the ICT sector might actually only increase global 
inequality, because so few people in the developing world has access to this 
technology. The role of ICT in development has also been noted among SSA 
countries where over thirty of them has some kind of national ICT promotion agenda 
(Stenvall). 
 
Although it might seem that ICT has a controversial role in SSA, its importance has 
been acknowledged as a key future success factor by SSA countries. Therefore the 
ICT industry has a huge potential being one of the fastest growing sectors in Africa. It 
is important to realize that technological solutions marketed should take Africa’s 
characteristics into consideration meaning that Africa needs ICT products and 
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services that can be better adapted to local conditions (Stenvall). For example, low-
cost innovations could provide one approach to utilize growth potential of ICT in SSA 
(Tucano, 2006 see the article: http://www.infodev.org/en/Publication.109.html). 
 
The role of Finnish ICT companies in SSA could be seen through the model of 
Luostarinen (1994) who theorizes that there are both push and pull factors in different 
industries which affect firms’ internationalization process. Although this framework 
will not be further analyzed, its main message is still very much relevant: firms will 
either have to extend their activities out of their national borders or they will vanish. 
The gradual openness and large size of African markets both geographically and 
demographically act as a pull force for internationalization and entry. After all, in 
large markets bigger sales can be achieved than in small markets. Although previously 
Africa has been seen as a hostile environment it is gradually becoming more and more 
open for foreign actors and foreign investments. This can particularly be the case with 
ICT. Its significance for development has been acknowledged by governments 
throughout SSA, which can ease entry of foreign ICT companies. 
1.10 Trade of Finnish companies in SSA 
 
In 2007, the trade balance with SSA countries posted a surplus of over 700 million. 
Exports grew 11% and imports grew 19% compared to 2006. Countries with whom 
Finland had trade activities were South Africa, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, 
Mauritius, Ghana, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Botswana, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Swaziland, Lesotho, Burundi, Malawi, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and 
Rwanda.  
(http://www.tulli.fi/fi/05_Ulkomaankauppatilastot/05_Tilastokatsaukset/pdf/2008/200
8_M20.pdf.) The most important trade partners for Finland were South Africa, 
Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Exports consisted mainly of 
industrial products and devices such as machinery, telecommunication products and 
paper products. Imports consisted mainly of raw materials such as metals. 
(Kauppaselvitys Saharan Etelänpuolinen Afrikka, 2008). 
 
In short, many of the SSA countries are fast emerging and growing economies and 
their demand is growing in various fields of economy. The Finnish foreign ministry 
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predicts that Finnish companies could have potential also outside the 
telecommunication and ICT products; there could be potential for fertilizers, paper 
products, tourism, consumer products and pharmaceutical products (Kauppaselvitys 
Saharan Etelänpuolinen Afrikka). Finnish companies could also develop their imports 
of agricultural products. The growth of SSA could provide exceptionally good 
prospects for Finnish companies in the finance and construction business. The global 
climate change, which will probably hit hard in Africa, could also provide 
opportunities for specialized Finnish companies. It will also be a matter of time before 
sourcing and sub-contracting types of business will reach Africa.  
 
Despite the tremendous business prospects in many industries in Africa, only few 
Finnish companies have woken up to the reality and recognized opportunities in 
African markets. The theory of Johanson and Vahlne (1977) is relatively suitable in 
analyzing the less active role of Finnish companies in SSA. Johanson and Vahlne 
suggest that internationalization of the firms is a gradual process and is influenced by 
market knowledge and commitment. Their theory emphasizes that firms would first 
start their foreign operations with low risk and indirect modes to “psychically close” 
markets. Over time and through experience, firms would increase their market 
commitment which in turn would improve firms’ market knowledge leading to further 
commitment and more distant markets (Johanson and Vahlne). Considering the fact 
that Finland was a relatively closed economy in the 70s and 80s and started to 
globalize and open fully to international trade in the beginning of the 90s, this theory 
could be quite helpful. One can argue that a less active role of Finnish companies can 
be partially explained by reasons such as that there have not been enough experienced 
and committed companies to penetrate SSA. Finnish companies have not possessed 
enough international experience to be committed to penetrate African markets. In 
addition, pull factors which according to Luostarinen pull foreign firms into markets 
have been less effective earlier in SSA due to protective and underdeveloped markets 
hostile towards foreign companies.  
 
In addition, psychic/cultural distance can be seen as one reason for low presence of 
Finnish companies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Barkema et al. (1996) state that companies 
meet cultural barriers while entering new markets especially in the case of FDIs or 
equity modes of entry and the stronger the sense of distance the different the culture is 
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from the entrant company’s host culture. Klein and Roth (1989) note that reasons 
behind strong psychic distance are higher risks and lack of knowledge. This could be 
one additional factor explaining poor integration of Finnish companies to SSA. After 
all, lack of knowledge creates wrong perceptions and prejudices. However, Klein and 
Roth state that experience of international markets is a factor reducing psychic 
distance. Barkema et al. add that previous experience in one country can be utilized 
further in the same cultural block. This indicates that companies operating in one SSA 
country could gain knowledge and experience to reduce psychic distance and further 
commit a smoother entry to another SSA country. 
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2 Theory of Literature 
2.1 Institutionalism as an approach to meet business challenges in SSA 
Conducting business in Africa and in developing countries in general is more 
challenging than it is in the so called industrial world. According to the World Bank’s 
Doing Business Index (www.doingbusiness.org/EconomyRankings), most of the SSA 
countries are at the bottom of the list that scrutinizes economy and business 
environment of the different countries. However, South Africa and Botswana were 
both ranked quite high (32nd and 38th position) on the list, even higher than some of 
the EU member countries. African economies are in many ways exceptional 
compared to societies in Europe or Asia. Nwanko (2000) claims in his research that 
the African marketing environment is often taken for granted by foreign companies 
who make too broad generalizations concerning the area and neglect recognizing 
special characteristics related to the African context in business. This study aims at 
concentrating on contextual factors and postulates that these factors play a crucial role 
in the success of SSA markets.  Since contextual factors are in focus, institutional 
theory is applied in this study. 
 
2.1.1 Development of institutional theories 
 
Institutional theories started to develop in various schools of social sciences already 
from the late 19th to the mid 20th century (Scott, 1995). There are different factions in 
institutional theories. Old institutionalism is often associated with historical 
institutionalism whereas new institutional theory focuses on two different strands; 
firstly, it concentrates on developing a sociological view of institutions – the way they 
interact and affect society (Karhunen, 2007). Secondly, the other strand is in 
economics which is widely studied by economic historian Douglas North (1990). 
 
The institutionalists vary in the extent to which they focus on different features of the 
institutional framework. Some, such as Dimaggio & Powell (1983); Scott (1995) and 
Oliver (1991) focus on institutions in organizational analysis. Their one main remark 
is that institutions are industry and/or field specific. North’s (1990) approach to 
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institutions is transaction costs based. He argues that all firms try to reduce their 
transaction costs and that uncertainty in the firms’ environment increases their 
transaction costs. North states that institutions are the ones to create “rule of the 
games" that reduce uncertainty. These different tendencies in the institutional research 
field wll be discussed in further parts of this study. 
 
The institutional approach in analyzing competitiveness becomes particularly useful, 
because it acknowledges the contextual factors unlike other theories. For example 
Porter’s (1985) theory of competitiveness simply neglects the external factors 
affecting companies and their competitiveness. The model of five forces does not 
recognize all factors that could be crucial to the competitiveness of companies. 
Porter’s framework expects that companies are in a kind of vacuum in their 
competitive field, although there are other factors having an impact directly on the 
company’s competitive advantage. For example, legislation imposed by local 
government can favor some companies at the expense of others. In addition, 
according to Karhunen and Kosonen (2008), traditional strategy research such as 
Porter’s theory sees that strategic choices are driven by firm-specific resources and 
capabilities without recognizing the institutional framework which decision-makers 
confront. 
 
Furthermore, Porter’s model assumes that competition in the industry is fair and 
square, although it probably never is, especially in the case of SSA where perfect 
information among players in the industry is seldom available. Kerber (2006) sees that 
companies actually compete in knowledge, which is another basic assumption of the 
knowledge-based view of the theory. He emphasizes that institutions are the ones 
influencing how knowledge is acquired. Consequently, institutional theory becomes 
useful in this research context, because institutionalists do not support neo-classical 
assumptions of perfect competition and unique equilibriums or the determination of 
preferences on an individual basis (Karhunen, pp.22).  
 
2.1.2 Basic assumptions of different institutional views 
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The basic assumptions of different views of institutional theorists are rather different 
from each other. New institutional economics which, as mentioned above, is the 
perspective of Douglas North, assumes that firms try to minimize transactions costs to 
gain better efficiency in the markets. According to North, increased transaction costs 
are result of uncertainty, and institutions provide the basic structure to attempt to 
reduce this uncertainty by establishing a stable structure to human exchange, whether 
political, social or economic. Therefore, by adapting to the institutional framework, 
notably to formal and informal constraints, an economic actor, in this case a foreign 
entrant is able to lower its transactions costs and to increase efficiency in the market.  
In addition, at least the formal but perhaps also informal constraints create 
inefficiency because they serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to 
design new rules and which can further be contradictory with interests of foreign 
entrants (North). 
 
The other group of institutional theorists such as Oliver and Scott tend to look at the 
institutional framework from the perspective of sociology and organizational analysis. 
According to Oliver, “Institutional theorists place particular emphasis on legitimation 
processes, the tendency for institutionalized organizational structures and procedures 
to be taken for granted (1992:563)”. In other words, the organizational view of 
institutions sees that firms are seeking legitimacy in a given institutional context and 
that institutions lead to a situation where the pattern of behavior is determined by 
institutions or is left to be determined by institutions. This view is greatly different 
from the view of new institutional economics since it puts emphasis on legitimacy 
instead of economic efficiency. Thereby assumptions of these two views are 
contradicting each other, because behavior chosen by some particular firm in order to 
seek legitimacy is not necessarily the most effective one, but the one the firm is used 
to (North, pp. 3-4).  
 
However, the views of new-institutional economics and the socio-organizational 
faction of institutionalism are not contradicting each other because according to Peng 
(2003), company efficiency and legitimacy can be sought at the same time. Peng 
merges both assumptions of these two different views presented above into one 
assumption. Later in this study it will be tested which of the three different 
assumptions applies to the companies of this study. 
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2.1.3 Definition of institutions 
 
According to North (1990:3; 6), institutions are “the rules of the game in a society or, 
more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.” The 
whole idea of institutionalism is that they do matter and must be taken into 
consideration. North states “that the major role of institutions in a society is to reduce 
uncertainty by establishing a stable structure to human interaction”. Peng (2002) 
states that uncertainty is reduced because institutions interact with institutions by 
signaling them which choices are acceptable and supportable. In other words, 
institutions set up a framework for organizations where to perform.  
 
An institutional framework consists of informal and formal constraints (North 1990). 
According to North, formal constraints include political rules, judicial decisions and 
economic constraints while informal constraints include social norms, customs and 
culture. Karhunen (2007) notes that the distinction between informal and formal 
constraints is complex, because it can be difficult to categorize constraints since they 
can have both formal and informal features. But North (1990) suggests that when 
formal institutions fail to serve organizations, informal ones will play to reduce 
uncertainty for the part of the organizations. Consequently, one of North’s central 
notions is that formal and informal rules act at different speeds, meaning that formal 
rules can change overnight whereas it takes longer for informal rules to change 
(Karhunen, pp.12). 
  
2.1.4 Institutional isomorphism and legitimacy  
 
One of the key assumptions of new-institutionalism is that organizations in a field 
become increasingly homogenous over time (Scott, 2001). This process is referred to 
as institutional isomorphism (Karhunen). Institutions are, however, field- and 
industry-specific, because macro-institutions are leveraged to organizations through 
field level structures (Scott), whereupon the institutional isomorphism varies from 
industry to industry. According to Dimaggio and Powell (1983:153) “isomorphism is 
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a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that 
face the same set of environmental conditions”. In other words, the institutional 
framework sets the rules for organizations to work and as a result they start to 
resemble each other. In a business situation, it can for example force all foreign 
companies to set up joint ventures, because of, say, some country-specific law.  In 
addition, Dimaggio and Powell state that isomorphic pressures arising from firms’ 
external environment and internal practices and routines impacts the choice of 
organizational structure. 
 
According to Dimaggio and Powell (1983:155,156), organizations compete not just 
for resources and customers, but also for political power and institutional legitimacy 
for “understanding the politics and ceremony that pervade modern organizational life” 
Legitimacy means that organizations must be approved by local institutions in order 
to perform successfully in that environment (Dimaggio and Powell). According to 
Scott (2001:237), “organizations require more than material resources and technical 
information if they are to survive“. “They also need social acceptability and 
credibility”. In addition, Scott (2001:59-60) presents that legitimacy consists of 
different levels depending on the tacitness of the factors affecting legitimacy. 
However, this study will not scrutinize legitimacy any further since the focus shall be 
put more on the relation between legitimacy and entry-mode. 
 
2.1.5 Strategic responses to institutional pressures 
 
Another main area of concentration of neo-institutional organization theory is its 
focus on interaction between organizations and their environment. When firms enter a 
specific institutional environment they face both formal and informal constraints 
which force them to response. Oliver (1991) proposes five categories of strategic 
responses that organizations could make in response to institutional responses. She 
claims that these responses vary with respect to the level of resistance to pressures 
from passive to active and labels them as acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, 
defiance and manipulation. Oliver’s main contribution to new institutional theory is 
that organizations play an active role by interacting actively with institutions. This 
notion is further used in Peng’s theory which will be presented later. Oliver also 
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presents that there is a likelihood of different organizational responses to the nature of 
the institutional context and institutional pressures (Karhunen, pp.13). Therefore, 
concentrating on just one industry, ICT, this study will yield information from one 
specific institutional context. 
 
Acquiescence is a passive strategy, because using it a firm agrees to institutional 
pressures (Clemens and Douglas 2004). Compromising means that firms balance the 
expectations of multiple constituents. Firms can for example negotiate with regulators 
to obtain a mutually agreeable solution that meets the intent of the regulation at a 
reduced cost. In an avoiding strategy, firms can choose not to install fire alarms to all 
the office rooms because it estimates that the cost is not equivalent to the possibility 
of fire. 
 
If a firm chooses to defy it, it can try to ignore institutional pressures or for example 
deal with request with attorneys. Manipulation is the most active way of responding to 
institutional pressures so that firms try directly to influence prevailing institutions.  
Nonetheless, the institutional environment affects differently in different places where 
conditions are not similar. After all, conditions do have a significant meaning in 
strategic responding (Clemens and Douglas).    
 
2.1.6 Effects of  institutional pressures on strategic responses 
 
Oliver (1991) identifies five institutional factors which work as antecedents of 
strategic responses which are Cause, Constituent, Content, Control and Context. She 
defines Cause as purposes behind the institutional pressures for conformity and that 
those companies that feel the most pressure to conform social or economic norms 
would present active resistance.  
 
Oliver states that organizations face several pressures from a variety of entities 
including the state, professions, interest groups and the general public. These, among 
others, are entities that exert institutional pressures on the organizations. This factor 
that explains who is exerting those pressures on the organizations is called the 
Constituents factor. Oliver discovered that the more there are different constituents 
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and the less the organization is dependent on them the greater it will show resistance 
to institutional pressures.   
 
Content refers to an issue which norms or requirements organizations need to 
conform. It represents the extent of consistency of institutions with an organizational 
goal (Oliver 1991). Oliver indicates that firms would choose less active strategies 
when institutional goals differ from organizational goals. Oliver (1991:150) defines 
Control as “the means by which pressures are imposed to organizations” In other 
words, how institutional pressures are imposed. Oliver argues that the stronger the 
pressure associated with Control the stronger is the firm’s preference for less active 
strategies. Oliver defines Context as the conditions within which institutions are being 
exerted. She argues that organizations are more likely to conform with institutional 
pressures when the degree of interconnectedness is low.   
 
2.1.7 Institutional aspect of business strategy 
 
Peng (2000:44) states that the earlier market-based institutional framework has been 
taken for granted and that greater emphasis has been put on task environment. 
According to Peng (2002), institutions greatly affect strategic choices; formal and 
informal constraints of institutional framework area factors that firms need to take 
into consideration above industry conditions and firm-specific resources. In other 
words, institutions affect companies’ decisions by creating certain boundaries the 
companies need to conform to. Consequently, firms are not affected by environmental 
determinism whereas strategic choices are driven by both firm preferences and 
institutional constraints. 
 
Peng’s contribution to institutional theory is salient and therefore his approach to 
institutions will be used as a theoretical framework in this study. Peng’s framework is 
useful in this study because it merges both North’s views on new institutional theories 
and views on transaction costs and formal and informal rules with organizational 
analyses of scholars such as Dimaggio and Powell, Scott and Oliver. 
 
27 
The table below conceptualizes Peng’s theory of how institutions and organizations 
impact strategic choices. It shows and represents an institutional perspective on a 
business strategy that focuses on the dynamic interaction between institutions and 
organizations, and defines strategic choices as the outcome of such interaction (Peng, 
2000:45). Strategic choices are still a very broad concept and can basically refer to 
any strategic decision taken in the organizations. Therefore, I will concentrate on and 
use Peng’s view as a base of theoretical framework in this study. 
 
 
Figure 3 Business strategies in transition economies 
  
Source: Peng, M.W. (2000). Business Strategies in Transition Economies: p. 45 
 
Numerous studies that have been made in the institutional field concentrate on 
emerging economies in Eastern Europe, Russia and Asia, especially various studies of 
Peng, but not much attention has been given to Africa yet. These studies have 
acknowledged that different kinds of institutional environments create challenges for 
foreign and local companies that they need to take into consideration in their 
strategies and overall behavior. These challenges include relations to the public sector, 
bureaucracy, corruption and different kinds of legal constraints. The socialistic 
background still has an effect on those countries where informal rules still prevail, for 
example business networks. The general result of these different challenges coming 
from weak institutional frameworks leads basically to a situation where foreign firms 
integrate very cautiously into those markets. Briefly, institutional relatedness affects 
for instance ownership and the scope of the firm (Peng et. al. 2004; Peng et. al.2005). 
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2.2 Market entry modes 
 
The choice of market entry is to facilitate the firm’s international market entry for 
specific foreign market entry (Albaum et al. 2005:251). The authors state that market 
entry should be consistent with the company’s strategic objectives. Albaum et al. do 
not mention the fact that sometimes these strategic objectives can be contradictory to 
institutional pressures which ultimately companies need to conform to in order to gain 
legitimacy in the markets. Davis et al. (2000) found that entry-mode would be 
dependent on both internal (parent) and external (host country) institutional pressures. 
 
 Meyer (2001) for instance emphasizes that the role of institutions in entry mode 
choice is often stronger in environments where the institutional framework is partially 
reformed, that is unstable and inconsistent. Consequently, assessing the institutional 
framework becomes even more helpful when entry mode to Sub-Saharan Africa is 
assessed. 
 
Albaum et al. (2005) categorize entry modes roughly into export and non-export 
modes. Export modes are further categorized into indirect and direct export depending 
on existing local or foreign middlemen. Other non-exporting modes of entry include 
licensing, franchising, assembly operations acquisitions and Greenfield investments 
and joint ventures (Albaum et al. 2005). Entry modes can also be categorized as 
equity modes and non-equity modes (Pan and Tse, 2000). Equity modes consist of 
joint ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries whereas non-equity modes consist of 
different export modes and contractual agreements, such as licensing, franchising and 
R&D contracts (Pan and Tse).  Increased complexity often demands more 
involvement that further on increases the possible risks. Therefore also institutional 
pressures can be stronger in cases demanding higher involvement such as joint 
ventures and green field operations than for example in indirect exporting.  
 
2.3 Role of the institutions in foreign entry 
 
There is no doubt that the market entry-mode choice is a critical element for foreign 
companies who are considering foreign expansion (Rodriguez et al. 2005). An entry-
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mode decision notably defines a company’s resource commitment, investment risk, 
degree of control, and a share of profits from international operations (Davis et al. 
2005). The study of foreign entry-mode choice have been strongly dominated by a 
transaction cost theory that focuses mainly on the impacts of firm- and industry-
specific factors on the choice of entry mode, but considering country-specific 
contextual factors as constant or less important (Yiu and Makino, 2001). Institutional 
theory becomes particularly relevant because it concentrates on contextual factors 
influencing entry-mode decisions (Yiu and Makino) and draws attention to non-
market constraints and pressures (Davis et al. 2005). This approach becomes 
particularly relevant in the SSA context, because its institutional environment differs 
greatly from the Western or Finnish corresponding environment. Consequently, the 
institutional view on market entry is a valid approach, because institutional forces 
have two major implications to entry choice by influencing entry-choice at different 
levels and in different magnitudes (Yiu and Makino). 
 
Effects of institutions on market entry strategies 
 
Institutions affect market entry strategies and more closely entry mode choices in 
various ways. Meyer (2001) shows that institutional frameworks affect entry mode 
choices of the firms through transaction costs that companies need to adjust when 
considering entry.  Meyer argues that Western firms entering emerging markets face 
high transaction costs because they lack information about customers and local 
partners, they have to negotiate with agents inexperienced in business negotiations, 
and they face unclear regulatory frameworks, inexperienced bureaucracies, 
underdeveloped court systems and a corrupt business environment. It is important to 
emphasize the fact that uncertainty may be perceived higher by a foreign entrant than 
by a local actor, because local actor possesses more information.  In addition, Meyer 
states that firms can also face post-entry transaction costs in terms of weak protection 
of intellectual property which will additionally increase uncertainty among foreign 
entrants.   
 
Meyer (2001:365) states that: “the institution of an economy determines the pattern of 
transaction cost.” He further continues by describing how volatile and inconsistent 
institutional frameworks create transactions to local environment to which foreign 
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entrants need to adjust. Meyer’s approach to institutions is the same as North’s who 
sees the effects of institutional framework from the transaction cost perspective, 
which was discussed earlier in this study. According to Meyer, rapid institutional 
change creates uncertainty and lack of information that results in high transaction 
costs. Formal constraints are one source of uncertainty (North), especially this could 
be the case of SSA since institutions and formal constraints such as legislation are not 
always stable and can change rapidly creating uncertainty upon foreign entrants, 
because rapidly changing institutions may create inconsistencies between 
requirements of organizations at any point of time (Meyer).  Informal constraints are 
also a source of uncertainty because they are less transparent than formal constraints 
since foreign entrants and investors can observe most aspects of the formal 
institutions are informal constraints harder to detect (Meyer and Nguyen, 2005). 
 
Meyer found that institutional progress, which he defines as a change towards a more 
Western type of institutional framework, encourages firms to prefer full ownership 
modes, because transaction costs thereby decrease. The problem with Meyer’s 
approach is that he does not specify properly enough how and which institutional 
factors (Meyer does not use concepts of formal and informal constraints or forces) 
affect market entry choice and he simply states that high transaction costs are primary 
determinant. Firstly, transaction costs might be low but specific legal constraints can 
dictate the market entry mode, for instance by excluding ownership modes. Secondly, 
it can be difficult to value how much informal constraints such as cultural constraints 
add to transaction costs of foreign companies. Nevertheless, transaction costs are an 
important factor in entry-mode choices and earlier research of international entry-
mode choice decisions have largely concentrated on the role of transaction costs 
(Brouthers, 2002).   
 
Effects of institutional pressures on market entry strategies 
 
One way to more closely examine the effects of institutional framework on market 
entry strategies is to analyze how institutional pressures that are exerted on foreign 
entrants affect their entry strategies. As discussed before, Oliver (1991) defines 
factors that create institutional pressures such as Cause, Constituents, Content, 
Control and Context which are closely explained in the beginning of the research 
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(section 2.1.6). Although we are not going to go deeper than this into explaining how 
each of these factors affect market entry strategies, it is still important to realize that 
these pressures which stem from the institutional environment have an effect on 
strategic choices of companies. Davis et al. (2005) argue that isomorphic pressures 
stemming from both internal and external sources have an important impact on the 
entry-mode choice and structures that firms pursue. In this study, greater emphasis is 
placed on external factors and pressures. However, business units which operate under 
their parent organization’s network are also subject to institutional pressures that stem 
from parent organizations (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). 
 
The approach taken by Davis et al in their study is similar to Peng’s theory of how 
institutions and organizations affect firms’ strategic choices. In this study, the focus is 
on market entry-mode choices. The difference is that all authors, Peng and Davis et al. 
express the same phenomenon slightly differently. Peng explains how institutions 
affect market entry choices (strategic choices) through formal and informal 
constraints, whereas Davis et al. discuss external forces affecting market entry-mode 
choices. These external forces can be understood as a part of institutional pressures 
which Oliver defined as cause, constituents, content, control and context.   
 
Oliver’s approach regarding effects of the institutional environment on company 
strategies is not very different from Peng’s approach. Peng sees that formal and 
informal constraints have an affect on market entry strategies or, to be more precise, 
on entry-mode choices (strategic choices) while Oliver’s approach to the same 
phenomenon is institutional pressures. Some factors of these pressures are similar to 
the formal and informal constraints. For example, constituents which Oliver defines as 
state, professions and interest groups can exert similar kinds of pressures on entry 
strategies and have an effect similar to that of formal constraints. The difference 
between these two approaches might be that Oliver (p.152) explains how companies 
respond to pressures that are exerted upon them. In other words, the company can try 
to actively influence their institutional environment, for example in cases when 
institutions negatively affect their desired entry-mode – companies can try to seek 
some sort of compromise. Western companies should be aware of the importance of 
negotiations in business not only in Africa but in the Third World in general (Cavusgil 
and Ghauri, 1990:17). 
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Clemens and Douglas (2004) argue that each pressure factor defined by Oliver has an 
effect on a company’s strategies. Clemens and Douglas found that the greater the 
pressures associated with any, Cause, Constituents, Content, Control or Context, the 
stronger a firm’s preference for less active strategies. This indicates also that if 
companies feel strong institutional pressures they might want to pursue more 
exporting, licensing and franchising modes than acquisitions and Greenfield 
investments. It sounds reasonable that the more complex the environment gets the less 
active entry-modes company chooses. Oliver’s approach is a good addition to Peng’s 
framework, because Peng does not present any ways of how companies could respond 
to its institutional framework, whereas Oliver does not make a distinction between 
what is formal and informal in this context and how this affects companies. One can 
also relate these two approaches of institutional constraints and pressures together by 
making an assumption that institutional constraints create pressures which affect the 
final choice of the market entry strategy. Furthermore, firms are also thereby able to 
react to these pressures exerted upon them. 
 
Summary of institutional effects on entry-choice mode 
 
There have been some studies of impacts of institutional environment on market entry 
strategies. Davis et al. found in their research that companies that are more influenced 
by host-country characteristics, that is, a local institutional framework are more likely 
to use export as their entry mode. Yiu and Makino found that multinational 
enterprises choose more likely joint venture over a wholly owned subsidiary when 
regulative and cognitive pressures increase in a host country. This indicates that 
foreign entrants prefer less control demanding entry mode while institutional 
constraints are stronger. This is noted also by Clemens and Douglas who argue that 
foreign entrants, who are affected by stronger institutional pressures, prefer to aim at a 
less active involvement in a host country. Meyer makes similar assumptions by stating 
that entrants prefer to establish more likely wholly-owned subsidiaries in economies 
where institutional progress is highest. 
 
There have been other studies arguing that institutions have an impact on the choice 
of local partners. Meyer and Nguyen (2005) state that the institutional framework 
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establishes which options are permitted in a given institutional context and that it 
influences foreign investors so that they may be required to have a local partner. 
Meyer and Nguyen refer to findings of Peng and Heath (1996) and Kock and Guillén 
(2001) by stating that especially in network economies, networking capabilities may 
be a vital asset for business since local partners are those possessing such network 
capabilities. Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) state similarly that a local partner belonging to 
local markets offers foreign entrants ways to overcome market entry barriers such as 
corruption. Uhlenbruck et al. found that a local partner reduces uncertainty associated 
with delivering information and knowledge on how to deal with issues related to 
corruption. However, there is no doubt that a foreign partner could reduce uncertainty 
relating to other constraints by providing knowledge of local environment and easing 
the entry of a foreign company.  
 
According to Uhlenbruck et al., a local partner can be used as a buffer against 
corruption, but the local partner can probably also be used to overcome some other 
constraints arising from the local environments. Studies of Uhlenbruck et al. and 
Meyer and Nguyen are both done within a context of emerging economies, and thus 
one can in further parts of this study evaluate to which extent they match SSA 
countries that can be regarded as emerging economies. Both Uhlenbruck et al. and 
Meyer and Nguyen have evaluated the role of local partners from the perspective of 
equity entries, but local partners might also be similarly significant to companies 
using non-equity modes of entry or companies using non-equity modes of entry could 
ally with other companies in similar situations or use some other type of outside help. 
 
2.4 Effects of entry-mode choice on legitimacy    
 
In this research context, institutional constraints are not the only factors affecting 
market-entry strategies and entry-mode choices. Issues related to legitimacy should 
also be taken into consideration. Kostova and Zaheer state how the lack of legitimacy 
may act as a barrier to entry, because legitimacy can be seen as acceptance and 
approval of a foreign company by its legitimating environment. In other words, 
legitimacy is the right to do business in the new market (Yiu and Makino).  The 
complexity of the institutional environment makes it more difficult to establish and 
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maintain legitimacy (Kostova and Zaheer). The complexity relates to the assumption 
that legitimacy is composed of different domains reflecting different types of 
institutions: the regulative, the normative and the cultural cognitive pillar (Scott, 
2001:59-60). Each of these factors impact legitimacy differently.   
 
The regulative, the normative and the cultural cognitive pillar differ from each other 
in their degree of formalization and tacitness – that is the degree to which they can be 
explicitly codified and how easily they can be made sense of by observing outsiders 
such as a foreign company (Kostova and Zaheer). Kostova and Zaheer suggest that a 
regulatory domain can be easiest to observe because it is formalized in laws and rules 
and regulations. The cultural-cognitive domain could be more difficult to observe 
because of its more tacit nature, and therefore legitimacy in the normative or cognitive 
domain might pose a challenge for companies (Kostova and Zaheer). In practice it can 
be very difficult for companies to be aware of normative and cultural-cognitive 
domains, not to mention of planning their strategies in accordance with those 
domains.   
 
Rodriguez et al. (2005) claim that without legitimacy companies may have no access 
to valuable resources that are vital to survival and profitability. Thus, one can assume 
that whatever entry mode a foreign company chooses it has a further effect on the 
company’s legitimacy. According to Yiu and Makino, companies choose their entry-
modes primarily in terms of gaining legitimacy from both internal and external 
claimants. One can state that the entry mode represents “an organizational form 
appropriate for the firm’s motivation to gain legitimacy in the relevant environments” 
(Yiu and Makino). However, it is important to realize that each institutional 
environment has different options for these organizational forms and that there can be 
several choices available. 
 
Institutional theories also recognize a role of the company and its choice in the 
adaptation to the institutional context (Kostova and Zaheer; Oliver). In a complex 
environment such as in many African states these choices can be very narrow due to 
high and complex institutional pressures, but nevertheless each choice of mode has an 
effect on the company’s legitimacy. 
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It is important to understand that legitimacy is constantly produced (Kostova and 
Zaheer) and therefore it needs to be maintained as well. In Sub-Saharan Africa this 
notion becomes even more relevant, because in Sub-Saharan African countries 
institutional environment is in many respects undergoing profound change. This adds 
additional challenges to companies considering market entry because one specific 
entry-mode can prove to be less successful in the future when the institutional 
environment changes alongside its constraints and pressures.  
 
Kostova and Zaheer note that legitimacy is not always needed in order to survive over 
the long term, especially in the case of MNEs, because they have alternative sources 
of resources and organizational support. They might also have better bargaining 
power than smaller companies do. On the other hand, big MNEs and their subunits 
will be more vulnerable to attacks from different interests groups (Kostova and 
Zaheer). A foreign entrant might also be in a weaker position regarding external 
legitimacy than local firms are, because existing local firms do not necessarily require 
for instance the same government approvals and permits as a new entrant does 
(Uhlenbruck et al.). This indicates that legitimacy of the local firms can also be on a 
higher level than that of the foreign entrants, because local firms have been in the 
market for a longer time and maintained and developed their legitimacy. 
 
Within this research context, I state that gaining legitimacy could be extremely 
important because Finnish ICT companies, excluding Nokia, do not necessarily have 
very many additional resources that they could afford to neglect the institutional 
forces and form their market entry strategies without conforming to environment 
rules. Gaining legitimacy in one specific SSA country can further increase a firm’s 
experience and knowledge and further help to expand to other SSA countries and to 
gain local acceptance.  
 
Institutional context and gaining legitimacy in that context has an effect even on 
competitiveness and competitive advantage. Consequently, it can be argued that a 
firm’s sustainable competitive advantage depends on its ability to manage the 
institutional context of its resource decisions and basically to be aware of what 
institutions should take into consideration when a company determines its resource 
allocation (Oliver, 1997). 
36 
3 Theoretical Framework 
 
The table below presents the theoretical framework of this study, which is modified 
from Peng’s (see page 16) framework of business strategies in transition economies. 
In this study, affecting institutions are various institutions of SSA which can be 
understood as the institutional environment of SSA as a whole. Chosen organizations 
in this framework are Finnish ICT firms and strategic choices which this study 
concentrates on are entry strategies. The figure below visualizes how theories are 
applied in this study and how answers to the research problem are to be found. Formal 
and informal constraints presented in the theoretical framework figure answer the first 
research question of what the challenges and pressures of SSA are. In the figure, listed 
constraints such as (formal) legal barriers and (informal) behavioral norms and 
business culture (North, 1990) are constraints recognized in a previous theory of 
literature. However, the intention of this study is to describe these factors in 
accordance with the SSA context, but also to seek other possible constraints in the 
empirical part.                         
 
In order to improve Peng’s view of how institutions affect strategic choices of 
companies and to find an answer to the second research question on how Finnish 
companies respond to pressures stemming from market environment of SSA, Oliver’s 
theory (1991) of different tactics a firm can apply in order to influence its institutional 
environment is applied to the theoretical framework of this study. As can be seen in 
the figure, the options vary from passive conforming such as acquiescence and 
compromise to ways of active resistance such as manipulation and defiance. Oliver’s 
antecedents of strategic responses are not applied to the theoretical framework of this 
study since this study focuses more on formal and informal constraints in explaining 
challenges and complexity of the institutional environment of SSA. Furthermore, one 
of Oliver’s main statements was that the stronger the influence of the antecedents 
(Cause, Constituents, Content, Control, Context) the stronger is the preference for less 
active modes of entry. Similarly, one can state that the stronger the informal and 
formal constraints are, the stronger is the pressure for less complex modes of entry 
modes, for example exporting rather than local production. 
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The last research question of this study relates to the question of how to overcome 
different challenges of the SSA environment and how to gain legitimacy in that 
market. The figure of the theoretical framework visualizes that the legitimacy of the 
company is affected both by external and internal factors. In the picture, two arrows 
pointing to the legitimacy box are thereby used to describe and emphasize that 
legitimacy is affected by two different factors. After al,l it was already discussed 
earlier how companies choose their entry-modes primarily in terms of gaining 
legitimacy from both internal and external claimants. In this study, the external factor 
refers to the institutional environment of SSA and the internal factor is a firm-specific 
characteristic such as organizational resources of a Finnish ICT firm. Both of these 
factors have an influence on how to gain legitimacy in those markets, thus this study 
will ultimately seek answers to the question regarding the extent to which the 
environment creates boundaries for legitimacy and the extent to which the company 
itself can affect gaining legitimacy in SSA.  
 
This study focuses on the aspect of legitimacy and tries to seek answers to whether 
and how Finnish companies have built their legitimacy in the area. Nevertheless, this 
study will not ignore the view of the new institutional economics stating that firms are 
pursuing to lower their transaction costs in a specific institutional context in order to 
gain better economic efficiency. On the contrary, this study aims to look at the issue 
from the same perspective as does Peng, who states that legitimacy and economic 
efficiency through lowering transaction costs are not options excluding each others 
but that companies can try to achieve both of them. For example, conforming to 
formal and informal constraints of the SSA institutional environment can create 
efficiency by lowering transaction costs as North states in his theory, but conforming 
to some of the constraints could also create legitimacy, local acceptance. In the same 
way, company-specific or ICT industry factors can influence legitimacy or efficiency. 
For instance, the firm’s own preference of entry mode can be the most efficient mode 
of entry for them since it does not always necessarily have to be in contradiction with 
the most efficient mode of entry preferred by the SSA institutional environment. 
Consequently, although Peng’s view seems to be rational, it remains to be seen later 
in the empirical part whether this view also applies to ICT companies of the SSA 
institutional environment. To provide a better visualization of the theoretical 
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framework, a whole table is presented even though this study will not concentrate on 
the relation between Finnish ICT firms and entry strategy. 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Theoretical framework 
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4 Methodology 
 
4.1 Method of data collection and analysis  
 
In this section, the research subject, the research methods and the data collection 
process are presented in order to clarify how this study was carried out. In addition, 
the choice of methodological approach of the study will briefly be explained. 
 
General research approach 
 
In this study, the chosen research approach is the qualitative one. The choice of this 
approach was quite natural because the use of the quantitative research approach often 
demands a lot of data which in this study would be difficult to find, because there are 
only a small number of Finnish ICT companies operating in SSA. In short, there are 
not enough sample companies for quantitative research. Therefore, using the 
quantitative research approach would most likely yield unreliable answers concerning 
my research problem. According to Silverman (2001:32), qualitative research is often 
used in the first phase of study in social and business research which is then followed 
by quantitative studies. However, some authors (see Erikson and Kovalainen, 2008) 
state that the link to quantitative research is not necessary and that the qualitative 
method of knowledge production can be equally adequate.  
 
In this study, the realistic research view is chosen instead of the positivistic paradigm 
which sees that there is a single reality which is assumed to exists, driven by natural 
laws and mechanisms (Riege, 2003). The realism paradigm believes that there exists, 
although not completely apprehensible, a real world to be discovered and explained 
(Healy and Chad, 2000). The world of realism is basically situated between the 
extremely objective world of positivism and the extremely subjective world of critical 
theory and constructivism (Healy and Chad, 2000). In this study, the interest is 
therefore in the real world and in what really is happening there. According to Riege 
(pp.78), “Case studies commonly follow realistic modes of inquiry, because its main 
objective is to discover new relationships of relationships of realities and build up an 
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understanding of experiences rather than verify predetermined hypotheses”. This 
study is not an exception and the case study is a chosen method. 
 
Research method 
 
In this research, the case study is chosen as a research method. According to Yin 
(1994:13), “A case is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”. Yin continues (pp.13) by stating 
that the choice of the case study approach is recommended when the researcher 
deliberately wants to cover contextual conditions which are believed to be pertinent in 
the research phenomenon. This statement indicates that the case study method is valid 
also in this research context by making the assumption that contextual factors of 
Africa’s business environment do have a meaning in companies’ strategic choices. 
This was also noted by Nwankwo (2000), who emphasized the contextual factors 
affecting foreign companies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Eisenhardt (1989) states that the 
case study becomes particularly useful when there is not much empirical evidence 
available and when a research phenomenon is not widely documented. This is the case 
also in this research context as discussed in the previous section, and therefore the 
case study method is an efficient research method. 
 
Yin (pp.14) states that case studies can include either quantitative or qualitative 
evidence or a mixture of both. According to Yin (1994), the case study approach is 
suitable when the research aims at responding to the questions “What,” “How,” and 
“Why,” and at gaining a holistic picture of the phenomenon. According to Ghauri 
(2004:109), case studies are widely used in the international business research field. 
Ghauri (pp.112) gives a direct example of how he used the case study method in 
researching how the turbulent business environment in Eastern Europe has affected 
firms’ entry strategies. This clearly shows that the case study method is applicable 
also in this study. 
 
According to Yin (pp.14), case study research can include both single and multiple 
case studies. In this study, multiple cases are used because companies face and 
experience different constraints that have had an effect on their market entry modes. 
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Yin also states that using multiple cases is a powerful source of information. Using 
multiple cases and from different countries of SSA will increase the credibility of the 
study, because despite the common factors of the SSA institutional environment, there 
are differences in constraints between different countries in the region. The multiple 
case study approach is used because it provides more information, not because it 
makes the results more generalizable.  
 
Yin (pp.15) argues that one major factor of case studies is that they pursue to explain 
causal links in real-life interventions that are too complex for the survey or 
experimental strategies. For example, it can be argued that studied companies are not 
necessarily aware of all institutional constraints or they cannot see the link between 
some institutional factor and its consequence on their own choices, because the 
respondent cannot view necessarily himself objectively or “out of box” and cannot 
separate himself from the phenomenon, because he/she is an actor in that phenomenon 
scrutinized in the case. Thereby, a case study with more active participation allows the 
researcher to identify it if it seems that the case companies are not aware of all the 
institutional constraints and pressures affecting them and therefore could provide 
more reliable information than less active research methods such as statistical 
methods. 
 
4.2 Case criteria 
 
The choice of the case companies was based on the following criteria: firstly, selected 
companies are primarily concentrated on ICT industry or industry that is related to 
ICT. Secondly, all companies chosen need to have business activities in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. After all, it is useless to study companies that for example see SSA as a 
relevant target region in the future, but are yet only planning penetration there. 
Thirdly, these case companies need to be Finnish or at least have their headquarters in 
Finland. Due to the fact that this research is done in Finland, choosing Finnish firms 
becomes relevant and facilitates conducting the study. Finally, some companies were 
excluded from this study, either because their person responsible of operation in SSA 
is permanently located in a foreign country or because it has been revealed that the 
company has only performed as a subcontractor for a bigger foreign company that has 
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coordinated and committed the actual market entry itself. Based on the criteria below, 
the following four companies were chosen for further analysis: Omnitele, Jutel, 
SANAKO and Tramigo. 
 
4.3 Data collection process 
 
It has been rather challenging to find enough case companies and it has been difficult 
to find and approach those companies operating in the region. Not many ICT 
companies specifically mention that they are doing business in Africa whereas some 
companies with matching criteria are in fact leading their operation in the region from 
another country. 
 
The data of this study was collected in the following ways, (which also may be 
overlapping): 
 
1. Data of SSA institutional environment is collected from scientific journals and 
monographs 
2. Latter information is collected from public sources such as company websites and 
annual reports as well as from special magazines that has made a story of the case 
company and their experiences in Africa. 
3. First set of questions is prepared for an interview, a list of question is developed 
and in-depth interviews are conducted. 
4. Interviews are coded, written down and additional questions developed and then 
sent to respondents by email in order to have more information or seek further 
clarification of some specific issue. 
5. Findings from the interviews and additional answers are gathered and analyzed 
 
4.4 Description of the interview process and the interviewees 
 
All of the companies were first contacted by telephone or mail, then the purpose of 
the study was presented and a meeting was scheduled by email with company 
representatives. In many cases, the companies which initially were intended as targets 
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for this study were dismissed companies more suitable for this study were identified. 
In addition, many companies such as Lemcon, Eltel Networks, Vaisala and Anite 
refused or backed off from interview. In many cases after having had a session with 
one company they recommended some other company to be contacted. In this study, 
altogether seven in-depth interviews were conducted. Five of them were conducted 
with case companies and the other two were additional interviews of other companies 
that were not chosen as case companies but still provided essential information for 
this study. It is important to note that each of the interviews, excluding the one which 
was made by telephone, lasted one and a half hours. This allowed to gain much deeper 
understanding from the case companies and allowed more time for interesting topics 
to evolve.  
 
In this study, the constructionist interview research approach was seen as the most 
applicable. According to Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008:80), the constructionist 
interview research approach “focus on how meanings are produced through the 
interactions that takes place between the interviewer and interviewee. In the 
constructionist interview approach, interviews resemble everyday discussions where 
the interviewer can take either an active or a passive role (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 
pp.80). One important feature of constructionist interviews is that the researcher uses 
their preplanned questions as initiators of conversation which can flow into many 
directions (Eriksson and Kovalainen, pp.80). Basically, when an interesting topic 
arose it was then further elaborated until moving on to the next question. In order to 
increase effectiveness of the interviews, research question frames were sent to the 
interviewees well ahead of the actual meeting. This kind of interview approach is 
likely to provide more information, because discussion was more free and less formal, 
furthermore it is important to emphasize that due to the fact that in the majority of the 
interviews there were more than one person present, the gained information was more 
resourceful than in case of just one person from each of the companies. 
 
Weaknesses of constructionist interviews and in-depth interviews in general are that 
they are difficult to replicate. It is important to note that in-depth interviews are thus 
highly dependent on the ability of the interviewer to be as resourceful, systematic and 
honest as possible (Marshall and Rossman, 1999:135). This issue was, however, 
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tackled through practice for each interview and especially experiences from the first 
conducted interview helped to improve the interview tactics. 
 
The following persons were interviewed: 
Interviewee Position Company Duration 
Seppo Lohikko Principal Consultant Omnitele 1,5 h 
Markku Virtanen Principal Consultant Omnitele 1,5 h 
Karri Virkajärki Vice President Marketing Strategy  Omnitele 1,5 h 
Thierry Delarue 
Strategy Planning and Insights 
Nokia Middle East & Africa Nokia 1 h 
Kai Mattlar Senior Account Manager Jutel 1,5 h 
Vesa Jaakkola Senior Consultant/Owner Cyrr Group 1,5 h 
Kristian Ylinen Senior Consultant/Owner Cyrr Group 1,5 h 
Raimo Körkkö Senior Vice President/Partner SANAKO 1,5 h 
Arto Tiitinen Senior Partner Tramigo 1,5 h 
 
 
4.5 Reliability and validity of the study 
 
Validity, reliability and generalizability are concepts that provide a basic framework 
for the evaluation of research in business research (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 
2008:291). Reliability refers to the extent to which a measure or procedure repeated 
yields the same results; therefore the question of reliability refers to consistency of the 
study (Eriksson and Kovalainen, pp.292). Validity refers to the extent to which 
conclusions drawn in research give an accurate description or explanation of what 
happened (Eriksson and Kovalainen, pp.292). Basically, if the study is valid, its 
findings are true and certain.  
 
There are some ways to ensure the quality of the research. Riege (2003) represents the 
different tests and techniques for establishing validity and reliability in case study 
research. According to Yin, the criteria applicable to descriptive and exploratory case 
studies include two measures for validity, and one for reliability (Yin, 1994). 
 
According to Yin (pp.33), construct validity is made during the data collection phase 
and can be increased in many ways. One way to enhance this criterion is to use 
multiple sources of information (Yin, pp.33). In this study, multiple sources of 
evidence within the cases are provided, but in addition to information yielding from 
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case study companies, additional information is collected to contribute to this study. 
This allows the researcher to verify information, but also to deepen the knowledge of 
the research phenomenon. An accessory in-depth interview was made with Cyrr 
Group - the only consultation company concentrating solely on Africa. Furthermore, 
an additional telephone interview was made with Nokia. In addition, having had 
access to the right and most informative respondent from each interviewed company 
has significantly improved construct validity of this study. Also, to foster construct 
validity and to improve accuracy of the interviews, secondary and alternative 
information of case companies was sought well ahead of the in-depth interview with 
each case company. This ensured a better understanding of the company and allowed 
more accurate questions to be asked during the interviews. 
 
Internal validity can be impacted in the data analysis part. However, this type of 
criterion is used in other types of case studies (causal and explanatory) to assess the 
validity of the causal explanation developed in the case. Therefore there is no need to 
pay attention to this criterion in this study. After all, the research questions of this 
study do not aim to seek causalities, whether event x led to event y. 
 
The external validity of case studies measures the generalizability of the research 
results to other cases (Karhunen, pp.84). This is different from other research 
methods, for example from surveys which aim at statistical generalization (Yin). This 
study aims not only to find similarities between cases, but also to compare case study 
companies and their experiences in different SSA countries with each other and to the 
SSA region as a whole. This is also the reason why each case in this study represented 
different Sub-Saharan African countries. Basically, this study tries to describe the 
institutional environment in SSA through taking various examples of specific SSA 
countries. Briefly, this study will seek similar results between the cases but also 
between cases and SSA. After all, it is impossible to find Finnish companies active 
everywhere in SSA, and therefore some generalization need to be done. However, in 
this study generalization is used to compare research results with previous studies and 
to connect findings to a wider theoretical framework. 
 
It is also interesting to find out to which extent the institutional environment is similar 
in different countries of SSA. In addition, in order to increase external validity and 
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generalizability, case companies are chosen based on common factors, such as being 
Finnish, performing in the ICT sector and being active in several SSA countries. 
Therefore some commonalities in their market entry strategies and responses to 
institutional environment could then be generalized to other similar companies. 
According to Yin (pp.36), external validity is often a major barrier in doing case 
studies, especially if only one case is applied, and therefore several cases are used in 
this study to further increase external validity. 
 
Yin (pp.36) notes that reliability in a case study means that if a later investigator 
followed exactly the same procedures as described by an earlier investigator, the later 
investigator should arrive at the same conclusions. In other words, the reliability 
measure aims at minimizing the errors and bias in a study (Yin, 1994). Interview 
questionnaires are therefore carefully documented in this study. Written documents of 
in-depth interviews were also documented in case further examination would be 
needed. In practice this means that all of the interviews were recorded and transcribed. 
In-depth interviews were also conducted in Finnish, which is the native language of 
the researcher and the interviewees, in order to avoid possible bias of interpretation 
from one language to another.  
 
There are certainly many restrictions caused by the chosen method. According to Yin 
(1994), one of the strengths of case studies is their contextuality. However, when 
results are analyzed they may thus be taken out of context, which could alter some of 
the results. The choice of interviewees could also impact the reliability of the study as 
all the answers are subjective. According to Riege (2003), the case study method has 
been criticized for being more subjective than other research forms due to a direct 
contact between the researcher and the organizations or people examined. 
Interviewees were also representatives of the company and they could have wished to 
give a more positive perspective of their activities in SSA than it actually is or they 
may have wished to emphasize the positive viewpoints of their company. For example 
Thierry Delarue emphasized the transparency of Nokia, but “forgot” to mention that 
Nokia uses Congolese tin, coltan and cobalt in its devices and therefore directly 
finances one of the longest ongoing civil-conflicts and human rights miseries in 
Africa and on the whole planet. In addition, the interviewees could deliberately have 
concealed essential information concerning the study. I tried to tackle these issues by 
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acquiring secondary information of the case companies, for example via their own 
websites and other sources. Often asking more indirect questions or rephrasing the 
same questions allowed to sense more true feelings relating to some issues.  
 
The next part of this study will concentrate on the empirical research that was 
conducted. First, the institutional environment of SSA will be introduced according to 
North (1990), consisting of formal and informal constraints. Then four company cases 
will be presented providing more detailed information of four example countries of 
SSA, after which the findings and discussions will be introduced. 
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5 Empirical Study 
 
5.1 Institutional framework of Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
It was discussed already earlier that an institutional framework consists of formal and 
informal constraints (North, 1990). Although there are great differences in institutions 
between different countries of SSA (Nwankwo and Richards, 2004), some common 
institutional constraints are identified based on literature and secondary data dealing 
with the SSA institutional framework. Therefore, before presenting the cases, main 
formal and informal constraints of institutional framework of SSA will be presented. 
The possible and additional country-specific constraints will be presented in a latter 
part of empirical study. 
5.2 Formal constraints in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
The marketing infrastructure 
 
Kinsey (1990) argues that in most of the developing countries and therefore in SSA 
countries, marketing infrastructure is underdeveloped and that commercial media, 
banking and financial facilities, physical distribution, research agencies and postal and 
other communications are generally under-represented creating additional costs and 
constraints on the organization. Kinsey continues by pointing out that both 
communications and physical distribution are in poor condition both in SSA and in 
developing countries in general. Therefore transportation facilities can often 
determine the extent of the market area. Nwanko (2000) gives an example in his 
research that poorly maintained roads add 17% to freight costs in Zambia. In Kenya, 
unreliable telephone and telex services reduce foreign exchange earnings by 2%. 
Kinsey (1990) further reveals that marketing channels are usually long, complex, 
highly fragmented and labor-intensive with products passing through various 
intermediaries. Because of the limited access to finance, for example retailers buy 
only small quantities from the wholesaler.  
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Fragile state environment 
 
According to Peng (2002), formal constraints include political rules, judicial decisions 
and economic contracts. He further states that the lack of a legal framework is 
accompanied by the lack of political certainty in those countries. Czinkota 
(pp.101─102; 2008) states that firms usually prefer to conduct business in a country 
with a stable and friendly political climate.  Czinkota argues that there is political risk 
involved in every nation, but the level of risk varies from country to country. 
According to him, there are three major risks: ownership risks, which expose property 
and life; operating risks, which refer to state interference, and transfer risks, which are 
met when funds are to be shifted between countries.  
 
Despite the fact that the IMF places only 14 countries on the list of fragile countries 
(see appendices), there are many other countries that are post-conflict countries, and 
therefore not necessarily very stable. In addition, many countries have internal turmoil 
and conflicts, for example in disputes in Nigerian Delta and in rebel activities in 
Chad. This should play a major role in strategic choices. Inequality and poverty are 
definitely factors that might create future instability, and the post-election crisis in 
Kenya in 2008─2009 is a typical example of this kind of development. Fragile state 
environments have implications for foreign businesses, too. A fragile state 
environment influences export guarantees. Although the Finnish governmental 
financing company Finnvera states that it issues export guarantees to most of SSA 
countries, it has still ranked the vast majority of these countries in the region as 
countries with poor creditability (Finnvera, 2008). This certainly has impacts on the 
cost of financing business deals in the region. 
 
Bureaucracy 
 
The role of the state is often very significant in Africa and affects business 
significantly. Next, some of the main formal constraints related to the state are 
analyzed. Shelley (2004: pp.18) argues how state bureaucracy is a severe problem in 
Africa; dealing with government agencies is very slow, inefficient and can be very 
costly. Shelley further continues: “What ever business you’re in, you will need far 
more licenses than anyone tells you or any kind of logic will ever dictate.” (Shelley, 
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2004:18). Procedures take three times longer than they normally would in Europe and 
therefore a great deal of patience is needed (Shelley 2004). One can expect that 
bureaucracy is something that will reduce interest and involvement of foreign 
companies. For example, one could expect companies to reduce bureaucracy by 
pursuing less active based entry modes instead of high active entry modes and perhaps 
tend to enter via a local partner to reduce involvement of different constituents of the 
bureaucratic environment. It is also important to emphasize that bureaucracy can be 
considered also as an informal constraint since bureaucracy is closely attached to 
social customs and culture which North categorizes to be factors defining informal 
constraints.  
 
Legal constraints  
 
One main legal constraint in SSA is tariffs, which are predominant foreign trade 
control mechanisms. Albaum et al. (2005:124) define tariffs as tax on imports which 
are commonly known to constrain international trade. In SSA countries, tariff 
percentage of all products is around 12 percent. Foreign entrants are interested in 
investment protection as well. A report named Economic Development in Africa 
(2008) reveals that SSA has among the lowest levels of investments protection and 
settling a business dispute can be particularly challenging. For example, according to 
the report in countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malawi, 
Mozambique and Sierra Leone, settling a business dispute could cost up twice the 
amount of the debt.  
 
Although there are evident legal constraints in SSA, African countries are making 
significant reforms in their business environment in order to achieve more foreign 
investments. For example Kenya and Ghana, but also countries in southern Africa, 
such as Madagascar, Mauritius and Mozambique, are committing broad-based 
reforms, including easing business regulations, procedures for property 
administration, licensing requirements and lifted regulatory obstacles that weigh 
heavily on the private sector (Regional Outlook:Sub-Saharan Africa 2008, IMF). A 
weak legal system might lead to increased informal procedures, because businesses 
cannot rely on formal ones. 
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A weak legal institutional environment has implications also for a firm’s entry 
strategies. Where many legal restrictions occur, firms tend to use joint venture modes 
while firms entering the environment with less legal restrictions tend to use wholly 
owned modes (Brouthers). Although Brouthers concentrates on equity modes in his 
study, his results may indicate that firms would likewise rather export their products 
through middlemen than do it themselves if legal constraints are high in a specific 
environment.          
 
Other formal constraints 
 
There are some other constraints which also are common. Firstly, there are constraints 
related to education and staffing. There are plenty of good universities in Africa 
producing a great number of post-graduates who nevertheless often lack appropriate 
working experience. It might be difficult for foreign entrants to find either local or 
foreign staff that is qualified enough. Finding a reliable local partner or contact person 
might also be challenging. Shelley (2004), for instance, warns of trusting local 
partners too blindly and adds that scamming by workers or local partners is very 
common.  
 
Constraints related to finance do also exist. Interest rates are higher in Sub-Saharan 
Africa than in any other region. Banks are more concentrated on financing the state 
than private firms that finance their investments with previous profits. Although 
foreign companies hardly rely on local banks, it might still be difficult to get financing 
from host countries and there might be difficulties getting export guarantees. Thirdly, 
one major infrastructural constraint mentioned in the IMF report (2008) was energy 
supply. Energy is expensive in SSA and companies are suffering from constant power 
outages which have negative effects on production. According to the IMF, the power 
sector needs urgent attention meaning that access to electricity needs to be increased, 
generation capacity needs to be scaled up and effectiveness of power utilities need to 
be improved. 
 
5.3 Informal constraints in Sub-Saharan Africa 
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It was already discussed that North (1990) defined social norms, customs and culture 
as informal constraints. The significance of culture has been acknowledged in many 
studies, for example Hofstede (1980) indicates that organizational policies can loose 
their effectiveness when the cultural environment changes. Therefore, one can see 
cultural factors as an informal constraint to strategic choices.  
 
The significance of cultural factors 
 
According to Kinsey (1988:49), culture has far-reaching influences on the firm’s 
marketing environment and affects all areas of an organization’s operations, both 
internally and externally. Kinsey (49-55) argues for how culture has effects on 
demand, on the organization’s public environment and on the macro-economic 
environment. Kinsey emphasizes how culture does have an effect on the marketing 
strategy and on the personnel along with other factors. It has significant meaning for 
the marketing strategy and for the tactics because culture will influence what is 
needed, how something is bought, who buys and decides to purchase. Therefore a 
marketing strategy must be implemented in accordance with a cultural framework. 
 
Characteristics of African cultures 
 
None of the SSA countries can be considered as national states. They all consist of 
diverse and differing cultures, both among themselves and among outsiders. Beugré 
and Offodile (2001) argue for how SSA is not a culturally unified region and is 
characterized by diversity, contrasts and contradictions. Jackson (2004) states that 
managers should take a cross-cultural approach to management in African countries 
because these countries consist of several different ethnic, tribal and religious groups.  
 
Despite the tremendous diversity, Beugré and Offodile argue that there are some 
common features among African cultures. There are, for example, 42 different tribes 
in Kenya while the equivalent number in Tanzania is 120. These characteristics 
should be taken into consideration when foreign companies are considering entry to 
Africa.  Beugré and Offodile identify the first common factor as respect for elders; 
Africans have great respect for older persons who they see as a source of wisdom. 
Beugré and Offodile identify a second characteristic as the importance of the extended 
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family. Family members are considered to have the moral obligation to help their 
family members, also in financial terms. The third major characteristic defined by 
Béugre and Offodile is collectivism; according to them group activities have always 
characterized African societies which shun individualism. Jackson adds that good 
social and personal relations are very important in African societies. Béugre and 
Offodile indentify deference to authority as the fifth common cultural feature 
indicating that most Africans favor absolute obedience to the authorities.  
 
There are also some other important prevailing cultural norms in Africa. Greeting and 
shaking hands is very important and especially in the countryside people should 
always greet the elders. People are also sensitive to how one pronounces their names 
and they do not want one to be patronizing or to show prejudice, bias, or stereotypical 
beliefs. One should definitely avoid condescending behavior and try to value Africa’s 
distinctive culture and heritage. 
 
Culture as a constraining factor 
 
From a business perspective, African culture can be challenging for foreign 
companies. Béugre and Offodile see that collective African cultures are intolerant of 
uncertainty which can be a challenge for a foreign company and its leadership, 
because for example government and companies’ local staff can oppose anything that 
is new and unfamiliar, and resist change within an organization. Authoritarian 
leadership and a collectivist approach can negatively affect the entrepreneurship of 
local workers who expect to always get direct guidelines on how to perform. In 
collective cultures it can be difficult to find someone willing to take responsibility or 
admitting one’s mistakes. Collective culture where a person is expected to share the 
profits with a larger family group can mean less incentive to work harder and be more 
successful (Béugre and Offodile). 
 
Béugre and Offodile quoted Kiggundu (1988) by stating that work motivation can 
occur as a serious problem in African organizations, but note that the same factors that 
motivate workers in Western cultures are also important in Africa. Shelley (2004:76) 
for instance notes that workers with higher diplomas often want to participate in 
decision-making processes and states that African workers need similar incentives to 
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those of any other educated worker in the world. Jackson (pp.183) adds that in 
communalistic societies as in African societies, the barriers between community life 
and organizational life must be broken down in order to provide the workforce with a 
context for motivation and commitment. 
 
In addition, foreign companies should understand to take a cross-cultural management 
approach in organizations with local staff as well as be aware of the existence of 
multiple stakeholders accommodating their interests. Multiple stakeholders do not 
refer only to family and tribe, but also to responsibility to the community as a whole 
(Jackson, pp.180). 
 
Other informal constraints 
 
Corruption 
 
Corruption and networks were discussed in the context of weak institutions, but one 
can understand them as serious constraining elements as well. As noted before, 
corruption is deeply rooted in SSA societies. According to Shelley (pp.74), each of 
the companies needs to define its approach to corruption and rent-seeking behavior. It 
is important to emphasize that corruption is perceived differently in different 
countries; what seems to be bribing in Finland can be considered as harmless gift 
giving or relationship building somewhere else. A strict approach to corruption can 
also weaken a company’s position in relation to other companies with a less strict 
approach. Companies need also to assess how a corruptive environment will affect 
them in the long run; a slack attitude might ease the company’s activity in a specific 
place at first but might then restrict other opportunities in the future. 
 
Pervasive and arbitrary corruption has a direct impact on entry strategies and 
decisions. Where corruption is highly arbitrary, firms cannot necessarily easily define 
their critical constituents which reduce the firms’ ability to conform local institutional 
environment and thereby gain legitimacy (Rodriguez et al. 2005). Rodriguez et al. 
claim that companies entering environments suffering from highly arbitrary 
corruption are more likely to enter via a local partner than via a wholly owned partner, 
because it might reduce uncertainty related to arbitrariness. Entering with a local 
partner might as well reduce interaction with government officials and the risk of 
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meeting corrupt officials, because foreign firms are more often subjected to regulatory 
constraints than local firms are (Yiu and Makino). According to Mbaku, corruption in 
Africa has a strong bureaucratic nature that might indicate that corruption is more 
pervasive than arbitrary in Africa. 
 
Pervasiveness reduces the likelihood that a company entering via FDI will choose a 
local partner, because the benefits from partnering are reduced and 
compliance/acquiescence with pressures to engage in corruption is expected 
(Rodriguez et al.). Partnering does not reduce the likelihood of costs of corruption. In 
a pervasive corrupt environment, legitimacy may be acquired by acquiring 
government consent (Rodriguez et al.). This external legitimacy and engaging in 
corruption can be a threat to an organization’s internal legitimacy. Rodriguez et al. 
argue that companies that would enter a host country of high pervasive corruption 
from a home country with strict anti-corruption laws, norms and values would be 
more likely to enter via non-equity modes. Rodriguez et al. concentrated mainly on 
equity modes of entry, but their findings could be applicable analyzing non-equity 
modes, for example exporting. One can argue that a company would prefer more 
indirect or direct exporting when corruption is arbitrary, but prefer their own 
exporting when corruption is pervasive, because a domestic or a foreign middleman 
would not either reduce the chance of costs of corruption.    
 
Personal relations and networks 
 
It was discussed earlier how weak institutional environment encourages companies to 
find alternative methods to cope with an uncertain environment. Networks and 
personal relations are likely to occur in these environments and their significance in 
business should not be underestimated. Without the support of a domestic network or 
access to a local network, conducting business can get very complex and difficult. 
Ellis (2000) found that personal ties can facilitate market entry by providing 
connections, but personal relations are also useful for screening and evaluating 
potential exchange partners. In addition, in international business, some sort of social 
engagement is a prerequisite for ascertaining trustworthiness well in advance before 
commencing negotiations (Björkman and Kock, 1995).  
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Good social contacts and access to a network can be a way to acquire external 
legitimacy (Rodriguez et al.) but they can also enable entry modes which would not 
otherwise be possible, because of, for instance, lack of resources and information. For 
example, companies would prefer less active entry-modes if they would lack contacts 
in the host country, because highly active entry-modes demand more valuable 
contacts in an unstable environment such as in SSA countries. However, it is evident 
that the importance of a network varies from industry to industry and from country to 
country. Nevertheless, in communal cultures such as in African ones, social contacts 
should be seen as a vital tool for conducting business. 
 
Time orientation 
 
Harvey and Kamoche (2004) state that time should be considered as a critical strategic 
variable when doing business in African countries. Harvey and Kamoche quote 
Nayyar and Bantel (1994) by describing how the ability to perform in Africa as timely 
manner is associated with the organization’s dynamic capabilities to distribute its 
assets timely and effectively by balancing the stock and flow of its resources.  
 
In Africa, managing time may be challenging for Western companies, because the 
concept of time can vary dramatically between an African and a Western country 
(Harvey and Kamoche). Sayings such as “hakuna matata” in Swahili or “mora mora” 
in Malagasy refer to taking things easy and not rushing too much. Harvey and 
Kamoche claim that some difficulties associated with doing business in African 
countries by Western organizations are rooted in the difference of the time concept; 
urgency and the future perspective of time are often at odds with many African 
cultures. It is therefore important to understand nuances of different dimensions of 
time in African cultures and to understand that they have an effect on cross-cultural 
relationships (Harvey and Kamoche). Having an importance in relationships, we can 
expect also time issues to affect entry-mode choices, especially in modes of choice 
where entry is made together with a local partner. 
 
5.4 Company cases  
 
Snapshot of case companies  
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One common factor among the case companies seems to be that each of them regards 
Africa as their strategic target market and all of them strive to expand their operations 
in SSA. All of them have also been able to do business directly with the end customer 
without any middlemen. In some cases, some of them had a local partner but that was 
because of legislative reasons. Each of the companies is a specialist in its own 
industry and field of expertise, and most of them are investing heavily in research and 
development. None of the case companies has made direct investments in SSA and all 
of them use exporting as their primary penetrating mode to the area. However, in 
many cases it is part of the case companies’ business not to engage capital while 
conducting projects in SSA. 
 
Name African Operation Country Year of Start Turnover 
Omnitele Direct exporting Angola 2003 8 million    (EUR) 
Jutel Project exporting Botswana 2002 3.2 million (EUR) 
SANAKO Project exporting 
South 
Africa 2004 12 million (EUR) 
Tramigo Indirect exporting Nigeria 2005 2.5 million (EUR) 
Table 1 Case companies 
 
5.4.1 Market environment of examples countries 
 
To provide a broader view of the example countries’ market environments, which 
further facilitates assessing the institutional framework of these countries, three 
different indicators are used. The Mo Ibrahim Governance Index ranks African 
countries based on various factors including Safety and Security, Rule of Law, 
Transparency and Corruption, Participation and Human Rights, Sustainable Economic 
Development and Human Development (http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/the-
index.asp). The Corruption Perception Index measures the perceived corruption 
degree among public officials and politicians (Transparency international, 2008). The 
scores of this ranking vary from 10 to1 points, the higher the score point the less 
corruption prevails in the country.   
 
The World Bank’s Doing Business Index ranks economies according to their ease of 
doing business. A high ranking on the ease of doing business index means the 
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regulatory environment is conducive to the operation of business. The index is based 
on ten different factors, which are: starting a business, dealing with construction 
permit, employing workers, registering property, getting credit, protecting investors, 
paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and closing a business 
(www.doingbusiness.org). Although this index mainly describes the circumstances 
faced by local companies, it is a useful measurement also in this study, since factors 
measured in doing business index all have indirect influence at least on foreign 
entrants. More information on these three indicators and SSA countries are available 
in the appendices. Above, rankings of example countries are presented and compared 
with each other. The comprehensive listings of all SSA countries are available in the 
appendices in order to provide outlook of the whole region. Although these indicators 
are relatively little detailed and vague, they provide good general insight to business 
environments. 
 
Corruption Perception Index 
Case Country Regional Country Rank Global Country Rank CPI Score
Botswana 1 36 5.8
South Africa 4 54 4.9
Nigeria 22 121 2.7
Angola 35 158 1.9
Table 2 Corruption Perception Index 
 
Mo Ibrahim Governance Index 
Case Country Regional Country Rank 
Botswana 4
South Africa 5
Nigeria 39
Angola 44
Table 3 Mo Ibrahim Governance Index 
 
Ease of Doing Business Index 
Case Country Regional Country Rank Global Country Rank 
South Africa 2 32 
Botswana 3 38 
Nigeria 12 118 
Angola 38 168 
Table 4 Ease of Doing Business Index 
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5.5 Case 1. Omnitele in Angola 
 
Omnitele is a telecommunications consulting company established in 1988 and 
operating in Helsinki. The company is relatively internationalized by having projects 
in more than 70 countries worldwide. The net sales of the company were 8 million 
Euros in 2007. According to the company’s website, Omnitele has helped their clients 
to solve daily commercial and technical challenges. One of the company’s core 
strengths is detailed technical know-how and solid business understanding. The 
company concentrates on three key consulting service areas, which are: operator 
product and service development; operator network and business development; and 
network planning and optimization. According to Omnitele’s website, the company 
concentrates on small-medium sized mobile operators and their operating 
environment, their challenges and their ways of working.    
 
Market environment of Angola 
 
According to all three indicators used to analyze the SSA countries’ market 
environment, Angola is ranked at the very bottom of the list. Angola’s rank in Mo 
Ibrahim Governance Index is 44th position, leaving behind only Sudan, Chad, DRC 
and Somalia. According to Transparency international (2008), Angola ranked among 
the most corrupted countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and in the world and scored only 
1.9 index points indicating that corruption is deeply rooted in Angola. The World 
Bank’s Doing Business Index ranks Angola at the eleventh last position in SSA, at 
the168th position in the world. Although Angola has committed some reforms, such 
as eased starting a business and dealing with construction permits, it has not been able 
to increase its position in the DB index. Based on these three indicators it seems that 
despite immense economic growth (16.3%, IMF 2008) which is fueled by Angola’s 
vast oil and diamond reserves, Angola remains to be suffering from substantial 
poverty and remains to be an extremely difficult  market environment.  
 
Doing business can be very challenging in Angola for both local and foreign 
companies. Registering property takes approximately 334 days in Angola compared to 
14 in Finland. Angola falls short also of forcing contracts and trading across borders, 
which are particularly important factors to consider for any firm. Exporting across 
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borders, which refers to required documents, time and cost to export and import, is 
very complex in Angola. For example, it takes 62 days for Angolan companies to 
finish the import process and the cost of importing is 3325 USD per container 
whereas the equivalent figures in Finland are 575 USD and 8 days. Briefly, trading 
across borders is both time-consuming and expensive in Angola. Enforcing contracts 
is also challenging in Angola: it takes over 46 different procedures. The duration of 
solving a commercial dispute takes over 1011 days costing on average 44.4% of the 
claim. To compare, in Finland it only takes 235 days and costs only 10.4% of the 
claim. One positive factor for foreign entrants in Angola is, however, its relatively 
good level of protecting investors which is above the global and African median 
(Doing Business, Angola country profile, 2009). 
 
Although Angola still is suffering from the consequences of the civil war lasting for 
decades, it currently enjoys relative political stability with MPLA -Movimento 
Popular de Libertação de Angola being the dominant political party in the country. 
The greatest tasks for MPLA are to improve resource management, to restore 
credibility to public life and to cut regional economic imbalances where yet infant 
mortality stands at 26% and life expectancy is 41.7 years. Angola is deeply dependent 
on oil which accounts for 95% of the export revenue and more than half of the GDP. 
Angola also has vast diamond reserves and the country’s hydro-electric potential and 
agriculture sector, notably cotton industry could attract high investment. In addition, 
there are major construction projects going on in the country which has attracted a 
few billion of foreign investment. Although it might take decades to overcome some 
of the challenges, Angola has all the raw ingredients to win the development battle. 
(Africa Report, 2009). 
 
Ominitele’s activities in Angola 
 
According to company representatives, Africa is one key strategic target market and 
Omnitele is thus one of the few Finnish companies with experience of working in 
over ten different countries in Africa. Their primary customers in Africa had been 
local operators and regulators. Many of the projects have been singular but for 
example in Ghana and in Côte d’Ivoire the company is used to have long term 
partnerships. Their current long-term partnership is the Angolan-based teleoperator 
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Unicel. Omnitele penetrated Angolan markets for the first time in 1999 when their 
customer Unicel gained their license. During that time, Omnitele worked as sub-
contractor for the Swedish telecommunications company Ericsson that was the 
responsible of building a network in Angola. Basically Omnitele consultants worked 
for Ericsson because Ericsson had staff shortages at that time and needed outside help 
in order to complete the project in Angola. During that time, Angola was a totally 
unknown target market in every level for company staff and executives. After 
finishing the project with Ericsson, a few years passed without any business in 
Angola, until 2003, when the Angolan part contacted Omnitele because they needed 
someone independent to evaluate the performance of the local network. Since then, 
Omnitele has been able to deepen and foster partnership with the Angolan partner 
through various projects. And today, several of its consultants are only involved in 
consulting Unicel with various tasks. It is important to note that Omnitele went to 
Angola because of pull factors of market and not because of the company had 
particularly planned to penetrate Angolan markets. It is also important to note that 
Omnitele was able to do business directly with the customer without using any local 
or domestic middlemen. 
5.5.1 Case findings 
 
Formal and informal constraints 
 
Even though Omnitele is a consultant company and therefore probably less vulnerable 
to some characteristics of institutional environment, it has experienced various types 
of challenges both in Angola and in other African countries.  The first challenge 
mentioned several times was the low level of infrastructure. In many other African 
countries one obstacle for business was that the networks are still underdeveloped and 
lacking capacity which therefore reduces competency. In Angola, however, network 
technology is very advanced, but the problem seems to be that the connection point to 
the international network is limited and therefore also lacks capacity. In terms of 
transportation, Angola was the hardest place for Omnitele, and due to decades of civil 
war, the overall level of infrastructure is low. Transportation is very challenging due 
to lack of proper roads. High costs were one emphasized factor in Angola, and due to 
the booming economy, costs of living are terribly high in Luanda – the capital of 
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Angola, and restaurants and hotels are very expensive and lack capacity. In the 
countryside, accommodation was also said to be very challenging from time to time.  
 
There are several legal constraints mentioned by Omnitele consultants. There were 
problems related to customs and one major constraining factor is withholding taxes. 
From each invoice sent to customer a certain percentage of total sums is relieved and 
paid to government. Another clear constraining factor imposed by government is anti-
corruption campaigns creating situations where business deals have to go via former 
tender process. Anti-corruption campaigns are common outside Angola, too, and 
create delays for projects because all foreign companies are tendered. This is the 
common case especially with state companies or companies where the state is a 
shareholder. Respondents experienced that decision-making is generally very slow in 
Angola. Although Omnitele consultants did not have any direct links to officials in 
Angola, they complained about the formality of the visa process and about the 
difficulty of obtaining visas to Angola. 
 
Omnitele is not suffering from many informal constraints or they would not be able to 
identify any. Representatives acknowledged that corruption might exist in Angola but 
they have not come across it. This is probably due to the fact that as a consulting 
company, they sell a special kind of expertise and according to Markku Lohikko and 
Seppo Virtanen, their business is so similar everywhere in the world that 
competitiveness in their industry cannot be obtained through corruption. The company 
recognized that networks might exist in Angola and acknowledged that personal 
relations are very important in consultancy. In addition, Omnitele executives 
mentioned that in Angola and elsewhere in Africa local companies are not 
accustomed to the use of outside consultants, meaning that in local business culture 
consultants are not often used. This can also be a possibility for Omnitele, as Seppo 
Virtanen mentioned, because in Europe companies need consultancy to a certain niche 
whereas in SSA companies needs consultancy in a wider perspective.  
 
There was also one clear factor which reduces Omnitele’s business in Angola. It is 
difficult to find experienced staff willing to work in Angola for more than a very short 
period of time. Seppo Lohikko mentioned that because this company sometimes had 
to rely on “the second best” options. 
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Omnitele recognized that the biggest threat to their business is a fragile state structure. 
Although Angola is peaceful country, the future might be difficult to forecast. Seppo 
Lohikko mentioned that the company was previously forced to withdraw from Côte 
d'Ivoire due to a civil conflict. Changes in the institutional environment were seen as a 
threat by Omnitele. Seppo Lohikko concludes: “Even long term partnerships can 
change and cease to exist when environment changes in some way, for example in our 
cases in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire there were reorganizations in local companies; 
foreign operator acquires local operator when whole field changes, decision making 
changes and whole function of the operator changes – there were no longer need for 
our know-how.” Basically if some foreign operator acquires Omnitele’s customer 
company Unicel that could mean end to their partnership. Nevertheless, both Lohikko 
and Virtanen emphasized the fact that the core of the business in Angola does not 
differ in any way from their business in other countries outside Africa. Consequently, 
due to the nature of consulting business and Omnitele’s strategy, the institutional 
environment in Angola does not have an effect on the company’s entry strategy in 
Angola, but this does not mean it would not influence Omnitele in other ways. 
 
Strategic responses to institutional pressures 
 
For a company such as Omnitele, the only way to adapt to the local environment in 
Angola is to comply with the local institutional environment as best as they can. 
However, one cannot state that Omnitele uses acquiescence tactics since it is not yet 
integrated enough in Angola to be aware of all possible constituents to comply with. 
Thereby Omnitele’s response strategy concerning Angola would be something of 
compromising. Basically Omnitele knows what is possible in Angola and what is not. 
When asked what they have learnt in Angola Seppo Lohikko responded that: “Well, 
at least we have learnt a great deal of realism. We understand that a project that 
could be done within a month in Western Europe takes three in Africa and we have 
learnt to be aware of those factors relating to everyday realism”.  
 
This realism, which can also be understood as institutional framework or boundaries, 
which need to be identified in the very beginning of project scoping. Seppo Lohikko 
continues by stating that: ”One needs to understand that we’re in Africa and even if 
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the basic needs of local operators are the same in Africa as in Europe, one needs to 
take reality into consideration, some things which are possible in Europe thanks to 
good infrastructure are not possible to carry out in Africa. One just needs to take this 
feature into consideration.” Omnitele is able to operate in those countries in SSA 
where it can comply with local conditions. For example Omnitele has been avoiding 
French speaking countries of SSA, because they do not speak French, and they also 
said that they would avoid going to Somalia, Zimbabwe or Nigeria because of weak 
security. To conclude, an environment with which Omnitele cannot comply is a total 
barrier for entry. 
 
Legitimacy and overcoming constraints in Angola 
 
In Angola and everywhere else in SSA, Omnitele aims at building long-term 
partnerships. In terms of sales, long-term partnerships are always more profitable for 
companies. However, while long-term partnerships aim at longer term cooperation, it 
has deepened the level of cooperation between Omnitele and Unicel and thereby at the 
same time deepened integration of Omnitele into Angolan markets. Omnitele’s 
experience shows that a long-term partnership with same old customer is a better 
solution in terms of legitimacy in Angola than let us say short-term projects with 
different clients. Consequently, the possibility for long-term partnerships is one key 
factor for Omnitele in the target country decision. Karri Virkajärvi also mentioned 
that DRC, Nigeria and Somalia are countries where they prefer not to enter because of 
the bad security situation.  But in addition, all these countries also have a very fragile 
state environment open to radical changes where commitment to long-term 
partnerships becomes impossible. 
 
The first starting point for Omnitele to overcome some of the constraints in Angolan 
markets is comprehension of the market in which Omnitele has succeeded relatively 
well. To be able to understand market characteristics in Angola, Omnitele has been 
able to better assess the potential in the market. Omnitele was able to penetrate 
Angola without outside help, but apparently this was due to good earlier references 
which apparently can create one path to enter into markets. At the moment, Omnitele 
is a part of the export ring managed by Cyrr Group which assists Omnitele in finding 
the right partners and organizing meetings in SSA. One major constraint affecting 
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entry has been local networks and overall difficulty of finding customers and partners. 
In many cases, Finnish embassies abroad and consulates have been very helpful 
assisting Omnitele to open relations with African customers. Markku Virtanen 
explained that: “I do believe that official backing has been very helpful because 
getting through is generally very difficult and thereby the help of embassy becomes 
very handy, because the call or letter from embassy opens the doors – the protocol is 
very important in SSA.”  
 
A major constraint for doing business in Angola for Omnitele was the difficulty of 
getting to the country fast when urgent need for Omnitele consultants occurs. 
Constant local presence would perhaps be a good way to overcome these issues and 
would signal that the company is committed to a specific partnership. Despite the 
importance of local presence, Omnitele’s biggest internal obstacle to long-term 
legitimacy in Angola is the lack of skilled staff. Seppo Lohikko described how 
sending staff to Angola is very difficult and how those who had gone there had had 
adaptation problems. Although there are few consultants working just with an 
Angolan partner which is a significant customer for Omnitele, it is clear that some of 
the consultation work needs to be done in Angola and not in Finland, because 
consultation is hand-in-hand doing demanding a face-to-face way of working. 
 
In Angola, Omnitele rarely organizes extracurricular events or occasions to foster 
partnerships with local partners. Omnitele considers that its most critical success 
factor and way to deepen partnership has been success projects. Being able to meet 
customer expectations has been a key factor in Omnitele’s success in Angola. 
Omnitele felt that it is important to be able to create an atmosphere where the 
customer feels he gets enough value in return for what it has paid, unless there will be 
no future projects. One can state that for Omnitele, the first stage for long-term 
legitimacy is successfulness of consulting projects. Therefore internal factors relation 
to legitimacy become very determining because once Omnitele has difficulties in 
finding staff to be sent to Angola and have to rely more on “second best choices”, it 
ultimately has an effect on the outcome of the projects. Once one major determining 
factor to survival is quality, the outcome of the projects could be threatened if there 
are no correct persons available.  The company would also become more volatile to 
competitors if local customers would obtain more incentive to change its partner due 
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to the fact that the other side of the partner could not provide enough value to that 
partnership and it would cease to exist. After all, another success factor for Omnitele 
has been that they are able to deliver the service that they have promised. 
 
5.6 Case 2. Jutel in Botswana  
 
Jutel is among the oldest and most experienced suppliers of digital radio broadcast 
solutions in the world. It was established in 1984 and its current head office is located 
in Oulu.  According to their website, “Jutel provides the best and most innovative 
solutions for managing media assets, radio workflow and radio broadcasting content 
to various delivery channels.”  Jutel’s primary product is called Jutel Radio Man 
which is a unique and complete broadcast content management solution.  Jutel Radio 
Man can be absorbed for both major broadcasters and for small to medium-sized radio 
stations. These different product groups of Radio man are called enterprise edition and 
workgroup edition. In addition to these products, Jutel provides its customers with 
various types of service and maintenance. Jutel aims at providing its customers with 
the best and most innovative solutions and therefore heavily invests on R&D. The 
turnover of the company is 3.2 million Euros. 
 
Market environment of Botswana 
 
Compared to Angola, Botswana is totally different although both of these two 
countries’ economies are deeply dependent on exports of diamonds. Botswana is a 
leading country among other African countries in all of the three indicators used to 
assess the market environment of the case countries in this study. Botswana’s rank in 
the Mo Ibrahim Index is fourth after Mauritius, Seychelles and Cape Verde which all 
are island states. Botswana is also the least corrupted country in Africa and in 35th 
position in the world. In terms of easiness of doing business, Botswana is in second 
position in Africa and 32nd in whole world. Thanks to the long-lasting positive 
economic growth which has been exceptional compared to other African states with 
small populations, only 1.6 million people (CIA fact book, 2008) has helped 
Botswana to maintain its leading position in the economic development in the SSA 
region.  
67 
 
In recent years, Botswana has been able to conduct a series of substantial reforms 
which are also recognized by the World Bank since for instance Botswana was able to 
climb over 14 steps in the doing business index compared to the year 2008. Botswana 
has done especially well in protecting investors and after some serious reforms has 
changed its position from 110th to 38th in the world, which is exceptional in all terms. 
Botswana does especially well also in getting credit and registering property. 
However, in terms of enforcing contracts and trading across borders Botswana 
remains to be a challenging environment. Enforcing contracts last approximate 987 
days with 28% cost of claim. For foreign companies, the cost of claim becomes most 
likely even higher. Thereby solving commercial disputes takes almost 4 times longer 
in Botswana than in Finland and costs twice as much. In land-locked Botswana, 
trading across borders is also expensive and time-consuming, as it takes 
approximately 41 days to finish the import process and costs around 3064 USD per 
container, almost as much as in Angola, which is over 5 times more expensive than 
imports in Finland. To conclude, although Botswana in many terms is an extremely 
easy target destination for foreign entrants – the penetration to Botswana can be partly 
very challenging, since exporting to Botswana can be substantially complex, both in 
cost and timely manner. In addition, although investor protecting is relatively high in 
Botswana, it is not necessarily enough for foreign entrants and especially for those 
needing local partner since in case of a possible dispute the resolution can require 
enormous amounts of time and resources (Doing Business, Botswana country profile, 
2009). 
 
The stabile continuation of real GDP growth of approximately 5% is expected to 
continue in Botswana due to the static diamond production that creates Botswana’s 
main exports. Botswana is relatively dependent on electricity imports from South 
Africa and has been suffering from electricity shortages caused by power shortfall in 
South Africa. Botswana also pursues economic diversification by positioning 
Botswana as a global financial center and expanding tourism. Botswana is also 
starting to expand production of other minerals such as copper, nickel and coal and is 
on track to become a uranium producer (Africa Report, 2009).  
 
Jutel’s activities in Botswana 
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The primary customers of Jutel are located in Botswana and Egypt, but the company 
does have activities also in Kenya, Ghana, Namibia and South Africa. Jutel has also 
identified Africa as one of its key target markets. According to Kai Mattlar, this is due 
to the huge technological backwardness of radio broadcasting systems, but also to the 
extremely tight competition in European markets. Most European countries already 
have digital broadcasting systems. Hence, the business potential in SSA is seen as 
exceptionally tremendous by Jutel. Currently, the company aims at fostering its 
partnership with SABC which could allow a smoother entry to other Southern African 
countries. 
 
Jutel’s history in Botswana began in 2002 when the government of Botswana decided 
that they need a modern TV and radio house system and set up an international tender 
process. This tender was won by British Dega systems. Kai Mattlar has met 
executives of Dega systems at a particular trade fair, and afterwards it was agreed 
between these two companies that Jutel provides the software needed for this build-
up. Briefly, Jutel worked as sub-contractor for Dega systems. Servers for software 
were installed in Finland, and when the system was built, it was sent to Botswana. 
The staff of Jutel then went to Botswana and helped in installation, build-up and 
training of the system. Jutel had, similarly to Omnitele, very little information of 
Botswana before entering its markets. It was likewise more pulled to Botswana’s 
market than pushed away from it. The entry to Botswana can thus be considered 
coincidental.. The Radio Man System was built in 2004, and currently Jutel has two 
big customers in Botswana: Radio Botswana and the Ministry of Agriculture. At the 
moment, Jutel aims at selling more products and services for the latter one. Just like 
Omnitele, Jutel has been able to penetrate to Botswana and South Africa without 
middlemen and gained the customer contacts without outside help. 
 
5.6.1 Case findings 
 
Informal and formal constraints 
 
Doing business is relatively much easier in Botswana than in many other countries in 
Africa. The World Bank ranked Botswana in its Doing Business Index as the third 
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easiest place to conduct business. Nevertheless, there are some clear constraints to 
market entries identified by Jutel. Bureaucracy is said to be the number one challenge 
making Jutel and foreign companies suffer in Botswana. Bureaucracy, such as tender 
processes, does not only slow things down significantly but it also exists in 
hierarchies in local organizations which slow down projects done jointly between 
foreign and local companies. In Botswana and likewise in Angola, bureaucracy in 
tender processes stems from anti-corruption campaigns, and each part of the process is 
carefully scrutinized, which creates extensions in the activities in the country. 
 
As in Angola, withholding taxes exist also in Botswana and are at the level of 15%. 
One clear constraint in Botswana is low education and know-how level which 
certainly set certain limits for foreign companies, such as Jutel, involved in high-tech 
products. One tremendous problem that vicariously impacts foreign companies in 
Botswana is HIV/AIDS.  The country has an estimated adult HIV prevalence of 
23.9%, the second highest in the world after Swaziland 
(http://www.avert.org/aidsbotswana.htm). In a first hand AIDS slows development of 
Botswana by wiping out young adult population in their most productive age.  
 
In Botswana Jutel does not use normal electronic invoicing instead of letter of credits 
and prepayments, but mentions that poor credibility and an underdeveloped finance 
sector is often a problem for Jutel in Botswana just like elsewhere in Africa. Lastly, 
one formal constraint that can create additional headache for foreign entrants is BEE 
(Black Economic Empowerment) laws that aim at strengthening the black 
population’s economic welfare and share in the economy. However, for Jutel BEE 
laws have been more influential in South Africa than in Botswana where these laws 
are not as strict. Ambiguously, Mr. Mattlar said that Botswana is an easy and safe 
place to be, but mentioned that it can, however, be challenging for foreign companies 
to enter.  
 
In addition to formal constraints there are some informal constraints in Botswana and 
elsewhere in Africa. According to Mr. Mattlar: “One feature of culture one should 
know…which is almost as bad as somewhere in the East, Japan or Thailand is losing 
face, if one makes a mistake it’s a terrible thing for them, for example if I speak 
nonsense – it will close doors in a very big area, because with these guys, one need to 
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know that their network is significant.” Although Mr. Mattlar on another occasion 
stated that personal networks are not very significant in Botswana, they clearly have 
some meaning after all, because once a foreign company is in that network, even if it 
does not recognize it, it should still behave according to the norms of the network or 
otherwise it could damage the company. The second informal constraint might be that 
despite the direct trade to Botswana, local customers often expect that foreign a 
entrant has a local partner and often this is the first question to be asked of a foreign 
company. Jutel felt that Africans like to trade with other Africans, not only in 
Botswana but also elsewhere in SSA. In other words, they feel more comfortable 
acting with each others. Thereby, using a local partner the things can happen in a way 
familiar to both parties. To conclude, in Botswana local environment does not impact 
a company’s entry mode strategy where Jutel is able to sell directly to its customers. 
However, in South Africa they do need a local partner by law, and Jutel actually 
benefits from a local partnership because it makes its business more effective. They 
have a local partner to take care of maintenance and service. 
 
Strategic responses to institutional pressures 
 
As mentioned before, Jutel has been able to trade with Botswanian clients relatively 
smoothly. Consequently, the local environment does not strongly affect the 
company’s operations. However, Kai Mattlar mentioned that the company still needs 
to adapt to local conditions in certain ways. For example, even in Botswana some 
product localization needs to be done by Jutel in order for it to match local customer 
demand. Jutel needs to customize its products to suit the needs of each customer.  It 
was also mentioned that customers in Europe prefer simple and plain software 
whereas customers in Africa could be satisfied with weaker software with nice colors 
and effects.  
 
Although Jutel as a small company has very small chances to impact the local 
environment to a larger extent, it has been active in impacting its potential customers 
and their preferences. Kai Mattlar described how they try to find potential customers 
in Southern Africa who need to build up the whole radio broadcasting and to discuss 
with them before they send a very detailed offer request. By doing so, Jutel is able to 
influence potential customers’ bids and gain points for the company. This is important 
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because Jutel’s marketed systems are so profound and thereby sold through 
international tender processes. The proactive approach of identifying customers is 
similar to that of Omnitele.  Jutel’s one way to affect possible changes in the 
institutional environment is to try to build up long-term partnerships with big local 
players such as SABC, which could facilitate Jutel’s integration into other Southern 
African countries. It was also mentioned by Seppo Lohikko of Omnitele that the 
company would be less vulnerable to changes in the environment and that their future 
in SSA would look more secure if they were able to partner with some big local 
player such as MTS, which is Southern Africa’s own operator present in many SSA 
countries. 
 
Legitimacy and overcoming constraints in Botswana 
 
Good “personal chemistry” was seen as an important facilitator in different projects of 
Jutel. Kai Mattlar described how he has learnt that in Botswana personal trust is very 
important: “Before one should even start talking about money, one should use time for 
talking and getting familiarized with local customer. It’s a slow way to do business 
but one can start talking about money once you drop the Mr. and you both start using 
your first names.”  Due to personal trust with local customers in Botswana, Jutel is 
able to overcome constraints in poor credibility and move to normal electronic billing. 
It was discussed earlier how good social contacts can be a way to acquire external 
legitimacy (Rodriguez et al.) and this seems to be the case also with Jutel. 
 
In Botswana, Jutel has also learnt that a foreign company needs to be able to invest 
seriously in the market and this has to be noted also by potential local customers and 
partners. For example, it gives a positive and better image when a foreign visitor stays 
overnight in Botswana, because the “fly-bye” attitude is considered rude. Knowledge 
of local culture and expectations are seen important by Jutel. Kai Mattlar described 
how people in Botswanian culture tend to give small gifts to each other. This practice 
was then absorbed by Kai Mattlar and he explained how giving small items such as a 
tea mug, a mouse pad or Finnish chocolate makes an impression on the local people. 
Consequently, Kai Mattlar emphasized how one should treat locals with great respect 
and form real friendships to make business runsmoothly. 
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Local presence is also very important and therefore for instance in South Africa Jutel 
has a local partner, Harambe, which is also required by the law. For Jutel the local 
partner is needed to ease adapting to the local institutional framework. It also benefits 
Jutel by enabling increased local presence which is particularly important for the 
company since one goal for Jutel is to prove they are able to provide services and 
maintenance from Finland to Botswana and other SSA countries. Kai Mattlar also 
noted that in some countries a local partner is also better than a foreign one due to 
BEE regulations. The protocol was also seen as important in integration in SSA and 
Jutel uses Cyrr Group to ease integration to other Southern African countries. Using 
Cyrr Group services has been seen as a very cost effective approach by Jutel. This 
indicates that using outside services or consultancy to overcome entry barriers could 
be an effective way to integrate to different SSA countries.  
 
Legitimacy can be seen particularly important for Jutel, because for them after-sales 
and maintenance services are equally important as the first sales when the radio 
broadcasting system is distributed. Thereby continuing contact between local partners 
has been one way to maintain trust between partners that was seen as essential. 
However, in Botswana due to anti-corruption policies, Jutel is not able to organize for 
instance dinners or other occasions for customers. One clear advantage for Jutel in 
SSA has been that their competitors have not yet started to integrate into SSA which 
certainly gives them at least short-term first mover advantage. In this context, the first 
mover advantage basically allows Jutel to form valuable relationships and position 
itself in the industry before competitors. In addition, Finland’s good reputation in 
Africa as high-tech a country has eased Jutel’s integration into Botswana and other 
SSA countries. In the long-term perspective company legitimacy is aimed at, good 
quality of service is equally important alongside good trust with local partners, 
especially when after sales are important for the company. 
 
5.7 Case 3. SANAKO in South Africa 
 
SANAKO is a Finnish company specialized in cross-curricular technology solutions 
with headquarters in Turku. SANAKO is perhaps more known by its renowned 
products such as Tandberg Educational, Auditek and Divace. The company has over 
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40 years of experience of learning solutions and SANAKO has versatile relations with 
many different actors in the learning industry through networks and alliances. The 
company’s product range is quite wide; they sell language learning products, such as 
multimedia labs, classroom management solutions, and mobile learning software. 
These products are accompanied by services and accessories. It is important to 
emphasize that SANAKO performs through local distributors and resellers 
everywhere in the world, except in the UK. Many of SANAKO’s products are award-
winning and certified. According to the company website, SANAKO sells their 
solutions both to the education and corporate sector, and is a global leader in language 
learning solutions. SANAKO is fairly internationalized, it delivers learning 
technology and services through over 70 resellers, but it has also its own sales 
subsidiaries in the UK, the USA, France, the UAE and China. The turnover of the 
company is around 12 million and 95% of the sales consist of exports. The share of 
SSA in turnover is just 1-3%, indicating that SANAKO’s sales to SSA still are 
marginal. 
 
Market environment of South Africa 
 
South Africa is the most developed country in SSA and all of the persons interviewed 
in this study unanimously argued that South Africa, being largely industrialized, is the 
most modern country of all SSA, South Africa ranks among the top in Mo Ibrahim 
Governance list with fifth position right after Botswana, indicating that the country is 
one of the most developed in SSA. By African standards, South Africa is among the 
least corrupt countries keeping fourth position, after Botswana, Mauritius and Cape 
Verde. However, the global ranking of South Africa is 54th scoring 4.9 points. The 
equivalent score for Finland is 9.0, almost twice as high as that in South Africa. These 
results indicate that corruption exists on some levels in South Africa and indeed there 
have recently been major corruption scandals in the country. For example, leader of 
South Africa’s leading political party of ANC and presidential candidate Jacob Zuma 
has been charged with corruption, which has created great political tensions inside 
South Africa.  
 
According to Forbes (2008), the great majority of Africa’s biggest companies are 
located in South Africa and the World Bank ranked South Africa as the easiest place 
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for doing business, not only in SSA but in the whole continent. The 32nd global 
position projects an image of South Africa as an easy business destination. Indeed in 
some terms South Africa is one of the easiest places to get credit; it ranked at second 
place in the world and having sophisticated laws of protecting investors at ninth place. 
Consequently, South Africa is in some terms, according to the World Bank’s criteria, 
an easier place than Finland, although the overall ranking of Finland is better than that 
of South Africa. In addition, the World Bank’s index reveals that South Africa does 
badly in other criteria used to form the WB’s business index which may especially 
concern foreign companies. South Africa is in 147th position when trading across 
borders is measured and 82nd when measured forcing contracts  
(http://www.doingbusiness.org/Documents/CountryProfiles/ZAF.pdf). 
 
Therefore, it seems that foreign companies willing to import or export to South Africa 
or using it as a gateway to Southern African countries could face great difficulties 
since trading across borders even compared to other SSA countries is difficult. Good 
investment protection law is not necessarily enough for foreign entrants if for instance 
possible disputes are difficult and costly to solve and create an additional risk for 
foreign entrants.   
 
The political situation in South Africa seems to be very complex. The ruling party 
ANC has been affected by internal power conflict creating political uncertainty in 
South Africa. In South Africa, members of business sectors tend to have close 
relations with the political class. For example the South African state has embarked 
on a massive infrastructure building program, and creating lucrative sub-contracts and   
political connections seem to play an important role in securing tenders. It is 
estimated that the economic growth of South Africa will slow down from 3.5% (2008) 
to 2.5% (2009). Slowing economic growth affects mostly the middle-income class 
reducing their consumption. South Africa has also been unable to control its level of 
inflation which was estimated to reach 11.9% in 2008, almost three times higher than 
government’s initial target (The Africa Report, 2009). 
 
SANAKO’s activities in South Africa 
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SANAKO has been able to sell their products to Nigeria, Senegal, Kenya and Ghana, 
but in many cases it has been a question of singular sales and not long-term 
partnerships or agreements. Some of the projects in which SANAKO participated 
have been financed by such organizations as the World Bank and UNESCO. At the 
moment, SANAKO is pursuing to deepen their presence in South Africa which is 
their most potential market in SSA since there are 12 different official languages 
providing natural demand for language education technology.  
 
SANAKO had sales in South Africa already during the apartheid government but was 
forced to withdraw from the country after the introduction of the international trade 
embargo. It was only in 2004 that SANAKO returned to South Africa since it started 
to get inquiries from the country and found a prospective local partner. In 2006– 2007 
SANAKO made a larger investigation of the local markets, organized seminars and 
training, and contacted end users. This was also backed by FINPRO and 
Finnpartnership that supported SANAKO in their re-entry to South African markets. 
SANAKO’s initial aim was to use South Africa as a gateway to other Southern 
African countries, but it is currently skeptical about the matter. In addition, their sales 
to South Africa, despite the efforts, have remained modest. 
 
5.7.1 Case findings 
 
Formal and informal constraints 
 
Despite the fact that South Africa is the most modern country, there are still several 
constraining factors for a company such as SANAKO. From formal constraints, a 
poor infrastructure was identified as one major challenge, especially because 
SANAKO’s products demand robust and advanced networks and infrastructure. Poor 
credibility and an underdeveloped financial system was also a challenge for 
SANAKO that stated for instance that they are not willing to sell their products on 
credit to South Africa. Bureaucracy and heavy delays in projects have also caused 
additional troubles for the company.  
 
Poverty and high prevalence of HIV/AIDS was seen as factors slowing down 
SANAKO’s interests to integrate South Africa and other SSA countries. In South 
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Africa, as in many other African countries, SANAKO’s primary customers are private 
schools and universities which are much less in numbers than public educational 
establishments. Thereby, their customers segments remain low. In South Africa the 
number of potential educational establishments was approximately 800, but many of 
those are governmental institutions meaning that bureaucracy and slow decision-
making had constrained penetration to that segment. Nonetheless, for SANAKO 
private institutions could be a good testing ground and a possibility to gain references 
before accessing governmental institutions. After all, SANAKO representative Raimo 
Körkkö mentioned several times how significant references are in their business. 
 
Corruption was identified as a  big informal constraint by SANAKO in South Africa 
and SSA. According to Raimo Körkkö, corruption increases transaction costs, and on 
occasions when corruption is at a very bad level, it prevents transaction and without 
specifying a country, that corruption has an effect also to tender processes. Since 
SANAKO operates through local distributors and importers, the South African 
institutional environment does not impact entry mode decisions. 
 
Strategic responses to institutional constraints 
 
Raimo Körkkö describes that for being able to trade and to be successful in South 
Africa, SANAKO needs to adapt to rules of the local environment. Therefore 
approaching the local institutional environment of SANAKO involves similar 
compromising as in the case of Omnitele and Jutel. In terms of product adaptation, 
SANAKO felt that they do not need to customize their products in order to conform to 
the local environment. However, SANAKO had to change their marketing material to 
meet local demands. In South Africa and elsewhere in SSA, SANAKO has received 
feedback that their company image is too occidental for Africa. For instance, Raimo 
Körkkö described how they are lacking pictures of black people in their company 
brochures and explained how they are aiming at obtaining local footage to better 
present and illustrate how their products are used in African schools and universities. 
In short, local customers and partners feel more comfortable if a foreign company is 
able to show that not only their products and services are applicable to Africa, but 
need to create an acceptable image by the local environment. Raimo Körkkö also 
mentioned that pricing is also a very sensitive issue in SSA for SANAKO and 
77 
mentioned how the only way to be competitive in the region is to keep prices low 
enough to match the local demand. 
 
Legitimacy and overcoming constraints 
 
The underlying potential in South Africa was seen quite large by SANAKO, but the 
company remained rather skeptical about harvesting that potential, stating that it could 
take more than five years before the company would be able to cash that potential. 
Although the company has seen some effort in South Africa, it still has not fully 
succeeded in taking over local markets and thereby in achieving legitimacy in the 
markets. Although SANAKO itself considers that South African markets are not 
mature enough, it can also be estimated that the biggest obstacle for legitimacy in 
South Africa for SANAKO is the lack of references. This has been acknowledged by 
the firm and gaining references and credibility currently has top priority in 
SANAKO’s objectives in South Africa.  
 
SANAKO has started to achieve references gradually targeting first private 
educational establishments before targeting public ones. Good relationships have been 
seen important in this process. Since SANAKO operates through local distributors, it 
is vital that they have good relations for instance with the ministry of education. As 
for the private sector, relationships could be easier to obtain since decision-making 
and hierarchical structure is less high there. Support to the local distributors was also 
seen very important. Raimo Körkkö mentioned that they often visit local customers 
together with the local partner. This indicates that despite the local representatives and 
partners SANAKO needs to be actively present in the market as well. The problem for 
SANAKO might be that considering that African countries are quite hierarchical, 
representatives or a minister of a ministry of education would demand participation of 
the company CEO or senior sales manager such as Raimo Körkkö to open the trade 
relations. If executives are not willing to travel to South Africa to meet local “big 
men”, it could give an impression that SANAKO is not willing to do the required 
effort or is not serious enough. 
 
To facilitate the integration process and overcoming constraints to entry, SANAKO 
relies on the CYRR group and their contacts. The company sees that using such 
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expertise is the most cost-effective way to integrate to SSA markets. SANAKO has 
also utilized the help of Finnish embassies and Finpro for finding and contacting 
potential customers. Raimo Körkkö stated that: “Finnish embassies and Finpro has 
worked as a protocol for us and we’ve been using their customer interface which is a 
rather inexpensive option. It’s totally different thing if commercial attaché phones to 
ministry of education than our salesman, there’s more a sense of diplomacy”. Another 
way for SANAKO to increase local coverage in South Africa is investing more and 
more in e-marketing and their websites.  
 
Using outside consultancy or help cannot yet overcome all the constraints faced by 
SANAKO in South Africa. As for Jutel, poor credibility was seen as the primary 
challenge in SSA. SANAKO is too afraid of selling on credit and finds letter of 
credits difficult to use. It also seems that SANAKO perceives greater uncertainty in 
the SSA region compared to other case companies. Building strong personal relations 
with local customers could ease in both of these issues. It was discussed earlier how 
strong personal relations could be essential in achieving external legitimacy, because 
they increase trust between constituents. Increased trust would perhaps be the best 
way to tackle financial difficulties since it becomes cheaper than letter of credits or 
governmental guarantees. This trust can be gained only through regular visits to South 
Africa. After all, even if the potential could be harvested only after years ahead, 
SANAKO would probably benefit by taking into account that trust in SSA is 
traditionally gained gradually over time through increasing transactions (Fafchamps). 
 
5.8 Case 4. Tramigo in Nigeria 
 
Tramigo is an ICT company specializing in tracking devices, established in 2002 and 
with its headquarters in Espoo, Finland. Despite being a relatively young firm, 
Tramigo is highly internationalized operating through distributors in over 150 
countries. Hence, Tramigo can be considered as a born-global company. The turnover 
of the company was roughly 2.5 million Euros but is estimated to exceed12–15 
million  this year, which means that the company grows extremely fast and 
aggressively. The share of SSA in Tramigo’s sales is over one third, indicating that 
SSA is a very important market area for the company. Tramigo’s primary product is 
79 
T22 which is a portable tracking device using GSM technology. T22 can be used for 
several purposes, for instance to track down assets, vehicles and people. In addition, 
Tramigo itself has created and patented its landmark standard and software which 
increases the company’s competitiveness. 
 
Market environment of Nigeria 
 
 
Compared to Botswana and South Africa, Nigeria’s rankings are much lower when 
using the same three criteria as with the other example countries. Nigeria is in 39th 
position in Mo Ibrahim Governance Index, which indicates that despite its massive oil 
and gas reserves, Nigeria has not been able to coordinate incomes yielding from 
exporting oil and gas into long-term development of the country.  Interestingly, 
Nigeria’s ranking is worse than in former conflict countries such as Sierra Leone and 
Liberia. Nigeria is just one place higher than Guinea Conakry, which is one of the 
most corrupted countries in the whole world. 
 
In terms of corruption Nigeria is not doing well either. From 10 to 1 Nigeria scored 
only 2.7, which left it in 121st and 22nd places in global and regional rankings.  Blatant 
corruption has been a common feature especially in resource-rich countries of SSA 
such as in Nigeria were corruption scandals have been part of everyday life since its 
independence in 1960. According to the Final Report of Corruption survey study 
(2003) made in Ahmadu Bello University, it was found that the institutions perceived 
to be most corrupted are: the Nigerian Police, Political Parties, National and State 
Assemblies, Local and Municipal Governments, Federal and State Executive Councils 
and the Traffic Police.  
 
The World Bank ranked Nigeria at the 12th place in the SSA region and in 118th 
position in easiness of doing business. In terms of employing workers and protecting 
investors, Nigeria is a relatively easy destination with global rankings of 27 and 53. 
However, Nigeria remains to be particularly challenging in terms of dealing with 
construction permits, registering property, paying taxes and trading across borders. 
Basically most of these factors excluding trading across borders would influence only 
domestic firms or those foreign companies being present in Nigeria as a form of a 
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legal entity. Nevertheless, low placement in sub-indicators of doing business indicator 
provides general indication of Nigeria as a complex business environment compared 
to Western business environments. 
 
Although current president of Nigeria Umaru Musa Yar’dua is showing more interest 
in Nigeria’s various problems such as tremendous corruption, he has not been able to 
provide any visible results. One of the key national issues is the crisis in Niger Delta, 
which is the region where most oil drilling takes place in Nigeria. Several armed 
gangs, some criminals and some with a political agenda are sabotaging the oil 
production and kidnapping employees of oil companies, affecting the willingness of 
foreign investors to keep working in the oil-producing region (Africa Report, 2009). 
 
Tramigo’s activities in Nigeria 
 
At the moment, Tramigo has sales operations in over 25 different SSA countries and 
they are constantly integrating into new countries. For Tramigo, Nigeria is globally 
the third-largest target country in terms of sales and the largest country in terms of 
profit margin; thereby Nigeria is the most important market for Tramigo also in SSA. 
Tramigo has been active in Nigeria since 2005 and is currently the leading brand in 
Nigeria. Like everywhere else in Africa, Tramigo operates through resellers in Nigeria 
and it has several distributors and importers in Nigeria. The main reason for this is 
that Nigeria is a federation divided into separate states. Secondly, Nigeria is the most 
populous country (148 million/2007,CIA factbook) of whole Africa. Therefore, using 
one distributor would not be wise. In Nigeria, Tramigo has been able to identify large 
target segments and their current goal in Nigeria is to increase sales by fostering their 
brand and image. 
 
5.8.1 Case Findings 
 
Formal and informal constraints 
 
Tramigo has been avoiding some of the formal constraints such as the complex 
customs system of Nigeria, because in their strategy they indirectly export their 
products using local importers and distributors. Legislation was seen very complex 
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and variegated due to the high number of different states in Nigeria, but otherwise 
most legal constraints were told to exist instead in North Africa where for instance in 
Egypt exportation of GPS technology is totally forbidden. In addition, legislation in 
Nigeria does not affect Tramigo much, because they use local partners. Poor 
infrastructure and poor logistics related to it were mentioned to be one of the biggest 
challenges in Nigeria, especially since Tramigo is in the distribution industry. A 
fragile state environment was seen as a potential threat, for instance because 
wholesalers are not willing to keep big stocks because of uncertainty. But unequal 
social structures and high income gaps was also seen as possibility for Tramigo, 
because the company is selling security products. Getting to Nigeria is also more 
demanding for the business traveler since the cost of living is high, visas are 
expensive and, for example, it was mentioned that in Lagos hotels are the most 
expensive in the world, far more expensive than in Monaco, New York or Paris. Both 
consumer and industrial products are very expensive in Nigeria because of the lack of 
capital. This is a constraint also for Tramigo, because wholesalers are not able to keep 
big stocks. It was also mentioned that Nigerian companies are reluctant to keep big 
stocks also because of the uncertainty and instability of Nigerian markets. 
 
Nigeria is also often mentioned as dangerous for foreigners, but Tramigo has not 
come across any dangers in the country.  Arto Tiitinen argued that there would be a 
higher possibility of ad-hoc violence in South Africa. Nigeria is notorious for its 
corruption and this was noted also by Tramigo. However, because local distributors 
take care of customs clearances and the size of each sale is relatively small, corruption 
has not caused additional problems for Tramigo. However, facilitation fees are said to 
be common in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa, but according to Tramigo it depends 
on the industry. For example, it is mentioned that network business in Africa is 
plagued by corruption. Nevertheless, corruption lifts the prices of Tramigo’s products 
for end users and thereby it shrinks the company’s target segments by indirectly 
affecting the demand. The institutional environment in Nigeria has not influenced 
Tramigo’s entry mode choice which is the same everywhere. However, in Nigeria that 
is a federation, Tramigo has been forced to use multiple distributors since each state 
or group of states demand local distributors. 
 
Strategic responses to institutional pressures 
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In Nigeria, Tramigo has not had to do any kind of modification to better match the 
local environment. On the contrary, Arto Tiitinen emphasized that their product is 
“peace of mind product” perfectly suitable to Nigeria’s markets. And therefore in 
Nigeria, which is an extremely unstable and unpredictable country, upper and middle 
classes have bigger needs of products such as Tramigo’s than people do in more 
stable Western countries for instance. Arto Tiitinen admitted that Nigeria is the most 
challenging for them in whole SSA, especially in terms of logistics and security, 
which are, however, less of a problem because they are acknowledged in the 
company. Many of the challenges exerting from local environment are avoided by 
Tramigo because they export indirectly. A Tramigo representative remarked that 
Nigerians expect and value face-to-face meetings and thereby Arto Tiitinen travels 
frequently to Nigeria. In Latin America Tramigo does a lot of marketing on television, 
but in Nigeria television and printing advertisement is very expensive; hence Tramigo 
invests more in internet marketing there, which has proved to be successful in SSA.  
 
Legitimacy and overcoming constraints in Nigeria 
 
Tramigo is able to overcome many of the biggest market entry constraints such as 
corruption, complexity of local distribution channels, bureaucracy and customs 
difficulties by using local distributors and not exporting directly. The company 
exports its products similarly almost everywhere in Nigeria. But due to Nigeria’s huge 
size and difficulty of managing that size, Tramigo is using multiple distributors 
whereas it in Togo and Benin has one exclusive distributor. Using multiple 
distributors and not being too loyal to any of them is also a part of the risk 
diversification of Tramigo in Nigeria. Tramigo also demands prepayments in order to 
overcome constraints related to poor credibility and complexity of the local banking 
system. 
 
Arto Tiitinen emphasized that Nigerians are a very entrepreneurial type of people. 
This has helped Tramigo a great deal because local salesmen and distributors have 
been very proactive and enthusiastic towards Tramigo’s products. However, backing 
local distributors is seen as important from the perspective of long-term 
competitiveness. Thereby active local presence is required in Nigeria where face-to-
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face meetings are very much valued. Tramigo tries to seek legitimacy by increasing 
local conspicuousness and fostering its local image through brand building in Nigeria. 
Although Tramigo is a leading brand in Nigeria, it does not mean much because 
Tramigo’s technology is still relatively new and its brand building is only in the 
beginnings. Tramigo is creating awareness of its products by investing in e-marketing 
and Google ad words, but is also looking for visible users. As an example, Tramigo 
gained temporarily high demand from the Nigerian delta, where kidnapped Shell 
workers were found and released because of Tramigo’s products.  
 
Unlike other case companies, Tramigo has not relied on outside consultancy in SSA. 
Tramigo was once a part of Finpro’s export ring in Asia but regarded that as useless 
and thereby refused any outside consulting. Part of the success of Tramigo in Nigeria 
and in other SSA countries has been more related to company characteristics: 
determination and creation of local geographical data, and focusing on SSA markets; 
especially Nigeria has been one success factor. Secondly, most of the Tramigo staff is 
emerging market specialists. Therefore outside help has not been considered 
necessary. In addition, Arto Tiitinen states that there exist no skilled consultants who 
could provide them with help since their work in SSA countries is pioneer work. 
Thereby competent staff plays a key role in directly influencing internal legitimacy. 
At the moment, Tramigo is forced to keep away from some SSA countries because of 
a lack of a competent and confident sales force. 
 
Perhaps the greatest turmoil to local acceptance and legitimacy in Nigerian markets 
has been product characteristics. Arto Tiitinen profoundly described how their product 
is ideal for Nigerian markets where there is more need for security providing products 
than for instance in Finland. Because there is a natural need in Nigeria for products 
such as Tramigo’s, gaining long-term legitimacy becomes easier. Since Tramigo’s 
product is urgently needed by many of the upper and middle class segments, it has 
increased word of mouth marketing which has greatly benefited Tramigo by 
increasing popularity of their products. Arto Tiitinen even mentioned that some of 
their customers in Nigeria are their best salesmen. This can, however, be a problem 
since it is widely known that it can be difficult to manage and influence word of 
mouth marketing by company. Ensuring good quality and constantly updating the 
local geographic information system helps to maintain the customer satisfaction.  
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5.9 Additional informant companies 
 
In order to increase the validity of this study, two additional interviews with two 
companies were made. The first additional informant company is Cyrr Group and the 
second informant company is Nokia. Instead of concentrating on just one example 
country, both of these additional informant companies provide answers regarding the 
whole SSA region since both of these companies have experience of multiple SSA 
countries. 
 
5.9.1 Cyrr Group 
 
Cyrr Group is the only Finnish consulting group concentrating solely on Africa. The 
company was established in 2001 and it has offices in Helsinki, Johannesburg and 
Paris and is planning to open new offices in West and East Africa. The company has 
an exceptionally wide contact network in Africa and helps companies to find business 
partners in Africa and develop long-term business relationships. Cyrr Group 
specializes in many different fields, but its primary field is IT and 
telecommunications. Of the companies in the case study, Cyrr Group is the one that 
has been promoting the penetration into SSA the most..  Therefore, information 
yielding from Cyrr Group can be regarded as equally valuable as the information 
yielding from the other case companies. 
 
Formal and informal constraints in SSA 
 
Cyrr Group executives Kristian Ylinen and Vesa Jaakkola emphasize that SSA is in 
every way a very challenging target region and full penetration to these markets or to 
one specific country can take years. There are several factors that restrict integration 
of Finnish companies to SSA. There are many formal constraints, out of which poor 
credibility and lack of proper financial institutions are the most common ones. For 
example, when letter of credits are used, it might be difficult to find a local bank 
approved by a Finnish bank and vice versa. Geographical distances are very long and 
the infrastructure is still underdeveloped. However, Cyrr group executives emphasize 
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that the infrastructure in the ICT sector will be significantly improved in the future, 
once a new subaqueous cable circulating the whole continent of Africa will be built. 
Competition might be harsh in many countries and in many industries. Competition is 
distorted in many industries due to the fact that for example Chinese trade policy 
skews competition in many sectors because China has made long-term governmental 
agreements which cover many sectors. Especially the telecommunications, the mining 
and certain infrastructure sectors are very much controlled by the Chinese. In 
addition, other notable legal constraints are EU export restrictions of some specific 
technology to certain SSA countries. 
 
Cyrr Group mentions that it has been difficult for Finnish companies to comply with 
the African time concept and with the fact that Africans do not like to rush with 
things. Therefore there are often delays in projects. One major informal constraint for 
Finnish companies mentioned by Cyrr is corruption. Corruption changes the 
competition field, which can be noted for instance in tender processes where deals are 
won in a vague manner by some corrupt participant. Thus, Finnish companies 
unwilling to participate in corruption will lose deals because there are always some 
who are willing to bribe. This, however, is said to be industry-specific.  
 
The most emphasized constraint for companies, according to Vesa Jaakkola, are 
business networks: “The significance of local networks is based on the fact that you 
know people and you are known. You can’t undermine this fact at all and here in 
Finland people see importance of these networks very naively, but they are (networks) 
very valuable in Africa, after all everyone wants to buy from friends” This statement 
indicates that without knowing anyone well enough in SSA it is very difficult to 
integrate into these markets.” 
 
Strategic responses in SSA 
 
Cyrr Group executives Kristian Ylinen and Vesa Jaakkola emphasized that the 
business environment in SSA demands a local presence and that it can be difficult to 
manage business operations outside SSA. At the moment, in 2009, Cyrr is opening 
two new offices in East and West Africa. This is a clear signal of how the institutional 
environment exerts pressures upon foreign entrants by demanding active presence in 
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the markets. Cyrr Group mentioned that one factor slowing down market penetration 
which can be a problem particularly for bigger companies is that there is often one 
manager who leads a big geographical marker area, often a MEA (Middle East and 
Africa) area who therefore perhaps does not have enough time and resources to use 
for SSA, despite the fact that SSA would require a great notion. 
 
Both Cyrr executives stated that it is important to adapt to a local environment 
although there are ways to affect local environment in SSA and make integration 
smoother into those markets. One needs enough time and determination for SSA 
markets. However, even smaller companies can use lobbying to change the very 
nature of a local environment. Kristian Ylinen revealed that: ”Lobbying in SSA is all 
about personal relations, even smaller companies can have success in this if they are 
able to build relationship with local tycoons or politicians, for instance if President 
happens to like CEO of some smaller company it will definitely take things forward.” 
In addition, Vesa Jaakkola noted that for Finnish companies, a global pricing strategy 
is seldom suitable in SSA markets, which suffer from lower purchase power. 
Consequently, too high prices can block entry to markets. In addition, Indian and 
Chinese firms are very competitive, particularly in the ICT business, because they 
often have lower prices than Western firms do. This does not mean that for Africans 
the price is the primary determinant for Africans, but it means that if a foreign entrant 
is able to set an adequate price for its products or services it is more likely to make the 
entry to markets smoother. 
 
Legitimacy and overcoming constraints in SSA 
 
The choice of country is probably the first thing that a foreign company should 
consider when it is planning entry in the SSA region. The country choice has a great 
influence on future success in the region, but it also has an effect on how the foreign 
company is able to overcome different market constraints and further achieve 
legitimacy. According to Cyrr Group executives, one should always pay attention to 
the choice of country noting that South Africa or Kenya are not necessarily always the 
best places to start integration, because of tight competition or maturity of markets.  
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To overcome the overall complexity of SSA markets, a lot of time and resources need 
to be committed by the foreign company. Kristian Ylinen noted that bigger companies 
can always be more efficient in this since they have more resources and a longer time 
perspective. However, smaller companies can be equally successful due to their 
greater flexibility. Foreign companies may also overcome different challenges if they 
are willing to adapt to local reality. Vesa Jaakkola for instance, described that there is 
no other way than adapt to African time orientation, because rushing things forwards 
will not improve the end result in any way. Developing business relations clearly 
demands time. Kristian Ylinen states that: “One needs to learn how to listen. Many 
Finns just travel to Africa and starts to instantly hold PowerPoint presentations of 
their own products. Africans value when you give them time – you shouldn’t be 
arrogant, if you meet your client for the first time then one should talk about general 
issues instead of giving product presentation”. 
 
Local presence was seen as important for both Cyrr Group in their own business and 
for their customer companies. Active local presence does not only ease the managing 
local operations, but it also fosters personal relations which were seen as a key factor 
in competitiveness in SSA by Cyrr Group. Nevertheless, according to Cyrr Group, a 
local partner is often required, if not by law then by practice. To ease integration to 
SSA for instance, personal relationships become useful in a corrupt environment 
because they provide personal trust which provides more long term value than if 
company would bribe its way through. Therefore, it is important that local partners 
have access to local networks and create good relationships.  
 
Cyrr Group executives emphasized that Finland has a relatively good reputation in 
Africa which could benefit Finnish companies’ desires to integrate into SSA. 
Although the protocol is seen important by Cyrr Group, Vesa Jaakkola noted that 
there are differences between countries in SSA. The poorer the country the greater 
significance does the official protocol have. For instance, in DRC or Mozambique 
differ significantly from South Africa. In addition, Cyrr Group suggested that one way 
to positively profile Finnish companies in SSA is social responsibility which might 
increase credibility of Finnish companies in the region. Good references are always 
important considering long-term survival in the markets. In addition, Cyrr Group 
executives pointed out that a company’s staff plays a significant role in its success in 
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SSA. Kristian Ylinen stated that: “It’s important that there’s genuine interest towards 
Africans and African culture, otherwise Africans are able to sense it. Especially 
Africans dislike fly-bye mentality and rush – culture awareness is important and that 
one understands different facts and how they influence to various things in Africa”. 
This statement indicates that cultural awareness helps greatly in relationship building, 
too. 
 
5.9.2 Nokia  
 
Nokia Corporation is a Finnish multinational communications company, 
headquartered in Espoo, Finland.  Nokia is the world’s largest manufacturer of mobile 
telephones. Nokia’s operation has been divided into two primary lines of business; 
Devices and Services & Software.  Nokia has 112,262 employees in 120 countries and 
has sales in more than 150 countries. In 2007, Nokia’s global annual revenue was 51.1 
billion Euros and the operating profit was 8,0 billion Euros. The company is listed in 
the Helsinki, New York and Frankfurt stock exchanges.  
 
The reason for choosing Nokia as an additional informant company is that it is of all 
Finnish companies by far the deepest integrated into Sub-Saharan Africa. Nokia’s 
devices are available almost in all of the different countries on the African continent 
and the company sees Africa as an extremely important growth market. At the 
moment, the company has regional head offices in Lagos, Nairobi and Johannesburg. 
In addition, Nokia has several other offices in different SSA countries. As a large 
multinational company, the institutional environment that the company faces in SSA 
could be far more complex. On the other hand, a big MNC also has more ways to 
respond to different institutional pressures than a small or medium-sized company 
does. 
 
Formal and informal constraints 
 
As a large multinational corporation, Nokia faces perhaps more complex challenges in 
SSA than the case companies of this study do, because none of the case companies 
had made any investments in SSA, for instance opened an office. Nevertheless, many 
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of the major constraints faced by Nokia are no different from constraints faced by 
smaller companies. For Nokia, the business environment is far less developed than 
anywhere else; SSA is still a small piece of their global strategy. The main formal 
constraints in SSA mentioned by Thierry Delarue are: the extreme poverty level, 
which obviously has an effect on the demand structure, poor infrastructure and an 
underdeveloped financial system.  
 
Although legal constraints vary from country to country in SSA, many countries 
maintain high levels of taxes and duties. In addition, tariffs are also at a high level in 
many countries. For Nokia, managing distribution channels is an overall challenge; it 
has especially been difficult to find local partners. One major problem for Nokia in 
SSA is parallel importing or grey importing. There are many small and big companies 
that export Nokia’s devices outside the formal distribution channel. This is a 
tremendous problem for Nokia, because the company cannot manage its marketing, 
pricing or control its distribution. Customers cannot have warranties for their devices 
which ultimately might impact the customer experience of Nokia’s devices 
negatively. Furthermore, corruption creates additional challenges for Nokia, since the 
company aims at being as transparent as possible. 
 
Strategic responses to institutional constraints 
 
Nokia is clearly different from the case companies because it is actively trying to 
influence local market environments in different countries of SSA. However, one 
needs to understand that Nokia has more possibilities to influence the environment, 
because Nokia is one of the biggest corporations in the world with more resources 
than smaller companies. Some features of Nokia’s responses to institutional pressures 
are very active and in Oliver’s categorization would be close to manipulation. For 
example, at the moment Nokia tries to seek abolishment of VAT on mobile phones in 
Africa and argues that it will contribute to economic growth of these countries 
(http://phonereport.info/tag/nokia-tax-africa). Thierry Delarue emphasized a few 
times during the interview that Ghana has contributed a lot economically after 
abolishing VAT from mobile phones. This is a clear sign of how Nokia tries to impact 
local environments in SSA and create a better sales environment for its products.  Not 
surprisingly, Nokia’s arguments are based on the company’s own field studies made 
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in Kenya and Nigeria. Consequently, it remains the local governments’ job to 
consider how valid and reliable they consider Nokia’s research findings. Interestingly, 
Nokia has not tried to lobby local governments of SSA and operators to decrease 
prices of call making (two to three times more expensive than in Finland) which 
definitely would positively impact Nokia’s sales in SSA. In addition, Thierry Delarue 
mentioned that Nokia’s SSA branch has been considering hiring a government 
specialist working and nurturing governmental relations, indicating that Nokia is 
seriously trying to find new ways to influence local institutional environments. 
 
Thierry Delarue described that in order to become more competitive in SSA region 
concentration is needed. The company has applied a special domestication and 
localization strategy. In this, SSA is divided into different sub-regions. By doing so, 
Nokia aims at fostering its local presence which was mentioned earlier to be important 
in order to be competitive in local markets in SSA. Thierry Delarue elaborated that 
Nokia aims at better understanding local environments and tries to better adapt to 
local conditions. Thierry Delarue mentioned that Nokia has been working very hard 
on building and designing phones which Nokia calls entry-level phones which are 
specially designed for the poorest segments in SSA countries. These phones are 
designed for people who have never had a phone before. Although Thierry Delarue 
mentioned that Nokia has not been as successful in understanding local needs and 
preferences as they would have hoped – it still shows that in order to comply with 
pressures stemming for local market environments Nokia is forced to have a wide 
product range and low-priced entry level phones. It seems that Nokia is about to 
launch new products that are targeting lower segments even better. 
 
In terms of pricing, Thierry Delarue felt that Nokia did not feel pressures to lower its 
prices despite Chinese and Korean competitors’ plans to target SSA markets with 
ultra-low-cost phones. He added that price is not the only determining demand factor 
for their products and that due to economic scales, Nokia is able to produce phones 
“cheaper than anyone on the planet”.  Consequently, as a company and its 
involvement in SSA grow, it has more determination and chances to influence local 
institutional constituents and shape the environment to better suit its desires. 
 
Legitimacy and overcoming constraints in SSA 
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Local presence is one major goal for Nokia in SSA, because it helps Nokia to better 
respond to challenges resulting from local market environments. In SSA, Nokia has a 
specific strategy to increase local presence which Nokia calls domestication and 
localization strategy. The domestication and localization strategy aims to have actual 
people on the ground, for instance currently Nokia has six local sales units which is a 
part of Nokia’s domestication strategy which aims at building long term presence and 
partnership on the ground. 
 
Currently Nokia has six sales offices, each responsible of marketing, logistics, 
management etc. so that different functions are under the same entity. This allows 
Nokia to better tackle challenges in different regions in SSA. The local presence has 
clearly been one part of Nokia’s success in SSA. This was identified by the company 
in the very early beginning and made Nokia invest money and resources in the SSA 
target region. In Nokia’s case, an active local presence has definitely affected the 
company’s legitimacy in the area. The importance of local acceptance and its role in 
local competitiveness was also identified by the Nokia executives. To increase local 
conspicuousness, Nokia has been very active with various social programs. Thierry 
Delarue emphasized how social programs are an important part of the domestication 
strategy, which aims at being long term corporate citizen and to be part of that 
community, because penetration into African communities requires Nokia to 
contribute to that society. Thierry Delarue highlighted that Nokia actively supports 
different social programs. However, they are not good at promoting it or advertizing 
it. Nokia firmly believes that they are changing peoples’ lives by enabling them to 
communicate and that the increase in mobile phones has a direct link to the GDP. This 
enthusiasm and the fact that their product is useful in local societies increases local 
acceptance for their products and eases access to those markets.  
 
However, active local presence is not enough for overcoming some of the constraints 
springing from local institutional environments. Even in big countries with very large 
customer segments such as Nigeria, Nokia uses local distributors and importers to 
overcome constraints such as poor infrastructure, bad logistics, underdeveloped 
marketing infrastructure etc. To decrease other risks resulting from the environment, 
Nokia demands prepayments and trades only with Euros or US dollars. 
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6 Discussions and Analysis 
 
In this chapter, results of the empirical part are analyzed against the theory presented 
earlier. Firstly, formal and informal constraints are analyzed from a theoretic and 
empiric viewpoint. Secondly, strategic responses to institutional pressures of Finnish 
ICT companies are discussed. Ultimately, the legitimacy of Finnish ICT companies in 
SSA is discussed and analyzed. In all three parts, possible common ground between 
the cases is scrutinized and analyzed to see whether some generalizations between 
cases and between these different countries could be extended to the whole SSA 
region. 
6.1 Formal and informal constraints 
 
All of the case companies tend to face similar kinds of constraints regardless of 
whether their primary target country is Angola, Botswana, Nigeria or partly South 
Africa.  Poor infrastructure was seen as a significant constraint for all companies. This 
is an especially strong constraining factor since ICT technology and ICT companies 
often demand profound infrastructure to perform and deliver the service they are used 
to. The high level of bureaucracy was seen as a tremendous problem since it slows 
down Finnish ICT companies’ integration in the region. Unfortunately, there was little 
to do to overcome bureaucracy. The third common factor mentioned by all case 
companies was the underdevelopment of financial institutions. Poor credibility is seen 
severe constraint and this is why all of the case companies excluding Jutel and Nokia 
demand prepayments. But as Raimo Körkkö mentions, the problem is not always that 
customers do not have money to pay, but that transferring that money from SSA to 
Finland is a challenge, too.  
 
Out of the informal constraints, corruption was acknowledged to be a common 
challenge in SSA, although all of the companies emphasized that they do not suffer 
directly from the corrupt market environments. Companies could not directly name 
other problems or challenges that could be categorized as informal constraints. This 
might indicate that they are perhaps not aware of all the characteristics involved in 
local markets. For instance, all of the case companies responded that there is plenty of 
cultural variety in SSA. However, they could not define how they differ from each 
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other or what kind of effect it might have on their operations. The case companies did 
not experience that networks of personal relationships had any influence on their 
performance in the target region. Only Jutel’s Kai Mattlar mentioned that in a case a 
customer receives bad service in a country, it could result in a loss of business 
contracts in wider area. Cyrr Group executives were the only ones to emphasize that 
the lack of personal relations would significantly slow down integration into SSA and 
to emphasize how important personal relations actually are in SSA. 
 
The findings of this study clearly support the theory of literature of institutions and 
their effect on market entry strategies. Clemens and Douglas (2004) stated that the 
stronger institutional pressures the stronger need there would be for less active entry 
modes. Davis et al. (2000) stated how companies that are more affected by local 
institutional frameworks tend to use exporting as their entry mode. Meyer (2001) 
added that the role of institutions to market entry is higher in unstable and inconsistent 
market environments that foreign firms need to adjust to. According to Meyer, the 
more the business environment starts to resemble a western type of business 
environment, the more companies would prefer more full-ownership modes.  
 
All of the case companies and even Nokia prefer less active modes of entry in SSA. 
Firstly, all of the case companies excluding Omnitele use local partners and 
distributors to ease their entry to the target markets. Although for instance Jutel sells 
directly to its customers in Botswana it has a local partner in South Africa who is used 
as an integrator also in Botswana. Secondly, all of the case companies, excluding 
Tramigo, use outside help to ease integration to SSA markets. Omnitele and Jutel 
were able to penetrate first to Angola and Botswana without outside help due to very 
good references. Both companies stated though that elsewhere in SSA the most 
effective way to integrate into the region is with a local partner or with help from an 
outside consultancy. Therefore, claims of Clemens and Douglas that strong 
institutional constraints force a foreign entrant to use exporting as an entry mode are 
clearly evident in this study. One cannot state based on the case studies that they have 
chosen the exporting mode because of contextual factors, because it has rather been a 
company-specific factor. However, Nokia’s experience in SSA clearly backs 
allegations of Davis et al. because Nokia only exports its products to SSA and, despite 
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being one of the biggest companies in the world, the complexity of SSA markets has 
prevented Nokia to use any kind of other entry modes. 
 
As Meyer (2001) considers, a role of the market entry is significantly affected by 
complex institutional environments. However, it was discussed in this study that 
Botswana and South Africa are relatively westernized places for doing business in. 
Nevertheless, in South Africa full-ownerships entry modes are not possible because of 
legal constraints that effect foreign ownership. In Botswana, local partners could 
become very handy since it was discussed how Jutel experienced that a local partner 
is needed even though not required by law. One can state that informal constraints can 
be strong and require local presence and a partner even though one can see them as 
partly Western countries.  
 
The findings of this study indicate that formal and informal constraints influence 
companies and their market entry strategies in two ways. Some institutional 
constraints resulting from local environments do not have direct influence on a firm’s 
market entry mode choices. Formal constraints such as a fragile state environment, 
bureaucracy, high costs, HIV/AIDS, and informal constraints such as culture and a 
different time concept create conditions to which a foreign company needs to adjust if 
it wants to operate and do business in that environment. These constraints mentioned 
above basically determine whether the company is mature enough to enter these 
markets at all. For example, all the companies described how they have considered 
not entering some specific countries in SSA due to a very fragile and unstable 
environment. Bureaucracy, high costs, unfamiliar culture etc. create a certain 
framework that forces companies to adjust if they want to continue to stay in those 
markets. Omnitele consultants, for instance, described how different time concepts 
and the culture need to be accepted, because a foreign company is not able to 
influence them in any way. It is important to note that one company’s constraint can 
be another one’s chance. For example, dualistic markets were clearly a great barrier to 
entry in SSA since the private school sector was very small compared to the poor 
public school system which did not have any chance to acquire SANAKO’s products. 
But for Tramigo, dualistic markets are only beneficial since their demand in SSA is 
higher than in Europe due to the fact that the gap between rich and poor is so high and 
the rich classes need products such as those of Tramigo. 
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There are other types of formal and informal constraints found in this study which 
directly impact entry strategies and choices of entry mode. As noted before, a 
different and complex market structure and marketing structure can be seen as factors 
that directly influence foreign entrants by forcing them to export indirectly via local 
distributors. Market uncertainty and the high level of corruption also constrain entry 
mode choices of companies influencing them to find a local partner. For example, 
since all of the companies interviewed were opposing corruption, a local partner or 
distributor is the perfect way to stay out of it. Although for instance Tramigo and 
SANAKO use local distributors everywhere, even outside SSA, they would not be 
able to operate in any other ways, since exporting and distributing directly to end-
users or customers would be too difficult for them to handle. In addition, many SSA 
countries have legal constraints, which forces companies to have a local partner, 
which also decreases uncertainty experienced by the foreign entrant. 
 
The lack of personal relations and the existence of local networks is the strongest 
informal constraint affecting the entry strategies of the case companies. According to 
Kristian Ylinen, doing business in SSA resembles trade between Finland and the 
Soviet Union, where relationships played a crucial role. In SSA, Jutel, Omnitele and 
SANAKO were all using outside consultancy which helped them in finding customers 
and partners. By relying on outside consultants with profound access to local 
networks, foreign entrants can ease their entry into the region. Networks have a direct 
impact on the choice of entry mode by forcing companies to find a local partner who 
also has good relations to end the users or customers in that specific country. For 
example, SANAKO needed a partner with good relations to the ministry of education 
in South Africa and elsewhere in SSA. Jutel chose a similar partner in South Africa. 
This partner has good relations with SABC and further with other big radio stations in 
Southern Africa. Consequently, the primary answer to the research problem would be 
that formal and informal constraints affect entry strategies of Finnish companies and 
force them to seek local partnerships and to look for outside help to reinforce their 
integration into the SSA region.  
6.2 Strategic responses to institutional pressures 
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The ways in which firms balance between host environment pressures and company 
preferences yields various strategic responses varying from full adaptation of 
operations to host environment pressures to full compliance to organizational 
practices manifesting in standardization of business operations in all target markers 
(Karhunen, 2006). As discussed in the section Theory of literature, the five response 
strategies defined by Oliver (1991) are; acquiescence, compromise, avoid, defy and 
manipulate. The responses of the case companies fall mainly into the compromise or 
the avoid strategy. However, Nokia is an example of a company showing that a 
manipulation strategy is possible also in SSA, particularly for multinational 
companies. A pure acquiescence strategy could not be applied by Finnish ICT 
companies, since the ICT sector is a fast-developing industry in SSA which means 
that the nature of the industry is not stable like in some traditional industries. The 
acquiescence strategy is not possible, also because informal norms and myths are 
vague for Finnish ICT companies. In other words, because firms were not fully aware, 
fact that became obvious during the interviews, of all the different factors or 
constituents of local institutional environments in SSA, Finnish ICT firms are not able 
to fully acquiesce. Perhaps partly for the same reason, the possibilities to defy are 
limited, too. At first, Finnish ICT companies’ relations to corruption resemble defying 
since the majority of the interviewees strongly expressed that they oppose corruption. 
However, this tactic is actually a sign of clear avoidance. Using avoidance tactics is 
also attached to the issue of choosing local distributors and partners. By choosing a 
local partner and distributor, a firm is able to avoid some of the pressures arising from 
the local institutional environment. Corruption is a good example; by relying on a 
local partner, a company is able to avoid corruption, as Tramigo’s case shows. Having 
a local partner or distributor allows a foreign entrant to better comply with 
organizational practices. 
 
A local partner allows foreign companies to follow their own practices more, but to 
some extent the local environment does, however, force companies to adjust their 
practices to match the pressures of the local institutional framework. Omnitele for 
instance needs to invest more time in completing their projects since it takes longer to 
finish them in Angola than in more advanced markets. SANAKO is also trying to 
change its image to be less occidental by localizing their marketing to suit South 
African markets. Although some of the tactics of Nokia fall into category of 
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manipulation, some of its actions relating to local environment resemble defying. For 
example operating under corrupt environments is a challenge for Nokia, but Thierry 
Delarue explained that they oppose corruption anyway. They are still able to perform 
in corrupt countries such as in Nigeria and Kenya. As a result, it takes longer for 
instance to open a new office. Defying pressures to pay bribes to facilitate entry 
thereby will not necessarily slam any doors, but only slow down the process. This was 
noted by the majority of the interviewees who all agreed that it is possible to operate 
in the ICT industry in SSA without getting involved in corruption.  
 
It sounds reasonable that lobbying active influencing to local environment is all about 
personal relations, as stated by Cyrr Group consultants. This indicates that even 
smaller firms, not only big transnational companies, have the possibility to influence 
the local institutional environment of SSA. Influencing can be even easier than in 
environments where personal networks do not play a significant role in a society. Cyrr 
Group consultants also stated that using personal contacts often becomes a much more 
effective way of influencing the local institutional framework than bribing, since 
personal relations can become more valuable over time. Based on empirical data, one 
cannot make assumptions or conclusions about the superiority of one response 
strategy over others or about how different response strategies affect the outcome of 
the market entry. Nonetheless, it seems that a proactive approach to the local 
environment in SSA, which all of the companies interviewed have applied in their 
behavior, gives companies the possibility to improve their positions in the markets in 
accordance with a local institutional framework. In addition, it is evident that 
increased knowledge of local target markets and the ability to profoundly understand 
different market characteristics in SSA gives foreign entrants more chances to choose 
their response approach. For example Nokia that understands SSA markets quite well 
is able to find ways to actively influence local environment. In this case, they 
published a research stating that their products support economic development which 
on the top priority list of all governments in SSA. In addition, it is important to note 
that foreign companies are able to use different kinds of response strategies to 
different kind of strategies to different institutional pressures. To conclude, in order to 
be successful in the SSA markets, a foreign company is able to sense under which 
pressures it is suitable to adapt to local conditions and when it is more suitable to 
comply with the company’s own organizational practices. 
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6.3 Legitimacy of companies in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
The relation between legitimacy and entry strategies was analyzed in the section The 
theory of literature. It was noted that lack of legitimacy may act as a barrier to entry 
(Rodriguez et al.) Yiu and Makino state that legitimacy is affected by both external 
and internal factors when market entry is planned. In the theory of legitimacy it has 
been acknowledged that legitimacy is a complex phenomenon which relates to the 
assumption that legitimacy is composed of three different types of domains; 
regulative, normative and cultural (Scott). However, this study does not go very 
deeply into legitimacy which has been analyzed and dealt with in this study mainly as 
a unitary concept which helps to comprehend it.  
 
There is no doubt that the experiences of the case companies support the views of the 
theory, notably that of Rodriguez et al. who state that the lack of legitimacy may act 
as a barrier to entry. This is true especially for company cases of this study which 
need the local approval since they do not have additional resources to penetrate to 
markets in SSA. The first and most influential factor affecting legitimacy is the 
company’s competitive products and services, which as also have been seen as the 
number one success factor by all case companies. The importance of service and 
product characteristics becomes increasingly remarkable in the ICT industry which is 
all about product competency. Many of the interviewees acknowledged that this is 
also the case in SSA, where for instance poverty does not mean that customers would 
be prepared to buy inferior technology. One also needs to understand that products 
and technology are developing very fast in the ICT industry. Thus it might not be 
clever to position only into one product. One should keep in mind that product 
development is very important. After all, legitimacy is constantly reproduced 
(Kostova and Zaheer, 1999), which means that a product or a service needs to be 
matched with customer expectations over time. When a product loses its value in the 
eyes of a customer, the loss can weaken the foreign company’s legitimacy. A 
competent product helps foreign entrants also to gain references which was seen to 
smooth long term penetration to markets and thereby positively affect legitimacy in 
the target market.   
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There is also a direct link between legitimacy and choosing a local partner or 
distributor. As found earlier in this study, a local partner or distributor is often 
required to overcome formal and informal constraints and to operate effectively in the 
target countries of SSA, which clearly indicates that local acceptability increases 
when a foreign entrant has a local partner. Kai Mattlar emphasized this factor by 
stating that the first question directed at Jutel is often that of who their local partner is. 
Because of the fact that a local partner is often required, it is important that partner 
companies are accepted inside their countries. This becomes especially crucial in joint 
ventures, because in joint ventures the stake of the local partner becomes increasingly 
important.  
 
The findings of the study also indicate that there are many, both internal and external 
ways, to achieve legitimacy. In addition to product factors, resource commitment and 
focusing on markets, there are other internal factors affecting legitimacy. Since 
penetration to SSA often is a very slow process, it was learnt that it often takes a few 
years until a foreign company is starting to achieve sustainable sales figures. 
Therefore there needs to be willingness and determination inside the company to 
make the effort for the markets and understand that instant harvesting after planting is 
not possible. Along determination it might demand additional resources since costs of 
doing business in SSA are often higher than in Europe. Nevertheless, using outside 
consultancy in market entries can be a very cost-effective way. A genuine interest 
towards Africans and African cultures is clearly an internal factor which can be seen 
to positively influence a firm’s legitimacy in the region. Kai Mattlar, who perhaps was 
able to sense the features of local cultures in the firm’s primary markets better than 
any other interviewee, stated that he discovered that Africans like to do business with 
Africans, indicating that Africans feel more comfortable to cooperate with someone 
with similar behavioral patterns in business. Therefore one needs to learn and to be 
aware of local patterns of how to do business. This does not necessarily mean that 
these patterns need to be applied by the foreign company, but at least recognizing and 
understanding local logic will not harm the foreign company’s legitimacy. 
 
Furthermore, understanding African markets and different factors influencing it will 
certainly give better chances to increase the companies’ legitimacy in the area. After 
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all, Kostova and Zaheer state that regulative, normative and cultural cognitive pillars 
of legitimacy differ in their degree of formalization and tacitness. The regulatory 
domain remained the easiest to observe compared to the cultural-cognitive domain. 
Thereby, when a foreign company’s knowledge of SSA market region increases, it 
becomes more aware of the issues relating to normative and cultural cognitive 
domains and can deepen its legitimacy in the area. For example, Kai Mattlar described 
how he has learnt little by little small features of culture in Botswana which he had 
further applied to improve relations with local customers.  
 
Internal and external legitimacy cannot always be separated from each other and need 
to be seen affecting each other. Local presence was seen as important in SSA. The 
companies’ experiences indicate that many of the constraints can be avoided when a 
foreign company is actively present in the SSA country which it aims to penetrate. 
But as learnt, a great majority of the case companies had difficulties finding qualified 
staff for their operations in the region. Lack of staff is a factor obviously affecting 
internal legitimacy, but it is linked to external legitimacy, too. Once firms are 
suffering of lack of qualified workforce they cannot maintain local presence as 
effectively as would be required in order to maintain legitimacy in that target country. 
For example Omnitele had problems finding people to send to Angola, which has a 
direct impact on its ability to manage its operations, whereas Tramigo had to stay out 
of some SSA countries due to the fact that they did not have enough human resources.  
 
Good personal relations were not emphasized by all of the respondents but could be 
seen as crucial factor in external legitimacy. Personal relations do not only help to 
overcome different constraints arising from local institutional environments such as 
corruption, but also helps to create trust. According to Fafchamps, trust is crucial in 
doing business since it decreases uncertainty. Since many of the SSA business 
environments are constantly changing, personal relationships help companies to 
shelter and to achieve legitimacy from external claimants. Personal relations become 
important in terms of legitimacy because when trust grows in longer periods, personal 
relationships may become valuable assets for a foreign company. For example, the 
temptation for a local partner to change its foreign partner decreases and its 
integration to local markets fosters, because as noted by Cyrr Group personal 
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relationships and friendship become more valuable than short-time possible high 
earnings. 
 
The use of Finnish embassies or outside consultants “to open doors” shows how 
important relations are in SSA. If companies are able to build strong local presence 
the use of third party network connections might diminish, because after all embassies 
and outside consultants are used by a foreign entrant because it is lacking contacts. 
Local presence, as noted, can benefit building long-term partnerships which can 
further positively affect local acceptance. Findings of this study also indicate that one 
needs to nurture relationships not only with theend customer, but also with the local 
partner. As Uhlenbruck et al. state, it is natural that the local partner becomes vital 
because it provides access to local networks, but as Cyrr executives stated it is 
important that the foreign company meets the end customers too and does not count 
on that local partner to nurture that relation totally on the behalf of the foreign 
company. SANAKO’s experience indicates, nonetheless, that even though a local 
partner exists it does not mean that business starts to bloom instantly, but rather shows 
that first step in integration to see effort creating sustainable business relationships.  
 
There is no doubt that charity activities can have a positive influence on external 
legitimacy. Nokia, whose legitimacy is stronger in SSA than that of its competitors, 
aims to be an active member in those societies. Most of the large African companies 
are active in charity work, which is almost a necessity for big companies, because 
distributing wealth is one characteristic of many African cultures. It seemed that none 
of the case companies were active in charity work, but it could be clearly their way to 
increase their legitimacy in their target countries. Finland as a state provides only a 
fraction of the development aid to SSA of other Scandinavian countries, which means 
that Finnish firms cannot falsely assume that because Finland assists some of the SSA 
countries, companies as tax payers have no need to be active in corporate 
responsibility programs. In many SSA countries, it is a primary concern and in their 
best interest to develop their societies, thereby contributing to that target increases 
companies’ external legitimacy. It may have an effect on internal legitimacy too, since 
staff of the companies could demand an active and responsible approach in the matter. 
It was revealed that Nokia is actively involved in charity in a number of SSA 
countries, but is not good at making it public, which actually might be a problem. 
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Although active advertising of being socially responsible is a rather sleazy approach, a 
company should be prepared to inform its different stakeholders of its corporate 
responsibility. For instance, what a small company could do is publish a simple 
booklet to be given to local customers and partners disclosing how much money the 
company uses on charity and on which kind of projects. After all, if the company does 
not reveal how it contributes to societies, stakeholders might assume that it does not 
contribute at all.  
 
Below, the empirical findings are presented in form of a table since all the findings 
could not be attached to the figure of theoretical framework. Nevertheless, empirical 
findings are divided in the table similarly to how they would in the theoretical 
framework. 
 
 
 
Empirical findings 
Firm  Country Institutional constraints Strategic responses Legitimacy 
Omnitele Angola 
Poor infrastructure, High costs,  
Different time concept, change in  
business environment, fragile state  
environment, Poor financial 
infrastructure Compromise, Defy 
References, Official 
backing/Protocol, Local 
presence, Staff, Competent 
service 
Jutel Botswana 
Bureaucracy, Legal system, HIV/AIDS, 
Culture, Networks Compromise 
References, Personal relations 
and trust, local partner, Local 
presence, Competent product 
SANAKO 
South 
Africa 
Poor infrastructure, HIV/AIDS, 
Different market structure, 
Bureaucracy, Corruption Compromise, Defy 
References, Official backing, 
Personal relations, Official 
backing/Protocol, Local 
partner 
Tramigo Nigeria 
Poor infrastructure, Fragile state  
environment, High costs, Corruption,  
Poor financial infrastructure and 
credibility Compromise, Defy 
Multiple local partners, local 
presence, Competent product 
Cyrr 
Group 
sub-
Saharan  
Africa 
Geographical distances, Poor financial
infrastructure, Competition, Networks, 
Legal constraints, Corruption All are possible 
Personal relations and trust, 
local partner, local presence, 
Social responsibility, 
competent product 
Nokia 
sub-
Saharan  
Africa 
Different market structure, Poverty,  
Corruption, Poor financial system,  
Parallel exporting, Legal constraints Manipulation, Defy 
Local presence, Social 
responsibility, local 
distributors/partners, 
competent product 
Table 5 Empirical findings 
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7 Conclusions 
 
7.1 Summary 
 
The initial challenge of this study was how to tackle the existing variety of 
institutional environments in Sub-Saharan Africa and to how to obtain information 
that could be extended to the whole region. Using the case method approach, 
additional company sources and secondary information, answers to the research 
problem were obtained. It seems that the institutional framework in SSA influences 
the entry strategies of Finnish ICT companies. The institutional environment forces 
them to favor indirect entry modes and outside consultancy to ease penetration to SSA 
markets. Although Omnitele and Jutel were able to enter directly to their primary 
target markets in SSA, they were both using outside consultancy or partners in other 
SSA countries. This indicates that the formal and informal constraints in SSA are so 
strong or different compared to Finnish circumstances that Finnish ICT companies do 
not have much of a choice regarding their entry modes. Indeed, Finnish ICT 
companies either approve to enter indirectly or their entry to SSA markets can be 
slowed down or even hindered. However, penetrating indirectly is not necessarily bad. 
For the foreign company, it is often the easiest and most profitable way to enter SSA 
markets. It allows companies to concentrate on their key competences and to provide 
their customers with the best service and product without having to use excessive 
resources. In addition, it allows companies to overcome different institutional 
constraints which would slow down their business since their knowledge of SSA 
markets is not sufficient.  
 
This study was able to identify different formal and informal constraints which are 
relatively similar between different countries of SSA. The institutional constraints 
were based on interviews and match findings in books and scientific articles focusing 
on African business environments. The main finding, however, is that different 
institutional constraints influence companies’ entry strategies differently, which is 
dealt with more closely in the next section. The results indicate that since most of the 
companies interviewed were not fully aware of all the factors or institutional pressures 
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affecting them, full compliance with the SSA institutional environment is not 
possible. Therefore, companies were compromising their company procedures and 
policies to match these pressures. Most companies also defy some institutional 
pressures, such as corruption, which ultimately forces them to choose local partners or 
distributors. For example, since Tramigo and Nokia use local partners and distributors 
who take care of imports, they do not need to get involved in bribing custom officials. 
It can be also understood that a local partner is there for responding to some pressures 
to which foreign companies are not able to respond themselves. There are also 
differences between companies concerning their responses to the institutional 
environment. Huge corporations such as Nokia can even use manipulative response 
tactics which are not possible for smaller companies due to smaller size and lesser 
resources. The significance of a local partner in SSA is strong since it also eases to 
overcome some of the institutional constraints.  
 
Findings of this study also indicate that legitimacy has a great impact on market entry 
strategies. Legitimacy eases and in some cases enables penetration to SSA markets. 
The theoretical framework of this study emphasizesf well how both external and 
internal legitimacy positively influence the outcome of the market entry to SSA 
markets, since lack of legitimacy could be an obstacle to market entry. The biggest 
threat for internal legitimacy for Finnish ICT companies was the lack of competent 
staff. All of the companies interviewed had difficulties finding the right persons for 
their African operations, which of course prevents them from assessing the potential 
in SSA markets. For example in the case of Jutel and Tramigo, Kai Mattlar and Arto 
Tiitinen were solely responsible of their African operations. A key factor for internal 
legitimacy for Finnish ICT companies was their product or service. In most of the 
cases, a product or a service, as explained earlier in this study, are ideal for SSA 
markets. A competent product increases legitimacy of one entrant compared to others. 
It helps to overcome institutional constraints such as corruption or networks because 
companies with a superior product or service do not have to open markets using 
corruption since the competitive product does it for them. 
 
 
Local presence is a significant factor for external legitimacy since local institutional 
environments in SSA demand constant local presence. Local presence is a part of a 
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company’s image in SSA, because if a foreign company is not locally well presented 
in SSA, it might indicate that the foreign company is not mature enough to have the 
right to stay in those markets. For instance, particularly Nokia’s success in SSA is 
based on local presence. Having access to local networks and having good personal 
relations can also be seen as a primary factor for success in the SSA. Lack of personal 
relations is a clear barrier for entry in SSA and since most of the case companies did 
not have contacts in SSA they were relying on outside consultancy with access to 
local networks, which together with good references helped them to obtain external 
legitimacy. 
 
7.2 Theoretical contribution 
 
In this study, some of the earlier findings concerning the way institutions and 
institutional frameworks influence firms’ entry strategies seemed to be applicable also 
in this study. Many of the earlier findings were yielded in researches done in Eastern 
Europe or Asia, but it seems that unstable institutions and institutional frameworks 
have similar kinds of affects on entry strategies of foreign companies in SSA as well. 
Consequently, the first theoretical finding in this study is that some of the main 
assumptions of how institutions influence foreign companies apply to SSA, too. Many 
of the earlier studies do not go into much detail regarding how institutions actually 
affect foreign companies’ entry strategies. Meyer (2001), Clemens and Douglas 
(2004), and Oliver (1991) all concluded similarly that the stronger the institutions’ 
complexity or the stronger the institutional pressures, the higher is the likelihood for 
firms to use indirect operational modes. None of these authors, however, go into detail 
or carefully describe the factors behind the institutional complexity or institutional 
pressures. In addition, authors such as Uhlenbruck et al., who found that a high level 
of corruption drives foreign companies to prefer indirect entry modes and choose a 
local partner, do not, nonetheless, take other factors into consideration. This can also 
be seen as other institutional constraints that also have an effect on firms’ entry 
strategies. After all, factors or institutional constraints such as corruption, networks or 
legislation cannot be seen affecting separately, but as factors which together influence 
the final outcome or decision of the entry mode of a foreign company.  
 
106 
According to Whetten (1989), theoretical contribution does not occur if an old model 
is applied to a new setting. Therefore, although most of the assumptions and findings 
of institutional theorists also apply to SSA and support the findings of this study, it is 
not theoretical contribution. The actual theoretical contribution of this study is related 
to the findings relating to institutional constraints of SSA. By assessing more closely 
different institutional constraints of institutional framework of SSA allowed to 
achieve contribution to theory. This study shows that different institutional constraints 
influence, at least in two ways, firms’ market entry strategies. Some factors directly 
influence the entry-mode choice, whereas others influence them indirectly by creating 
an institutional framework which foreign firms need to conform to if they want to 
perform in these markets. This finding also supports Peng’s view presented in the 
theoretical framework of this study. In other words, firms can seek legitimacy and 
economic efficiency at the same time. For example, a foreign partner or a good 
personal relationships lowers uncertainty and therefore transaction costs, but also 
helps to gain external legitimacy since good personal relationships and access to the 
network is also required to achieve legitimacy in those markets. In addition, utilizing 
local networks is also a factor increasing a firm’s economic efficiency in SSA, which 
as a research finding justifies the view that economic efficiency and legitimacy do not 
necessarily exclude each other. 
 
7.3 Managerial implications 
 
While conducting this study, it became evident that most of the managers are not 
totally aware of the different institutional constraints or pressures affecting them in 
SSA. This study provides detailed information on different institutional constraints in 
SSA, particularly in Angola, Botswana, South Africa and Nigeria, providing 
managers valuable information concerning the kind of institutional forces that prevails 
in those environments. This is particularly important since informal constraints can in 
many cases be stronger than the formal ones. In terms of market entry strategies – the 
more managers are aware of different constraints of the institutional framework – the 
better they are able to plan their market entries according to these constraints.  
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As regards the importance of personal relations in network economies such as in Sub-
Saharan African ones, it was found in this study that lack of personal contacts was 
significantly slowing down integration to these regions. Since personal relations are 
everything in business for Africans and highly valued by them, they should be 
assessed as vital by foreign managers, too. Fafchamps stated that by nurturing 
relationships in Africa, a foreign firm is able to access local networks, providing it 
wants and sees them as important. The significance of personal relations will remain 
in Africa at least for the next thirty years, which means that if a foreign company 
desires external legitimacy, it needs to accept that it needs to invest in relations. Local 
presence plays a key role in this. To ease the building of local networks, awareness of 
local cultures and habits is important. None of the case company managers 
interviewed, excluding Kai Mattlar, were able to identify tendencies and features in 
African cultures. This of course demands genuine interests in African cultures and 
people. Some managers complained that Africans want to do business primarily with 
other Africans; thereby it does not harm foreign managers to try to learn more about 
the African way of doing things instead of trying to cooperate with them as they do 
with managers in the West, which could be partly unfamiliar for Africans. 
 
Since local partners are extremely important in SSA, they can significantly slow down 
or accelerate integration to these markets. It is important that foreign managers invest 
enough time and consideration in tracking down the best possible partner. As we 
noted, most of the case companies used outside consultancy for finding a local 
partner. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that outside consultancy, an official 
protocol or a local partner cannot do everything for a foreign entrant. Active 
participation and local presence is needed from the entrant company side or 
integration to these markets slows down significantly as happened to SANAKO. 
 
Managers should also put more emphasis on corporate responsibility. The business in 
SSA is often extremely profitable for foreign companies, but Finnish managers still do 
not consider corporate responsibility important. Nokia was probably the only 
company interviewed in this study taking an active role in corporate governance. 
However, Thierry Delarue noted that although Nokia does more than other 
companies, it is not good at reporting this. Although it is sleazy to use corporate 
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responsibility as a marketing weapon, managers still need to be able to communicate 
that they perform in a responsible manner to the community.  
 
7.4 Limitations to the study 
 
The main limitations in this study are related to choice of methodology. As noted in 
the methodology part of this study, case studies have been criticized of being 
subjective and difficult to replicate. This matter was tackled by adopting as objective 
an approach as possible to case companies and by maintaining an independent 
research approach by understanding that the choice of methodology could yield 
subjective results. Although interview formulae were documented, it could be difficult 
to replicate cases since another researcher does not necessarily possess enough 
background data to successfully conduct in-depth interviews.  In addition, each of the 
in-depth interviews can be seen as unique and therefore once replicated could yield 
slightly different answers. However, the answers yielded from in-depth interviews 
were often quite general, which could ease the possible replication of cases. 
 
Another limitation relates to the geographical scope of this study which is sub-
Saharan Africa. Since the SSA region covers so many different countries, this study 
was restricted to only selected examples of SSA region which were taken into 
account. Besides, most SSA countries are still unknown target countries for Finnish 
ICT companies, whose integration to the region is still at its initial phase. 
Nevertheless, each of the selected country examples was quite different from each 
other for instance in terms of easiness of doing business.  
 
The number of cases can also be seen as a limitation of this study. There was only one 
case company representing one example country of SSA and thereby relying only on 
one company could provide too subjective answers concerning the institutional 
framework of one specific example country. This limiting factor was, however, 
reduced by using other sources of information to analyze the market environment of 
each example country. There is also a limitation in the depth of this study since only 
executives of Finnish companies were interviewed, and the basic indicators to assess 
business environment in selected countries are all developed in Western countries and 
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according to their measurements of African business environments. No local African 
executives of example countries were interviewed to gain information of institutional 
constraints from the local perspective. This was a conscious decision since there were 
financial restrictions which prohibited collecting primary data from example 
countries. 
 
This could have influenced the results of this study since it can be expected that local 
African executives would be aware of some institutional constraints and their 
implications to foreign companies better than foreign, in this case Finnish, executives. 
On the other hand, Finnish executives were better able to answer questions concerning 
formal or informal constraints since local executives could not necessarily see them 
affecting foreign entrant companies, or affecting them differently Another major 
limitation is the ongoing global economic or financial crisis, which has not been taken 
into account in this study. The financial crisis surely has different kinds of impacts on 
Sub-Saharan Africa and its institutional environment. Exclusion of the financial crisis 
could be justified since its implications for SSA are still uncertain. At this time, the 
whole crisis is going on and its very nature is not certain. In consequence, it could be 
dangerous to assess its effects on the SSA institutional environment.  
 
7.5 Suggestions for further research 
 
One of the main findings of this study is the significance of a local partner or 
middleman.  Thereby one could go more into detail and study how for instance the 
choice of a local partner influences the outcome of the market entry or success of 
foreign entrant companies when they are about to penetrate SSA. Since the role of the 
local partner is so vital in SSA, studying local partners and their performance could 
yield significant information on how companies compete and survive in environments 
drastically different from Western market environments and “rules of the game”. 
Local partners and middlemen in SSA are certainly better adjusted to the institutional 
framework than foreign entrants are, as was found also in the research, but one could 
also study how African companies perceive institutional environments in Western 
countries and how they change their organizational practices or what kind of 
implications to their market entry strategies overall different institutional framework 
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could result for them. Could African firms and their market entry strategies be less 
affected by the institutional framework in Western countries and what kind of 
institutional constraints would they be facing there?  
 
This study yielded some other further interests towards the institutional environment 
of SSA and SSA as a whole. Since SSA is a vast region, one way to receive more 
detailed information of the institutional environment of that area is of course to 
concentrate just on one country and one industry and not necessarily the ICT sector. If 
one thinks further about research in a more theoretical sense, one could study more 
closely different institutional constraints and their affects on market entry strategies. 
This study found that different institutional constraints influence the choice of market 
entry mode differently. One could study more closely the institutional environment of 
one SSA country and identify which institutional constraints have a direct influence 
on the choice of market entry, and which have an indirect effect. And perhaps one 
could study other possible ways in which different institutional constraints could 
affect foreign companies’ behavior. 
 
One last suggestion for further research concerns the legitimacy of foreign companies. 
In this study, it was found that gaining both internal and external legitimacy in SSA is 
both needed and important, but can create economic efficiency by lowering 
transaction costs. One suggestion for further research regards the way companies 
maintain legitimacy in SSA when some of the fundamental elements of institutional 
environment change. For example, when making this study, there were severe 
political changes in some countries of SSA. For example, the President of Guinea-
Bissau, Joao Bernardo Vieira, was shot dead by renegade soldiers and the 
democratically elected President of Madagascar, Marc Ravalomanana, was displaced 
in a coup d’état. Therefore, one could research legitimacy from the point of view of 
how the legitimacy is affected in case of disorder, coups and bloodshed. Do foreign 
companies lose their legitimacy, which could pose a barrier to entry as Kostova and 
Zaheer state? And more in general, what kind, and to what extent drastic, often violent 
changes in SSA institutional environments impact on legitimacy of foreign 
companies? Consequently, the SSA context provides many opportunities for scientific 
research. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Paying Taxes (2008) Source: 
:http://doingbusiness.org/Exploretopics/payingtaxes/?direction=Asc&sort=7 
 
Region Payments (number) 
Time 
(hours) 
Profit tax 
(%) 
Labor tax and 
contributions 
(%) 
Other 
taxes (%) 
Total tax 
rate (% 
profit) 
East Asia & 
Pacific 24,90 251,6 20 11,10 7,60 38,7
Eastern 
Europe & 
Central Asia 47,2 366,8 11,80 26,10 10,20 48,1
Latin America 
& Caribbean 34,8 393,5 20,40 14,60 13,60 48,1
Middle 
East&North 
Africa 22,8 216,3 12,9 16,30 4,10 33,3
OECD 13,4 210,5 17,5 24,40 3,40 45,3
South Asia 31,5 293,3 18,1 7,50 14,70 40,4
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 37,8 311,7 21,5 13,20 32,00 66,7
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Real GDP per Capita growth in SSA  Source: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2008/AFR/eng/sreo1008.pdf 
Real GDP per capita growth 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
      
Oil exporting countries      
Angola 3,30  11,20  20,60  18,60  21,10  
Cameroon 1,2 0,90 -0,7 0,7 1,2
Chad 5,8 4,8 30,4 5,9 -1,2
Equatorial Guinea 9,3 30,1 3,5 -1,9 4,1
Gabon -0,1 -1,4 0,5 -1,5 2,1
Nigeria 7,7 3,2 4,6 2,7 5,5
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Middle-income countries 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Botswana 6,1 6,1 6,6 4,8 5,2
Cape Verde 2,8 2,5 3,8 3,8 4,6
Lesotho 0,8 1,9 1,8 3,7 3,2
Mauritius 2,7 3,7 2,2 2,9 3,3
Namibia 2,1 5,3 3 3,8 3,9
Seychelles -7,7 -3,7 1,1 2,6 4,9
South Africa 2,1 3,8 4,1 3,9 3,7
Swaziland 0,5 -0,1 0,4 0,3 -0,3
      
      
Low-income countries 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Benin 2 0,1 0 1,1 1,4
Burkina Faso 4,6 1,4 4,6 4 4,1
Ethiopia -6,1 10,1 7,3 7,6 3,6
Ghana 2,6 3 3,2 3,6 3,7
Kenya 0,7 2,4 3,8 4,1 4,4
Madagascar 6,7 2,3 1,7 1,9 2,7
Malawi 1,6 2,8 0,1 6,4 3,6
Mali 4,8 0,1 3,7 2,2 3,3
Mozambique 5,9 5,6 5,3 6,1 4,4
Niger 1,3 -3,6 3,6 0,3 1
Rwanda -1,9 1,2 0,7 2,4 2,8
Senegal 4,1 3,1 3 0,8 3,1
Tanzania 3,6 4,4 4,5 4 5,2
Uganda 0,9 2,1 3 1,8 2,5
Zambia 2,7 2,9 2,7 3,5 3,5
 
 
      
Fragile countries 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Burundi -4 2,8 -1,1 3,1 3,4
Central African rep -9,4 -0,7 0,2 1,5 2
Comoros 0,4 -2,30 2,1 -0,8 0,9
DRC 2,8 3,5 3,3 2 3,4
Côte d'ivoire -3,2 0 -0,3 -0,1 0,2
Eritrea 1,3 0,5 2,3 -0,4 -1,1
Gambia 3,9 4,1 2,3 3,7 4,2
Guinea -2,3 0,1 0,2 -0,2 -0,5
Guinea Bissau -3,6 -0,8 0,2 -0,2 -0,5
Liberia -34,3 -5,7 8,1 7,1 10,7
Sâo Tome and principe 1,9 2 3,9 5,9 4,9
Sierra Leone 6,7 4,6 4,5 4,7 3,8
Togo 2,4 -0,3 -1,4 -0,8 0,2
Zimbabwe -11,3 -3,6 -5,3 -4,8 -5,7
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Mo Ibrahim Governance Index (2008) Ease of doing business (2008)   
Source:http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/index2008  
Source:http://www.doingbusiness.org/EconomyRankings/ 
MO IBRAHIM GOVERNANCE INDEX  Ease of doing business/ World Bank 
Mauritius 1  Mauritius 24
Seychelles 2  South Africa 32
Cape Verde 3  Botswana 38
Botswana 4  Namibia 51
South Africa 5  Kenya 82
Namibia 6  Ghana 87
Ghana 7  Zambia 100
Gabon 8  Seychelles 104
São Tomé e Príncipe 9  Swaziland 108
Senegal 10  Uganda 111
Malawi 11  Ethiopia 116
Lesotho 12  Nigeria 118
Benin 13  Lesotho 123
Comoros 14  Tanzania 127
Tanzania 15  Gambia 130
Madagascar 16  Malawi 134
Kenya 17  Rwanda 139
Rwanda 18  Mozambique 141
Uganda 19  Cape Verde 143
Burkina Faso 20  Madagascar 144
Zambia 21  Sudan 147
Mozambique 22  Burkina Faso 148
Mali 23  Senegal 149
Niger 24  Gabon 151
Cameroon 25  Djibouti 153
Djibouti 26  Comoros 155
Gambia 27  Sierra Leone 156
Congo Brazzaville 28  Liberia 157
Togo 29  Zimbabwe 158
Guinea-Bissau 30  Mauritania 160
Ethiopia 31  Côte d'Ivoire 161
Mauritania 32  Togo 163
Zimbabwe 33  Cameroon 164
Swaziland 34  Mali 166
Burundi 35  Equatorial Guinea 167
Equatorial Guinea 36  Angola 168
Sierra Leone 37  Benin 169
Liberia 38  Guinea Conakry 171
Nigeria 39  Niger 172
Guinea Conakry 40  Eritrea 173
Eritrea 41  Chad 175
Côte d'Ivoire 42  São Tomé e Príncipe 176
CAR 43  Burundi 177
Angola 44  Rep.Congo 178
Sudan 45  Guinea-Bissau 179
Chad 46  CAR 180
DRC 47  DRC 181
Somalia 48    
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Corruption Perception Index SSA(2008). Source: Transparency International, 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi 
Country Country Rank Regional Country rank CPI Score 
Botswana 36 1 5,8
Mauritius 41 2 5,5
Cape Verde 47 3 5,1
South Africa 54 4 4,9
Seychelles 55 5 4,8
Namibia 61 6 4,5
Ghana 67 7 3,9
Swaziland 72 8 3,6
Burkina Faso 80 9 3,5
Madagascar 85 10 3,4
Senegal 85 10 3,4
Lesotho 92 12 3,2
Mali 96 13 3,1
Gabon 96 13 3,1
Benin 96 13 3,1
Tanzania 102 16 3,0
Rwanda 102 16 3,0
Zmbia 115 18 2,8
Malawi 115 18 2,8
Niger 115 18 2,8
Mauritania 115 18 2,8
Sao Tome and Principe 121 22 2,7
Nigeria 121 22 2,7
Togo 121 22 2,7
Eritrea 126 25 2,6
Ethiopia 126 25 2,6
Mozambique 126 25 2,6
Uganda 126 25 2,6
Comoros 134 29 2,5
Liberia 138 30 2,4
Cameroon 141 31 2,3
Kenya 147 32 2,1
 Côte d´Ivoire 151 33 2,0
Central African Republik 151 33 2,0
Gambia 158 35 1,9
Guinea-Bissau 158 35 1,9
Congo, Republic 158 35 1,9
Angola 158 35 1,9
Burundi 158 35 1,9
Sierra Leone 158 35 1,9
Zimbabwe 166 41 1,8
DRC 171 42 1,7
Equatorial Guinea 171 42 1,7
Chad 173 44 1,6
Sudan 173 44 1,6
Guinea 173 44 1,6
Somalia 180 47 1,0
122 
World Bank Doing Buiness Index, Example Countries (2009)  Source:   
http://www.doingbusiness.org/EconomyRankings/ 
World Bank Doing Business Index 
         
Economy Ease of Doing Business Rank Starting a Business 
Dealing with 
Construction Permits 
 
South Africa 32 47 48  
Botswana 38 80 119  
Nigeria 118 91 151  
Angola 168 156 125  
     
Economy Employing Workers Registering Property Getting Credit Protecting Investors 
South Africa 102 87 2 9 
Botswana 73 29 43 38 
Nigeria 27 176 84 53 
Angola 174 173 84 53 
         
Economy Paying Taxes Trading Across Borders Enforcing Contracts Closing a Business 
South Africa 23 147 82 73 
Botswana 17 149 92 26 
Nigeria 120 144 90 91 
Angola 130 172 179 142 
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 Example of interview formula 
Haastattelu toinen osa. 
  
Tramigo Nigeriassa 
  
-Miten ja miksi päädyitte etabloitumaan Nigeriaan? 
-Millaisena näette Nigerian näkymät markkinoilla? Luuletko että talous vielä kiihtyy kun öljyntuotanto palaa taas kehiin? 
-Millaisia käsityksiä/taustatietoa teillä oli Nigeriasta ennen kuin aloititte tunnustelut? 
-Millaiseen toimintamuodon valitsitte? Oliko teillä paikallinen tai Suomalainen välikäsi vai asioitteko Suoraan asiakas yrityksen 
kanssa?  
- Onko teillä yksi vai useampi asiakas jakelija, hallitsetteko jakelukanavan täysin 
-Nigeria  oli Doing business rankauksessa sijalla.118 Kuinka vaikeaa Nigeriassa on tehdä businesta? Kertooko tuo rankkaus 
mielestänne totuuden Nigerian markkinaympäristön kompleksisuudesta? 
-Millaisia haasteita ja ongelmia koitte Nigeriaan  menon yhteydessä? Mitkä ovat olleet suurimpia yllätyksiä? 
-Jouduitteko markkinoille tulon aikana olemaan yhteyksissä viranomaisiin? 
-Koitteko ympäristön painostavana vai mahdollistavana? Törmäsittekö joihinkin tekijöihin esim. epävarmuuden tunteeseen, joka olisi 
muuttanut käyttämistänne verrattuna suunniteltuun strategiaan? 
- Onko olemassa mitään muita tekijöitä kohdemaan liiketoimintaympäristössä Mitkä yritysten on hyvä muistaa Nigeriaan 
saavuttaakseen onnistuneen markkinoille tulon? 
-Onko ICT-alan osittainen liberalisointi vaikuttanut toimintaanne millätavoin? 
- Kuinka paljon teidän täytyi sopeuttaa teidän palvelua vastaamaan paikallisia oloja? 
-Onko ollut vaikeata ymmärtää Nigerian markkina ja asiakastarpeita? 
- Saattoiko tämä sopeutuminen olla ristiriidassa aikaisempien linjauksienne kanssa ? 
-Miten hallitsitte riskit kyseisessä maassa? Koitteko epävakaan (fragile) yhteiskuntarakenteen riskinä? 
-Vaikuttiko ympäristön kompleksisuus lainkaan siihen minkä toimintatavan valitsitte maassa? 
-Koetteko lainsäädännön rajoittavan yrityksenne toimintaa maassa ? Miten reagoitte siihen? 
-Millä tavalla paikallinen kulttuuri vaikutti toimintaanne maassa? Koetteko jotain piirteitä kulttuurissa jolla oli suoraa vaikutusta  
projektiinne? Esim. rajoittavaa tai mahdollistavaa vaikutusta. 
-Miten hoidatte/hoiditte suhteita paikalliseen asiakkaaseen? Miten luottamus rakennetaan Nigeria? 
-Nigeria  on eräs Afrikan pahiten korruptoituneita maita, oletteko törmänneet korruptioon maassa?  
-Kuinka vaikeaa maassa on toimia ilman sotkeutumista korruptioon? Luuletteko että kilpailijat tai muut ulkomaiset yritykset saattavat 
turvautua korruptioon Nigeriassa  asioiden vauhdittamisessa? 
-Miten pyritte hallitsemaan riskit ja epävarmuuteen liittyvät tekijät? Myönnettiinkö teille vientitakuita? 
-Onko olemassa mitään tekijöitä kohdemaan liiketoimintaympäristössä mitkä yritysten on hyvä muistaa Nigeriaan saavuttakseen  
onnistuneen markkinoille tulon 
-Miten Nigeria on kokemuksissaan eronnut muista SSA maista ja miten millä tavalla haasteet siellä on ovat samanlaisia kuin muilla  
markkina-alueilla? 
-Millaista kokemusta olette Nigeriasta saanet ja miten se on auttanut toiminnassanne muissa Afrikan maissa? Mitä koitte oppineenne 
siellä? 
 
